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ABSTRACT
Reinvigorating Maneuver Warfare: An Organizational Learning Analysis of a Failed Strategic
Initiative.
by
BP McCoy
March 2020
Chair: Richard Baskerville
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business
The world is a dynamic and turbulent place. Organizations of all types regularly face the
dual challenge of learning from the emerging realities of their environment and using that
knowledge to accurately adapt to remain competitive. Often, the changes required to remain
competitive demand a significant and irretrievable strategic investment of resources and changes
in the status quo of how the organization will function going forward. Such strategic changes are
often communicated in the form of mission or vision statements, campaign plans, or
philosophies.
Considering the resources committed and the opportunity costs involved, strategic initiatives
must be implemented with care and precision to succeed, as a failed implementation could pose
an existential threat to the organization. This case study examines one organization's attempt and
failure to sufficiently implement a strategic initiative. This study may be tailored and applied to
any organization seeking the adaptive change necessary to succeed in the dynamic and contested
environments of business or conflict. The study format is a cross-sectional single case study
informed by the Theory of Action. The results of this study revealed five explanatory frames
which serve to describe and explain the dynamics of the organization, and they illuminate the

xv

influence Model I single-loop and Model II double-loop organizational learning systems have on
the implementation of a strategic initiative. Captured within the explanatory frames was the
discovery of a surprising anomaly, namely the presence of a sub rosa clan. The sub rosa clan’s
Model I behavioral control produced a bête noires1 effect that countered the senior
management’s Model II learning efforts, sustained the status quo, and sunk the strategic
initiative. This study contributes to the organizational learning, maneuver warfare, and control
theory literature streams and offers managers potential corrective interventions that may be
applied proactively and preemptively to enable the successful implementation of a strategic
initiative.
Keywords: Organizational Learning, Theory of Action, Single-loop learning, Double-loop
learning, Clans, Maneuver Warfare, Mission Command.
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French; the literal translation is “black beast.” A bête noires is avoided by others. It may be a thing that is

particularly dreadful.
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I

INTRODUCTION

In 1989 the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) General Alfred M. Gray led the
seminal effort to publish FMFM-1 Warfighting (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a;
USMC, 1989). This act represented a strategic initiative (Shivakumar, 2014) that officially
changed the United States Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy from one of attrition to one of
maneuver (Damian, 2001). The doctrinal change signaled a momentous shift in the Marine
Corps’ theory about war, how it prepares for war, and how it wages war (USMC, 1989). The
shift from an attrition-focused philosophy to one focused on maneuver was strategic, as it
determined the weapons the Marine Corps procured, how it organized its formations, and how it
trained and educated its members (Brown, 2018; Shivakumar, 2014; Terriff, 2006a). Officially
declaring the warfighting doctrine and philosophy for the Marine Corps and, therefore, the ‘law
of the land,’ FMFM-1 Warfighting represented a seismic shift in the status quo throughout the
organization that was not wholly embraced by all (Tucker, 1996). A schism simmered between
the attritionists and the maneuverists (Anonymous, 2011) for nearly three decades.
In 2016, the 37th CMC General Robert B. Neller issued FRAGO-01/20162 as a call to
action for the Marine Corps to ‘reinvigorate Maneuver Warfare (Mw)’ (USMC, 2016a). In turn,
the Marine Corps’ Training and Education Command (TECOM) held a series of three working
group sessions over a two-year period in an effort to understand why the Marine Corps was not
executing its foundational doctrine vigorously and how to reinvigorate the philosophy in practice
(TECOM, 2016, 2017, 2018). One organization participating in the TECOM workshops was the
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Fragmentary Orders extend or expand upon the original or base order. FRAGO-1 expanded on CMC's original

planning guidance.

2
Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG). MCTOG, a formal schoolhouse and the
Ground Combat Center of Excellence gamely responded to the 37th CMC’s call to action by
undertaking a strategic initiative of its own by issuing a long range campaign plan that restored
Mw ‘front and center’ to its curriculum (MCTOG, 2018b). This study examines in situ
MCTOG’s attempt and the subsequent insufficient implementation of their strategic initiative to
answer the research question: Why is it difficult for the Marine Corps to implement Mw despite
30 years of doctrine, training, and education efforts to do so? This study may be broadly adapted
to any organization seeking the adaptive change necessary to succeed in the dynamic and
contested environments of business or conflict as management challenges are not unique to one
organization, rather they are created systemically and baked into organizational management (see
Vaughan, 1996, p. 415), and aid in developing broader principles for implementing strategic
initiatives (see Yin, 2009).
To provide full transparency and reveal to the reader my potential biases as a researcher, I
will outline my personal background and involvement with the problem area. I am a retired
Marine colonel who served during the time of the original implementation of FMFM-1 and the
decades that followed. During my service, I experienced the transition to Mw from the
perspective of the training and education continuum as a student in the first class to receive
formal Mw instruction at Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) in 1991–1992. I also served as a
tactics instructor at AWS and as the operations officer of TECOM, and I was well-versed on the
levels of emphasis placed on Mw in the training and education continuum. From an operational
perspective, I served as a company commander in the Gulf War in 1991, company commander
from 1992 to 1995, and various operational staff positions. As an infantry battalion commander
for two very kinetic tours in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, I gained a deep appreciation for the demands
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that the reality of combat places on doctrine. Throughout all those experiences I encountered
leaders and peers with varying degrees of understanding and commitment to Mw.
Currently, I am a contracted employee at MCTOG and provide curriculum development
and delivery to newly selected ground combat battalion and regimental commanders. I also
participated in the development of the MCTOG campaign plan. Due to my closeness to the
problem area and my relationship to the members of MCTOG, I will break from the traditional
third-person approach of academic writing and adopt a more transparent and authentic firstperson approach for this study (Vita).
My steps to account for and mitigate any biases are addressed in Chapter III: Case
Method, Chapter IV: Case Results, and Chapter V: Discussion, under the limitations section.
While my bias is something I must acknowledge and mitigate, my up-close perspective of the
problem area and the organization I conducted this study within also provided the foundation
stone for discoveries. In the words of Root-Bernstein, sometimes the discoveries choose the
discoverer. “What was found was always there but overlooked by habit, lack of interest or an
untrained eye” (Root-Bernstein, 1989, p. 15, 66). Only when a subject is viewed through the
lenses of various experiences and training, and by questioning what is known about a subject in a
new way, can discoveries be unlocked. Root-Bernstein pointed to the heart of an inductive study
through a quote attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, “the more ways you twist the lion’s tail, the
more you make him roar.” While fully accounting for the bias my background may create, I also
gain the ability as a researcher to dig deep into a stoic, devoted, and sometimes stiff-necked
organization, and ask the hard questions.
Military organizations have particularly strong cultures and even stronger sub-cultures
(Holmes-Eber, 2014b; Johnson, 2018; Kelly, 2008). These cultures are deeply intertwined with
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traditions and artifacts, such as rituals and ceremonies (Builder, 1989; Hawkins, 2015; Johnson,
2018; Piscitelli, 2017) that create a Heideggerian Dasein3 and define the organization’s
fundamental existence. Strong cultures, “while stable and lasting, are also hard to change”
(Schein, 2017, p. 343), and, in a turbulent world, this might be a liability. Often, culture is seen
as the issue holding organizations in the past and hindering change (Builder, 1989; Davidson,
2010; Hanson, 2001; Nielsen, 2014; Whiteley et al., 2013). Advancing organizations with strong
cultures and subcultures forward into new contexts demands an adaptation not of their stable and
lasting cultures, but through the adaptation of their organizational learning systems (Davidson,
2010). However, change must be an adaptation that is particularly coherent with the
organizational being, i.e., its defining traditions and artifacts and values (Friesenborg, 2013;
Schein, 1984). This study, informed by the Theory of Action (ToA) (Argyris & Schön, 1974,
1978, 1996), intends to investigate how organizational learning systems, not simply culture,
impacted a military organization’s efforts to adapt to and address future security challenges
through the implementation of a strategic initiative to reinvigorate a warfighting philosophy.
I.1

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to explain, through an qualitative, interpretive, cross-sectional,
single case study (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009), why there exists a gap between the espoused Mw
theory held by a deeply traditional military organization and the actual theory in practice that is
something short of Mw and perhaps remains attrition warfare. To inform this study, I applied
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that they create a kind of collective—an experience of being that is peculiar to particular military organizations or
branches.
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ToA (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996) against a contemporary situation faced by a military
organization as it attempted to effectuate a warfighting philosophy and meet the challenges
created by an ever evolving operating environment and the changing character of war (USMC,
1997a, 2016c). More specifically, the organization in this study is seeking to adapt to the future
operating environment (FOE) by evolving its training and education curriculum to reinvigorate
the extant, if somewhat dormant, Mw warfighting philosophy (USMC, 1997a). The
reinvigoration of Mw is seen by the Marine Corps as a critical enabler necessary to execute the
Marine Operating Concept (MOC) (USMC, 2016b), a modern concept of operations necessary
to cope with the FOE.
I.2

The Military and Organizational Learning

Military organizations are some of the largest organizations in the world. According to the
National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2020 published by the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), the United States maintains approximately 1.3 million active duty
personnel. Counting select National Guard, Reserves, and Department of Defense civilians, the
end strength is over 2.2 million personnel, not including contractors (USD DOD, 2019, p. 260).
The estimated US defense budget for FY2020 is $718.3 billion (USD DOD, 2019, p. 1). These
immense organizations share common management problems with other kinds of organizations
(Augier et al., 2014) including leadership (Hawkins, 2015; Maltz, 1997), culture (Higbee, 2010;
Tinoco & Arnaud, 2013), performance (Haeckel & Nolan, 1993; Parker & Parker, 2017; Szalma
& Hancock, 2008), and learning (Clemons & Santamaria, 2002; Davidson, 2010; Shultz, 2012).
Improving military organizations’ ability to adapt to evolving security realities will not only
provide more effective and efficient use of public resources worldwide, but it will also provide
better national security and improve economic stability and peace in the community of nations.

6
I.3

The Need for Marine Corps Organizational Learning: Past and Present
I.3.1

Past Organizational Learning: Breaking the Mold

Specifically, the case at hand provides an excellent venue for exploring the learning adaptations
of military organizations. In 1975, the United States ended its involvement in the Vietnam War.
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) turned to address a new role in the defense of Western
Europe at the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017;
Terriff, 2006a, 2006b). The Soviet Union’s army was massive, heavily armored, and tactically
overmatched the relatively lightly equipped Marine Corps (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff,
2006a). The USMC recognized two immediate needs to remain relevant: first, to carve out a
niche in the national security plans; and second, to address how to survive in an ever-increasing
lethal battlespace due to technological advances in target acquisition, precision guided munition
(PGM) technology, and the sheer armored mass of the Soviet army. To address these needs, the
29th CMC determined the current doctrine of attrition warfare was obsolete and wholly
insufficient for the task (Brown, 2018; Lind, 1985b; Osinga, 2007; Terriff, 2006a).
Attrition warfare is best characterized in the words of Osinga: “Firepower as a
destructive force is king. Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion etc.) is used to weaken or dilute
the effects of enemy firepower… Measures of success are ‘body count’ and targets destroyed.”
(Osinga, 2007, p. 166). Clearly, any attempt by a light force to symmetrically confront the Soviet
army in attrition warfare would be extremely costly and would more than likely fail (Terriff,
2006a). The USMC needed to learn and adapt to a new reality if it were to remain a useful
institution to the nation, and survive both on the battlefield against the Soviet Union and in the
budget wars of the Pentagon (Brown, 2018; Terriff, 2006a). However, attrition warfare was not
only the Marine Corps’ tacit doctrine for decades, it was woven throughout its values and norms.
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Young Marine recruits are socialized into the Marine Corps with stories, bordering on folklore,
of the Corps’ greatest battles being contests of attrition: Belleau Wood, Tarawa, Iwo Jima,
Chosin Reservoir, Khe Sahn, and Hue all resonate with Marines at a deeply personal level
(Bartlett & Sweetman, 2008; Hough et al., 1958; MCA&F, 1960; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff,
2006c). Attrition warfare values leaders with physical courage and who are skilled in
implementing processes, procedures, and control mechanisms to generate overwhelming mass
and fires through synchronization while minimizing risks yet not shying away from casualties
(Hanson, 2001; Johnson, 2018; Lind, 1985; Linn, 2002; Osinga, 2007; Weigley, 1977). Being
process- and control-oriented, attrition warfare is designed for top-down hierarchical
relationships and task-oriented objectives. While effective at using destruction to break an
enemy’s will and capacity to resist (Osinga, 2007), attrition warfare of the industrial age had
been outpaced by the changing character of war in the information age, and any force practicing
it was highly vulnerable to an array of modern-day adversaries exploiting the technology and
lethality presented by technological advances in target acquisition PGMs (Damian, 2001; Terriff,
2007b; Weigley, 1977).
In response to the new operating environment, the Marine Corps sought future relevancy
by evolving its doctrinal approach to warfare based on Col John Boyd’s sense and respond
theory, Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA-Loop) (Boyd, 1985; Brown, 2018; Osinga,
2007; Terriff, 2006a). In 1989 the USMC published FMFM-1 Warfighting as its keystone
doctrinal publication. FMFM-1 Warfighting articulated the Marine Corps’ philosophy of how it
understands the nature and demands of war, its theory about war, and how it prepares for and
wages war. This warfighting doctrine (FMFM-1 1989 and later updated to MCDP-1 in 1997)
espouses a theory that Marines will operate and thrive in an environment described as the “fog of
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war” (USMC, 1989, p. 6, 1997a, p. 7) characterized by friction, uncertainty, adversity, and
ambiguity and rely on dispersion, surprise, and maneuver to offset enemy advantages en masse
and mitigate their use of PGMs (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a). Additionally, Mw
doctrine contrasts with attrition warfare values and norms in several ways: Mw values leaders
who display initiative rather than dogged obedience to orders and eschews hierarchical command
and control in favor of executing the intent of the commander two levels up (MAGTF
Instructional Group, 2015; Reiter & Meek, 1999; USMC, 1997a). Mw views the acme of tactical
prowess as attacking enemy weaknesses, achieving surprise, and defeating the enemy’s cohesion
(Terriff, 2007b; USMC, 1997a, 1997c, 1997b) rather than attacking enemy strengths head on as
in the celebrated battles of Belleau Wood, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa (Bartlett &
Sweetman, 2008; Hough et al., 1958; Krulak, 1984; MCA&F, 1960).
Mw values junior leader decision making marked by initiative, boldness, and acceptance
of risk and intent rather than simply executing ‘go-and-do’ orders-oriented terrain objectives
(Brown, 2018; Lind, 1985b; MAGTF Instructional Group, 2015; USMC, 1996, 1997a, 1997c,
1997b). Attrition warfare held central to the aim of seizing and holding terrain and breaking the
enemy’s will to resist through demoralizing attrition (Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006b). In
summary, the Mw doctrine sharply contrasts with the legacy attrition warfare approach
employed by the US military from the Civil War though Vietnam (Weigley, 1977). This contrast
resulted in a schism within the Marine Corps between those that embraced Mw and those that
embraced attrition warfare, with each side often derisively labeling each other as maneuverists or
attritionists, respectively (Brown, 2018; Terriff, 2006c). While debates and diatribes raged within
the USMC, in the end the decision process for organizational change was more teleological than
it was dialectical (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995), as the 29th CMC signed FMFM-1 into effect with
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the “with the force of a papal ‘bull’” (Lloyd, 1989). While there were open and spirited
arguments made for the merits of attrition warfare as the so-called ‘Marine way of war, where
we close with and kill the enemy’ (Robeson, 1989; Terriff, 2006c, p. 221; Tucker, 1996), and
arguments made for how Mw seemed to eschew close quarters fighting and therefore was
somehow un-Marine-like, in the end, the 29th CMC had the final say, and FMFM-1 Warfighting
became the official cornerstone doctrine of the Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps, perhaps more than any other service, has a tradition of vocalizing
dissent, but once a decision is rendered the Corps tends to rally behind the direction set by the
CMC (Builder, 1989; Johnson, 2018). However, after the 29th CMC’s decision to implement
Mw, there was persistent grumbling amongst Marines, with the dull roar of a long-running
narrative along the lines that Mw was a fad’ and was about ‘dazzling the enemy till they drop’
rather than being concerned with ‘real combat’ (Anonymous, 2011; Brown, 2018; Damian, 2001;
Piscitelli, 2017; Robeson, 1989; Terriff, 2006a).
I.3.2

The Present Need for Organizational Learning: The Say–Do Gap

In 2016, nearly three decades and eight CMCs after the publication of FMFM-1, the Marine
Corps was again winding down a counter-insurgency effort as the United States transitioned to
supporting roles of indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan (JFD, 2016; Johnson, 2018;
USMC, 2016b). After 15 years of counter-insurgency operations against guerilla, terrorist, and
proxy forces in the Global War on Terror, the Marine Corps faced a new, uncertain and much
more lethal future operating environment. The emerging environment was described in the Joint
Forces document titled the Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested
and Disordered World (JOE 2035; JFD, 2016). The JOE 2035 describes conflict against potential
peer, near peer, and non-state organizations with state-like capabilities and presents a wide array
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of national security challenges.
Facing uncertainty once again, the Marine Corps turned to Mw doctrine to chart a path
forward. The 37th CMC, in FRAGO-01/2016: Advance to Contact (FRAGO-01/2016), issued a
call to action for the Marine Corps to “reinvigorate a maneuver warfare mindset for the 21st
century” (USMC, 2016a, p. 8). The 37th CMC's call to action to reinvigorate Mw contends that at
one time not only did the Marine Corps fully adopt and executed Mw, but it had done so
‘vigorously.’
Even after nearly 30 years, the schism between attritionists and maneuverists continued.
The Marine Corps’ professional journal, The Marine Corps Gazette, had hosted in its pages the
early debates surrounding Mw in the late 1970s and 1980s through to the publication of FMFM1 in 1989. After the publication of FMFM-1, the journal featured arguments for and against Mw
(Lloyd, 1989; Robeson, 1989; Tucker, 1996). Between 2010–2011, there were a series of 10
anonymous articles styled after the CS Lewis’ 1954 work The Screwtape Letters, titled The
Attritionists Letters. It these letters, General Screwtape (an ardent ‘attritionist’) admonishes a
young (Mw-curious) Captain Wormwood, against the misguided notions of Mw and berates him
over the follies of Mw while extoling the virtues of attrition warfare (Anonymous, 2011). The
Attritionists Letters, while anonymous in print, were recognized inside the Marine Corps as a
muffled scream protest registered by a minority of pro-Mw officers against the lack of
institutional commitment to Mw in actual practice. This series of articles speaks to the schism
that remained between attritionists and maneuverists (Johnson, 2018). In other words, The
Attritionists Letters signaled that Mw, after 22 years of practice by that time, was not wholly
accepted in the Marine Corps. It is evident that the 37th CMC’s call to action to ‘reinvigorate
Mw’ represents an acknowledgement of a ‘say–do gap' between the institution's espoused theory
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of Mw and the current theory-in-practice. It is also interesting to note that the authors of The
Attritionists Letters were advocating for the espoused doctrine of Mw, yet they felt the need to
remain anonymous. With that in hand, and while outside the scope of this dissertation, it may be
fair to question if the Marine Corps ever practiced Mw, let alone vigorously.
Emblematic of the above described struggle to reinvigorate Mw is the challenge faced by
MCTOG to adapt its organizational learning system and curricula to implement the long-range
vision of the MCTOG 2018–2028 Campaign Plan (MCTOG, 2018b). That campaign plan aimed
to put into action the results from the TECOM workshops and contribute to the reinvigoration of
Mw, therefore enabling the implementation of the MOC (Nicastro, 2017, 2018; TECOM, 2016,
2018).
I.4

The MCTOG Campaign Plan and the Bid to Reinvigorate Mw

MCTOG is a uniquely situated organization within the Marine Corps that functions both as a
formal schoolhouse in the training and education continuum and as a “Center of Excellence”
(COE) representing the interests of the operating forces of the Marine Ground Combat Element
(GCE). For the purpose of this study, GCE is defined as those elements of the Marine Corps
specifically trained, manned, and equipped to engage enemy forces in direct ground combat. This
unique positioning of MCTOG ensured it had two very different and powerful sets of
stakeholders with significant demand signals.
First, as a formal schoolhouse, MCTOG conducts individual-level training and education
of a critical segment of the force consisting of mid-grade officers and senior-grade enlisted
Marines within the GCE. The Marines graduating from MCTOG are assigned to critical
operations and intelligence positions in the operating forces and will be called upon to plan and
execute a wide range of missions around the globe. These missions include the expeditionary
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application of lethal and non-lethal capabilities across the spectrum of conflict, ranging from
low-intensity counter insurgency operations to high-intensity combat against peer competitors.
They also respond to humanitarian crises or the evacuation of American citizens from a conflict
zone. Developing and delivering a cutting-edge curriculum that is both true to Mw and develops
the skills and agility necessary to execute the MOC is firmly a MCTOG task. “Ensure we are
developing Marines with the agility and perspective to manage uncertainty, think critically, and
solve complex problems” (MCTOG, 2018a, p. 4; USMC, 2016b, p. 25). On request, MCTOG
also provides collective training to GCE battalion and regimental battle staff to prepare them for
worldwide operational deployments. Most often, the requests are to train battle staff on planning
processes and procedures for operations, intelligence, and the employment of firepower.
Secondly, in addition to its individual and collective unit training missions in its role as a
schoolhouse, the MCTOG functions as a COE. “The service [supporting establishment] looks to
MCTOG to lend intellectual capacity and rigor to develop, refine and sustain emerging concepts
and doctrine to ensure the operating forces are prepared” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2). The dual role
of schoolhouse and COE and being situated at the nexus of two sets of stakeholders in tension,
each with significant and differing demand signals, placed a tremendous strain on resources.
(Fig. 1).
The MCTOG campaign plan recognizes it sits astride the institutional tension between
the operating forces and the supporting establishment. “Systemic institutional change happens at
the service level [supporting establishment] where responsibly resides to fulfil the
responsibilities of Title 10 of the US Code; to conduct the training, manning, and equipping of
the operating forces” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2). The weight and complexity of the supporting
establishment’s responsibilities and the bureaucratic processes to execute them are deliberate and
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slow. On the other side, there are the GCE operating forces. The “[GCE] operating forces find
themselves at the nexus of tension and opportunity where meeting daily operational requirements
and remaining ready to win… outstrip their resources. Operating forces’ focus on immediate
challenges for readiness to fight and win today, limits their resources to focus on innovation to
win tomorrow’s wars” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2). The MCTOG campaign plan seeks to embrace
this unique position. “But we can leverage this as a position of advantage to enable and sustain
meaningful change as the GCE’s center of excellence” (MCTOG, 2018b, p. 2) As Fig. 1 depicts,
MCTOG is ideally situated for not only the conduct of this study by being on the front line of the
reinvigoration of Mw effort, it is also ideally situated in the context of engaged scholarship, to
leverage the findings from this study and help to reinvigorate Mw for both the supporting
establishment and the GCE operating forces.
Figure 1: MCTOG and Institutional Tension

MCTOG
- Formal schoolhouse with the unique dynamic
purpose for:
- Training Ground Combat Element (GCE) units
- Training and Education (T&E) of key GCE
individuals
- GCE Center of Excellence (COE) uniquely situated to:
- Capture and institutionalize/exploit innovation
- Quickly produce doctrine to suit emerging needs
- Train and educate leaders in operational art
USMC Supporting Establishment
- Resources
- Policies
- Doctrine
- Institutional training
- Bureaucratic process bound
- Long term systemic change

Institutional Tension

-

- Key node in T&E continuum
- Potential high payoff

USMC Operating Forces
Dynamic operating environment
Faced with ever-evolving reality
Resource shortfalls
High tempo
Short term innovation
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Finally, a major reason for conducting this research at MCTOG is the potentially
influential position held by training and education institutions within the military. As Davidson’s
research explains, “internal institutional process can prevent, promote, permit military learning
through change… and act as a powerful counterweight to entrenched organizational culture”
(Davidson, 2010, p. 192).
The MCTOG campaign plan was an effort to a to address the Marine Corps’ drive to
reinvigorate its Mw philosophy and enable execution of the MOC. In doing so, MCTOG would
be pivotal to the Marine Corps by providing a ready and relevant operating force to meet the
national security challenges of the FOE.
The Marine Corps’ Mw philosophy, and the reinvigoration thereof, is thoroughly
embedded in the goals of the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028. However, the actual
execution of the campaign plan at MCTOG fell completely flat. A full year after the
Commanding Officer signed the campaign plan into effect, it had gone absolutely nowhere. In
December 2018, MCTOG attempted an intervention in the form of a leadership offsite, an event
many of the participants of this study attended. This study was conducted a year and a half after
the campaign was signed into effect and nearly six months after the December 2018 leadership
offsite. While visible progress was being made towards implementing the campaign plan at that
point, the progress was slow and incomplete.
The MCTOG campaign plan was a failed strategic initiative intending to reinvigorate Mw
and enable the MOC in order to meet the challenges of the FOE. By describing and explaining
the root causes and dynamics of the say–do gap, this study may increase MCTOG’s
understanding of how and why the initiative failed and may inform potential corrective
interventions.
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I.5

The Importance of This Study: Blood and Treasure

Explicating the dynamics at play in the say–do gap between an espoused warfighting philosophy
and the warfighting theory in practice is not a trivial matter for two reasons. Primarily,
improvements in a military organization’s ability to adapt to dynamic and ambiguous operational
environments have a dramatic potential to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of national
security, which entails the better use of a large share of national resources in the form of both
blood and treasure. Secondarily, the 37th CMC has stated the importance of Mw doctrine in three
major service planning documents: FRAGO-01/2016 (USMC, 2016a), the Marine Operating
Concept (MOC) (USMC, 2016b), and the 37th CMC’s Message to the Force: Seize the Initiative
(USMC, 2017). Each document underscores the criticality of Marines’ ability to execute Mw in
the context of the 21st century in order to operate within the complexity, adversity, and
uncertainty of the FOE (JFD, 2016; USMC, 2016b). Most notable was the MOC, which boldly
makes a statement on the importance of adapting to the FOE in articulating the central problem
statement:
“The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, or equipped to meet the
demands of a future operating environment characterized by complex terrain,
technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and exploit
signatures, and an increasingly non-permissive maritime domain.” (USMC,
2016b, p. 8)
The document then goes on to describe the remedy to the central problem:
“The MOC is the starting point to address this problem by reaffirming the
primacy of maneuver warfare and combined arms for the 21st century and
identifying the critical tasks to develop the future force.” (USMC, 2016b, p. 8)
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In fact, the MOC dedicates an entire chapter titled “The Primacy of Maneuver Warfare” to the
topic and confirms that the 37th CMC and the institution are committed to Mw as the enduring
doctrinal warfighting philosophy.
I.6

The Reinvigoration of Mw Gets Underway

In FRAGO-01/2016, the 37th CMC directs TECOM to establish a working group to study and
make recommendations on how Mw may be reinvigorated. This action strongly implies that the
37th CMC believes the Marine Corps’ current ability to execute Mw in the context of the FOE of
the 21st century was insufficient. In response to this directive, TECOM hosted a series of three
separate workshops, each with the same core facilitators but with different participants and
subject matter experts.
The results of the first workshop conducted on October 25–27, 2016 focused on
institutional structure and culture reform, namely in the form of changes to personnel
management processes and the enculturation of Mw by reversing the bias for the science of
warfare, the ‘attritionists’ approach, in favor of the art of warfare, the ‘maneuverists’ approach
(TECOM, 2016). The most prominent point coming out of the first workshop session was this
quote from the outbrief: “The Marine Corps can talk about maneuver warfare but has not
institutionalized an ability to do [sic] maneuver warfare” (TECOM, 2016, p. 7). The reason for
the lack of an ability to “do” Mw was attributed to a fixation on attrition in both the operating
forces and in the training and education continuum (TECOM, 2016).
The results of the second workshop series conducted on June 20–22, 2017 focused on
enabling Mw by strengthening tactical decision making rather than solely following technical
processes and “improving the quality of instructors through dedicated instructor development”
(Nicastro, 2017; TECOM, 2018, p. 13).
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Responding to the 37th CMC’s call to action to reinvigorate Mw and seeking to act on
both FRAGO-01/2016 and the findings from the first two TECOM “Reinvigorate Maneuver
Warfare” workshops, the MCTOG developed a long-range vision to restore Mw to primacy. This
effort was captured in the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028 (MCTOG, 2018b). This
document would be the vehicle for change in the Marine Corps. Its implementation is the focus
of this study and will be discussed in detail later in this study.
The third workshop was conducted on April 24–25, 2018 and focused on reviewing the
findings of the first two workshops and defining the training and education actions needed to
effectuate Mw. I was invited to participate as a subject matter expert in this third workshop
session and was present for the discussions. During the discussions concerning the efficacy of
Mw, the general thrust of conversation regarding the need for a reinvigoration of Mw circled
around how Marine units had become accustomed to the static and very procedural nature of the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Johnson, 2018; West, 2011). In those
theaters, Marines have encountered the leading edges of the FOE in Iraq and Afghanistan, where
the situation is ambiguous and where the familiar command, control, and information flow is
often irrelevant with high levels of uncertainty. The general consensus of the discussion was that
Marine tactical leaders did not always adapt appropriately to ambiguity in tactical situations and
often defaulted to becoming internally oriented, task-focused, and fixated on “go and do” orders,
which was practically the opposite of what Mw emphasizes. The outcome is the opposite of what
is required to execute the Mw doctrine and the concepts presented in the MOC.
Another key finding from the group is articulated in the post-workshop reflections
provided by one workshop participant. “Participants acknowledged that executing maneuver
warfare in the context of the MOC and FOE ‘demands a higher standard’ of understanding and

18
realizing of our warfighting philosophy” (Nicastro, 2018, p. 2). Finally, at the end of the
workshop, one participant threw up his hands and said, “I guess we [the Marine Corps] doesn’t
have the culture to execute Mw” as others nodded in agreement. Another participant offered, “I
don’t think people have a fundamental nor conceptual understanding of Maneuver Warfare.”
The latter comment prompted me to note that the effort to reinvigorate Mw may not be about
culture or structure, as both were focus items from all three workshops. Instead, I was prompted
by the statement to investigate the role an organizational learning system might have as an
impediment or pathway to full effectuation of Mw.
Ignoring for a moment the persistent and open schism between attritionists and
maneuverists, and assuming the 37th CMC premise is correct that at one time the Marine Corps
vigorously practiced Mw, the Marine Corps’ current understanding and practice of Mw is
insufficient to meet the demands of the FOE and execute the MOC. The two requirements
necessary for the Marine Corps to remain a relevant and ready force in the 21st century and
effectively meet the demands of the FOE and the MOC, the Marine Corps must understand why
and how its adoption of Mw has been insufficient thus far. The consequences of going to war
with a force that espouses one theory of warfighting while in practice executes another theory of
warfighting will be a dislocation of expectation, and the stakes are blood and treasure. While the
TECOM workshops tended to focus on organizational structure and culture as the reasons for a
lack of Mw efficacy, this study will address the issue from an organizational learning perspective
(Davidson, 2010). The next chapter will investigate the pertinent literature streams surrounding
this area of study. I cast my net widely among the literature in an effort to illuminate the research
question from several angles and to build a theoretical framework for a study that will help me
separate the discourse from the discord.
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The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II will discuss the
relevant literature streams pertinent to this study. Chapter III will explain and justify the
methodological research approach for this study. Chapter IV will detail the findings from the
research work. Chapter V will discuss this study’s contribution to the literature and managerial
practice by detailing potential interventions to improve an organization’s implementation of a
strategic initiative to effect change.
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II

LITERATURE REVIEW

To begin this study, I investigated five literature streams to inform and frame the problem and
provide a theoretical framework to rigorously examine the problem of the failed strategic
initiative in the form of the MCTOG campaign plan to reinvigorate Mw. The five literature
streams are organizational learning, organizational learning and culture in a military setting, Mw,
and the Marine Corps planning documents regarding the reinvigoration of Mw, and Control
Theory as it applies to hierarchies and clans (Table 1). While not all inclusive, Table 1 illustrates
the top 12 seminal or critically informative articles for the main literature stream and
organizational learning and the top five seminal or critically informative works for each of the
other literature streams. Working from left to right in Table 1, the first literature stream,
organizational learning, captures articles firmly planted in the camp of scholarly research and
largely situated in private sector organizations. The second literature stream contains scholarly
articles and book chapters on organizational learning and culture situated in military
organizations. The third and fourth literature steams, Mw and USMC planning documents,
address the history and implementation real-world problem of adopting the espoused theory of
Mw and firmly ground the discussion in the literature. During the course of the fieldwork, the
data pointed to the phenomenon of clan activity within the MCTOG hierarchy. Accordingly,
control theory was included in the literature review as the fifth literature stream.
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Table 1: Literature Review
Organizational Learning (OL)

Military Learning
and Culture

Maneuver
Warfare

USMC Planning
Documents

Control Theory
Hierarchies and
Clans
Integrating the
Individual and the
Organization
(Argyris, 1964)

Theory in Practice,
OL, OL II (Argyris
& Schön, 1974,
1978, 1996)

Exploration and
Exploitation in
Organizational
Learning (March,
1991)

OL and The
Marine Corps: The
Counter
Insurgency in Iraq
(Schultz, 2012)

FMFM-1
Warfighting
(USMC, 1989)*
* Revised to
MCDP-1 (USMC,
1997)

Marine Operating
Concept (MOC)
(USMC, 2016)

The Reflective
Practitioner
(Schön, 1983)

A Dynamic Theory
of Organizational
Knowledge
Creation (Nonaka,
1994)

Innovate or Die:
OC and origins of
Mw in the Marine
Corps
(Terriff 2006)

A New Conception
of War (Brown,
2018)

MCTOG
Campaign Plan
2018-2028
(USMC, 2017)

Markets,
Bureaucracies and
Clans. (Ouchi,
1980)

Reflective Systems
Development
(Mathiassen, 1998)

Exploration &
Exploitation in
Organizational
Learning: A
Critical
Application of the
4I Model. (Nielsen
et al., 2018)

Resistance to
Organizational
Cultural Change in
the Military (Kelly,
2008)

Maneuver warfare:
Can Modern
Military Strategy
Lead You to
Victory? (Clemons
& Santamaria,
2002)

FRAGO-01/2016:
Advance to
Contact.
(USMC, 2016)

Hierarchies, Clans
and Theory Z: A
new Perspective on
Org Development.
(Ouchi & Price,
1978)

An OL
Framework: From
Institution to
Institution
(Crossan et al.,
1999)

The Link Between
Individual and
Organizational
Learning (Kim,
1993)

Lifting the Fog of
Peace: How
Americans
Learned to Fight
Modern War
(Davidson, 2011)

The US Army and
Mission
Command:
Philosophy vs
Practice
(Matzenbacher,
2018)

USMC Science &
Technology
Strategic Plan
(USMC, 2018)

Enacting Clan
Control in
Complex IT
Projects: A Social
Capital
Perspective. (Chua
et al., 2012)

Organizational
Learning: The
Contributing
Processes and
Literatures.
(Huber, 1991)

Organizational
Learning (Fiol &
Lyles, 1985)

OL Mechanisms:
A Structural and
Cultural Approach
to OL.
(Popper &
Lipshitz, 1998)

Innovate or die:
Organizational
culture and the
origins of
maneuver warfare
in the United
States Marine
Corps. (Terriff,
2006)

CMC Message to
the Force: Seize
the Initiative
(USMC, 2017)

Informating the
Clan: Controlling
Physicians’ Costs
and Outcomes.
(Kohli &
Kettinger, 2004)

II.1

Organizational Learning

The past 45 years have witnessed an ever-increasing growth in organizational learning literature.
This growth is attributed to organizations’ need to match the challenges in an ever more fluid,
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turbulent, and volatile world (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996). The ability of an
organization to learn quickly and properly increases its ability to adapt and compete in a
changing environment (Eisenberg et al., 2018). We now live in a world of disruptive change
(Christensen & Overdorf, 2000) where organizations, whether military, government, or business,
must innovate to remain relevant. In other words, “what got you here, won’t get you there,” and
yesterday’s tried and true processes and procedures may be insufficient or perhaps even
detrimental to an organization striving to meet the demands of tomorrow (Bontis et al., 2002). In
the military, we know future operating environments will be disruptive, complex, and uncertain
(USMC, 2016b), yet are we aware that an organization’s capacity to learn is touted as a
fundamental strategic capability (Fiol & Lyles, 1985a). While it is a commonly accepted theme
that organizations must adapt to and thrive in a disruptive world, is it is not a commonly accepted
that they must know how to learn as an organization in order to adapt to and thrive. However,
there is no clear agreement as to what organizational learning is, let alone how best to achieve it
(Scott & Candidate, 2011).
While the literature generally agrees that organizational learning is important, there is
considerable discussion on what organizational learning is exactly and how an organization goes
about doing it. To begin, this review will seek to establish in the literature the key underpinnings
of organizational learning, including defining learning, how organizations create knowledge, and
organizational learning and outlining the levels of learning in an organization and the factors that
influence organizational learning.
II.1.1 Organizational Knowledge Creation
Learning is a central theme running throughout the organizational literature stream. The notion
of learning is often taken for granted, and rarely do we explore how it affects our daily lives.
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Therefore, a specific definition of learning must be determined. There are two main camps in this
debate surrounding the definition of learning. First, there is the cognitive process camp, which
claims that organizational learning is a cognitive process that occurs when new insights are
acquired (Fiol & Lyles, 1985a; Huber, 1991). Huber (1991) claimed that learning has occurred
when one entity within an organization gains knowledge that may be put to use at some point in
the future, as this new knowledge may be cause for reflection, adjusting assumptions, and/or
building new mental models with which change occurs, even if it is not observable behavior
(Huber, 1991).
Second, is the cognitive behavioral process camp, which claims that organizational
learning is a cognitive behavioral process that happens only when new insights are accompanied
by changes in behavior (Fiol & Lyles, 1985b; Popper & Lipshitz, 1998; Weick, 1991). The
cognitive behavioral process camp (Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1978, 1996; Crossan, Lane, &
White, 1999) acknowledges that while cognitive learning is important, learning does not occur
until new insights, mental models, and assumptions result in new behavior. Argyris and Schön
(1978) contended that an organization learns when it identifies and corrects errors, while Crossan
(2003) asserted that learning is complete when one aligns one’s insights with one’s behaviors.
From a cognitive process viewpoint, the Marine Corps met the requirement for organizational
learning in that it recognized a need for change and wrote a new doctrine. However, the
argument could be made by the cognitive behavioral process camp that organizational learning
did not occur, as the new insights (doctrine) were not accompanied by changes in behavior.
The literature points to an ongoing discussion regarding organizational learning and
whether an organization can actually learn. Some have contended that organizational learning is
simply the sum of individual learning within the organization (Kim, 1993). Kim (1993) claimed
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that only people can learn, and so the learning that takes place in an organization is restricted to
what the individuals within the company have learned or by gaining a diversity of thinking in
either new personnel coming into the organization or by the temporary injection of knowledge
through consultants or collaborating with other organizations. Individual learning alone,
however, does not account for how organizations can experience a complete turnover in
personnel, as often happens in military units. In fact, military units and their service-supporting
establishments are specifically designed to replace people as the organization lives on (Argyris &
Schön, 1978; Hawkins, 2015; Kim, 1993). Therefore, an organization may experience a
complete turnover of collective learning, yet the new people in the organization still behave the
same way based on what the organization previously learned. As Hedberg articulated, “Members
come and go and leadership changes but organizational memories [persist to establish and
reinforce] norms, assumptions and preserve certain behaviors… norms and values over time”
(Hedberg, 2003, p. 6). Levitt and March (1988) supported this notion of preserved memory by
explaining that learning resides within the structure of an organization and contended that
organizational learning is a compilation of experiences and operating rhythms such as processes,
procedures, and organizational structure (Levitt & March, 1988). This dissertation will refer to
two main types of knowledge: explicit and tacit. Gorman (2002) provided a taxonomy of
knowledge most easily described as a spectrum running from explicit knowledge to tacit
knowledge. Explicit knowledge would be describing the procedure for how to fix a flat on a
bicycle, with a collection of steps set in sequence that can easily be written down and passed on
in a lecture. At the other end of the spectrum is tacit knowledge, which would be trying to
explain the procedure for how to ride a bike. How to ride a bike can be known experientially, but
it is difficult to pass on by simply telling another person. Between the two ends of the spectrum
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are degrees and types of knowledge. Starting on the explicit end are declarative ‘what’
knowledge, procedural ‘how’ knowledge, judgement ‘when’ knowledge, and finally, wisdom
‘why’ knowledge. We will find later in this study that teaching Mw is very much at the tacit end
of the spectrum, while the methodical procedures most associated attrition warfare are at the
explicit end of the spectrum.
As highlighted earlier, the literature on organizational learning focuses on individual
learning and learning embedded in the structure of an organization. How learning and knowledge
travel within an organization gave rise to the study of individual, group, and organization
learning levels. Individual learning as described by Simon (1996) and Kim (1993) leads to an
exchange of knowledge between individuals and groups of individuals. This exchange is held as
the collective knowledge of the organization (Hedberg, 2003; Levitt & March, 1988). Collective
knowledge was further explored in Nonaka’s (1994) study, which investigated the dynamic
process of knowledge creation within an organization and developed an operational model. The
model captures the interplay of tacit knowledge created by individuals and the role of the
organization in contextualizing and amplifying that new knowledge in explicit form. In other
words, it takes the tacit task of riding a bike, or employing Mw, and makes it more explicit and
accessible to others internal or external to the organization. Nonaka’s (1994) 2 x 2 model (Fig. 2)
organizes the creation of knowledge in the quadrants: socialization, externalization,
combination, and internalization. Nonaka (1994) explained how each quadrant can create
knowledge. For example, in the socialization quadrant, tacit knowledge can be created between
two or more people interacting and exchanging that knowledge, like each relating how each
learned to ride a bike and then melding those experiences. Likewise, explicit knowledge can be
created between two or more people combining procedures, steps, and checklists, like two people
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comparing their steps for fixing a flat on a bicycle and combining them to create a new process
that can be taught in a lecture. The quadrants of internalization and externalization are where
knowledge moves from explicit to tacit and tacit and explicit, respectively. With internalization,
a person or group can move from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge by internally processing
information and making connections to expand their understanding in a very experiential
manner. To explain the externalization of knowledge from tacit to explicit, Nonaka (1994)
offered that while “tacit knowledge held by individuals may lie at the heart of the knowledge
creating process, realizing the practical benefits of that knowledge centers on its externalization
and amplification through… a dynamic entangling of [all four quadrants]” (p. 20).
Figure 2: Model of Knowledge Creation

Note: (Nonaka, 1994, p. 19)
In the next section, I will address Argyris and Schön’s (1978) ToA and its greater
implications on organizational learning.
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II.1.2 Organizational Learning
Yanow (2000) proposed that the organizational learning process is rooted in organizational
culture (Yanow, 2000). Thus, understanding organizational culture is critical to understanding
the organizational learning process (Ando, 2002; Eisenberg et al., 2018; Friesenborg, 2013;
Kohli & Kettinger, 2004; Nielsen, 2014; Schein, 1984; Skerlavaj et al., 2007; Wang & Rafiq,
2009; Whiteley et al., 2013). Schein (2017) complicated the role of organizational culture and
learning by presenting the paradox of becoming a perpetual learner and the stabilizing influence
of culture. He wrote that, “while strong cultures are desirable as a basis for lasting change, they
are by definition stable and hard to change.… If the world is becoming more turbulent, requiring
more flexibility and learning, does this not imply that strong cultures will increasingly become a
liability” (Schein, 2017, p. 343). Not surprisingly, the USMC has a rich, storied history and
culture of martial prowess formed over 244 years of national defense. This USMC, like all
others, “must compete in and adapt to an ever-changing environment” (Eisenberg et al., 2018)—
an environment characterized by fluidity, turbulence, and volatility (Argyris & Schön, 1996).
II.1.3 Organizational Learning: Theory of Action (ToA)
ToA was introduced in 1974 by Chris Argyris and Donald Schön and represents seminal work in
the field of organizational learning. Their theory states that individuals and organizations hold
two types of theories of action: (1) espoused theories, what they say they do; and (2) theories-inuse, what they really do. The space between these two theories in action represents a “say–dogap.” Within the say–do-gap exists a complex interplay of norms, assumptions that define the
atmosphere of a setting. There are also governing variables, which are the truths that people try
to hold within a range of tolerance with various action strategies that are employed consciously
or subconsciously. These action strategies, in turn, have consequences to relationships, learning,
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and the self that influence how an organization behaves, either as a Model I or Model II type
organization, and how it learns with either single-loop or double-loop learning. Each of these
elements of ToA are detailed below.
Theories of Action: Argyris and Schön distinguished between two types of theories of
action: espoused theories and theories-in-use.
Espoused Theory: Espoused theories embody the world view and values upon which
people believe their behavior is based and what they believe about themselves, or, in the case of
an organization, what it believes about itself. Espoused theories are known to all since they are
proclaimed in both words, typically by individuals, and in writing, typically by organizations.
Espoused theories are often at odds with actual behavior driven by governing variables, and thus
a contradiction exists (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996; Schein, 1996).
Theory-in-use: Theories-in-use are signaled by individual and group behavior and are
often unknown to the individual and or organization (Argyris & Schön 1974, 1978, 1991). They
are described as either Model I or Model II (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996; Schein, 1996).
Congruency and Incongruency: Congruency occurs when one’s espoused theory, what
one says, matches one’s theory-in-use, what one does. As stated by Argyris and Schön (1974),
“inner feelings are expressed as action” (p. 23). Conversely, incongruency occurs when one’s
espoused theory, what one says, does not match one’s theory-in-use and is a form of selfdeception (Argyris & Schön, 1974). “Often times individuals [and groups] are blissfully unaware
of this incongruency as their theory-in-use behaviors fell outside of the espoused theory…when
people become aware of this gap they are often shocked” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. xiii). In this
dissertation, I will refer to incongruency as the say–do-gap. Argyris and Schön (1974) were
careful to note that congruency holds no virtue over incongruency. “An espoused theory that is
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congruent with an insufficient theory-in-use is less valuable that an adequate espoused value that
is out of congruence with an inadequate theory-in-use because the incongruence can be
discovered and provide stimulus for change” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 23–24). This is an
important point; this study does not make a value judgment on the effectiveness of the Marine
Corps’ efforts to institute and subsequently reinvigorate Mw as the warfighting philosophy;
rather, I aim only to investigate why the effort appears to be insufficient after 30 years.
Norms: Prevailing conditions and practices within an organization form a complex and
tacit set of social rules (Argyle, 1990; Argyris & Schön, 1974) and set an atmospheric tone
within an organization. Norms may appear as unwritten rules for “how things get done around
here” (Hawkins, 2015), who holds power, how decisions really get made, what behavior gets
rewarded, and who gets promoted (Jaeger, 1983).
Assumptions: Argyris and Schön (1974) discovered that assumptions are spoken or
unspoken, conscious or unconscious, and frame a person’s perspective about self, others, the
situation, and the connections between action, consequence, and a situation.
Governing Variables: Governing variables represent goals that a person is trying to keep
within some acceptable range while trying to live up to the espoused values in a plan at the
individual or organizational level (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Any action taken by an actor to keep
one governing variable within an acceptable range will likely impact upon a one or more other
governing variables and trigger a trade-off among governing variables4 (Argyris & Schön, 1974).
Action Strategies: Action strategies are used by a person or organization, consciously or

4

In some works, Argyris and Schön used the terms “governing variables” and “governing values” interchangeably.

For this study, I will use the term governing variables exclusively to avoid confusion with Marine Corps core values.
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unconsciously, to keep the governing variables within an acceptable range or tolerance level.
These strategies, however, carry either intended or unintended consequences for learning and
relationships (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996).
Consequences: When individuals, groups, and organizations employ action strategies to
maintain governing variables within a range of tolerance, whether consciously or unconsciously,
there are consequences for those actions. Argyris and Schön (1974) categorized the implications
for the employment of action strategies as consequences to learning, relationships, and self.
Model I and Model II: Central to ToA are the Model I and Model II constructs. Argyris
and Schön (1974, 1978, 1996) defined a Model I learning system as one where behavior is
governed by the following values: achieving goals, maximizing winning and minimizing losing,
minimizing the expression of negative feelings, and rationality. A Model I construct is likely to
be more efficient in dealing with structured situations and routine problems and is associated
with single-loop learning. A Model II construct defines learning system where behavior is
governed by valid information, informed choice, and internal commitment (Argyris & Schön,
1974, 1978, 1996).
Single-Loop Learning: In single-loop learning, individuals, groups, and organizations
modify their actions according to the difference between expected and reached outcomes. This
produces incremental learning, which is necessary for the routine parts of doing business;
however, there is no questioning of the premise or values of an activity, and the actor “learns to
avoid or suppress conflict and satisfy existing governing values” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19).
As illustrated in Fig. 3, single-loop learning is the conduit for Model I organizational learning,
wherein one’s underlying assumptions about values, self, and others are hidden (Friesenborg,
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2013), and change is directed at one’s action strategies to maintain governing variables within
tolerant levels.
Figure 3: Single-loop Learning

Theory-in-use
Consequences To:
Espoused Theory

Norms
&
Assumptions

Governing Variables

Action Strategies

- Learning
- Relationships
- Self

Model I / Single Loop
Learns new ways to suppress conflict
Maintain field of constancy by learning to
maintain existing governing variables
Defensive routines employed to maintain
status quo

Single Loop
Adapted from Argyris and Schön (1974, p. 21)

Double-Loop Learning: In double-loop learning, people, organizations, or groups
review actions in the framework of our operating assumptions and ask “what is going on here?”
and “what are the patterns?” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19). In contrast with single-loop
learning, the actor in double-loop “learns to be concerned with the surfacing and resolution of
conflict rather than suppressing it” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19). Note that “double loop
learning does not supersede single loop learning” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, p. 19). As illustrated
in Fig. 4, double-loop learning is the conduit for Model II organizational learning, where one’s
underlying assumptions about values, governing variables, self, and others are publicly discussed
and analyzed (Friesenborg, 2013). This public acknowledgment results in the questioning and
adjustment of governing variables to bring one’s espoused theory into congruency with one’s
theory-in-use.
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Figure 4: Double-loop Learning

Theory-in-use
Consequences To:
Espoused Theory

Norms
&
Assumptions

Governing Variables

Action Strategies

- Learning
- Relationships
- Self

Model II / Double Loop
Concerned with raising and resolving conflict.
Learns to change the field of constancy and
change the governing variables across the
whole theory in use
Open Dialogue & Change Status Quo

Double Loop
Adapted from Argyris and Schön (1974, p. 21)

The next section addresses the military learning literature stream and the contextual
influence of culture and how typically strong military cultures may influence organizational
learning.
II.2

Military Learning and Culture

According to Shultz (2012), there is only a small segment of scholarly literature in security
studies that addresses the related subjects of military learning and innovation. Modern war is full
of ambiguity, and military organizations must create an organizational learning environment to
be effective. “The concept of critical thinking and organizational learning cannot be
underestimated’ (Zacharakis & Van Der Werff, 2012). Learning, innovation, and change are
difficult to achieve and maintain in larger organizations in general, and military organizations in
particular (Builder, 1989; Davidson, 2010; Haynie, 2018; Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Johnson, 2018;
O’Connor & Kotze, 2008; Shultz, 2012).
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The USMC is both large and a military organization, and it is one with a deeply
engrained culture rife with artifacts and rituals of past heroics that have often been elevated to
near-mythical status (Brown, 2018; Davidson, 2010; Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Piscitelli, 2017;
Terriff, 2006b, 2006a). As Schein (2017) stated, “while strong cultures are desirable as a basis
for lasting change, they are by definition stable and hard to change” (p. 317). Zucker (1977), and
later Schein (2017), concluded in their studies of awareness in organizational culture, there is a
complex interview, observation, and joint-inquiry approach required to give the necessary
attention to the opportunities and constraints that organizational culture provides. Here, it is
evident that Schein’s (2017) recommended approach is quite similar to Argyris and Schön’s
(1974, 1978, 1996) ToA, and a case study from the interpretive perspective may be very helpful
in illuminating and deciphering the cultural context in organizational learning systems of military
instructional institutions.
The Marine Corps has recognized the need to evolve and adapt its operating concepts for
the future and has embarked on a self-described “campaign of learning” (MCCDC, 2018;
USMC, 2016c) to prepare itself for the future. To this end, the USMC has published the Marine
Operating Concept, which details how the force will be developed and employed the future
(USMC, 2016c). A critical component of the USMC’s campaign of learning and the MOC is to
reinvigorate the foundational Mw warfighting philosophy, which represents both an espoused
theory and is also a doctrinal artifact. While it is deeply embedded in the organizational culture,
there are various levels of understanding of and commitment to that philosophy. While it is
recognized in the literature that there is a need to understand organizational learning in the
military in order to deal with the ambiguity of the FOE (Davidson, 2010; Holmes-Eber, 2014a;
Zacharakis & Van Der Werff, 2012), and despite the overwhelming amount of literature
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concerning organizational learning in general, the literature has not consolidated any theory on
organizational learning specifically in a military context. While Davidson (2010) illustrated the
positive impact of education and learning institutions in the military dating to the early 20th
century, Davidson concedes it was still insufficient. The literature has very little to offer
specifically concerning the role of organizational learning systems when services attempt to
adopt a new warfighting philosophy or doctrine (or ‘reinvigorate’ one), as with the Marine Corps
and Mw and the US Army with Mission Command. The next section focuses on the Mw
literature steam.
II.3

Maneuver Warfare

In Chapter I above, I thoroughly discussed much of the Mw literature stream and provided a
background on the foundations of Mw as warfighting philosophy headed by the seminal work
FMFM-1/MCDP-1 Warfighting (USMC, 1989, 1997a). These documents capture the Marine
Corps’ understanding of Mw and is descriptive in nature regarding the expected attitudes and
behaviors of Marines necessary to execute Mw. Additionally, the literature stream provides the
history spanning from Mw’s inception (Boyd, 1985; Brown, 2018; MAGTF Instructional Group,
2015; Osinga, 2007; Terriff, 2006c) to Mw becoming official Marine Corps doctrine (Brown,
2018; Damian, 2001; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a, 2006c). It also illustrates the difficulty the
US Army has had in adopting its own version of Mw, which was coined Mission Command
(Matzenbacher, 2018).
II.4

USMC Mw Planning Documents

The USMC Mw planning documents literature stream detailed the Marine Corps’ institutional
attempts to initiate the reinvigoration of Mw, beginning with the 37th CMC’s call to action in
FRAGO-1/2016 and the TECOM ‘reinvigorate Mw’ workshops (TECOM, 2016, 2017; USMC,
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2016a, 2017). These actions underscore the central role the Mw philosophy plays in preparing
and employing the force for the FOE (USMC, 2016b, 2017). These documents also provide
insight into the Mw values the institution espouses. The Mw literature discussed in Chapter I also
introduced MCTOG’s strategic initiative to reinvigorate Mw via its campaign plan (MCTOG,
2018b). As a result of the TECOM workshops, the various schoolhouses within the TECOM
training and education continuum were tasked to explicate how Mw was being taught in their
respective institutions (MCU, 2016, 2017). The responses were consolidated by Marine Corps
University (MCU) and largely remained tabulated accounts of the number of classes and hours
devoted to Mw curricula, with little on their efficacy in teaching or reinvigorating Mw. In the
end, there is not an empirical observation or analysis of any concrete attempts to reinvigorate
Mw.
II.5

Control Theory Hierarchies and Clans

The fifth literature stream concerns control theory, specifically the role of “clan control” (Ouchi
& Johnson, 1978; Ouchi & Price, 1978a; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983) within a formal hierarchy.
This literature stream was not addressed until after field work had been conducted. The first
coding cycle revealed the potential of clan activity that may have had an impact on how MCTOG
learned as an organization. Further research into the works of Ouchi (1980) and Ouchi and Price
(1978) revealed how organizations function and achieve results through one of three methods of
control: formal bureaucratic, market, and clan control. In the case of MCTOG and the Marine
Corps, market control was not applicable due to the nature of the relationship between the
individual and the organization. Each member of MCTOG is an employee versus a market actor
seeking financial gain and generating capital (Ouchi, 1980). However, formal bureaucratic
control is easily applicable. Clan control, especially operating within a formal hierarchy, was
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revealing when applied to the Marine Corps in general and MCTOG specifically. Ouchi and
Price (1978b) defined a clan as:
“… a culturally homogenous organization, one in which most members share a
common set of values or objectives plus beliefs about how to coordinate effort in
order to reach common objectives… and draws informal control from peer
monitoring and sanctions to promulgate shared values, beliefs and norms.” (p.
64)
This definition describes the methods of informal control clans may wield and shed new
light on the data corpus. Ouchi and Price (1978b) continued to explain how clans achieve control
through a process of socialization, where the more complete the socialization, the stronger the
control of the clan. They made a fascinating point that, “a strong form of this complete
socialization is seen in such total institutions as the Marine Corps and some [emphasis added]
monasteries” (Ouchi & Price, 1978a, p. 65). One interesting caveat to explain some of the
tension within MCTOG between the hierarchical management and the clan emerging from the
data is the claim that “clans merge individual goals with organizational ones and thus provide
them the motivation to serve the organization” (Ouchi & Price, 1978b, p. 64). As the data will
show later in the results section, this was not the case at MCTOG—the clan’s goals ran counter
to the organization’s goals. Kohli and Kettinger (2004) discussed in their study how clans may
be initially counter to hierarchical organizational goals, but they demonstrated how those two
sets of goals may be aligned through intervention. Additionally, Chua et al. (2012) claimed that
clan control is “essential for complex multi-stake holder projects” (p. 579) and described
processes for enacting clan control with individuals who have strong social capital—those who
are capable of building ties, sanctioning norms favorable to organizational goals, or censoring

37
norms that are counter to organizational norms.
II. 6

Framework of Theory of Action and Warfighting Philosophies

The rigor of conducting a detailed literature review across the five literature streams provided a
considerable depth of understanding to the complexity of the problem. Specifically, the literature
review informed a synthesis of ToA and two warfighting philosophies, namely attrition warfare
and Mw. Table 2 below represents an original contribution towards aligning organizational
learning requirements with warfighting philosophies by indexing the main descriptors of the
attrition warfare and Mw warfighting philosophies and the salient elements of ToA, specifically
Model I single-loop and Model II double-loop organizational learning systems. The table
provides a side-by-side compare-and-contrast view of Model I and Model II learning systems by
units of analysis: governing variables; action strategies and consequences; for relationships,
learning, and self. Additionally, Table 2 illustrates how the Marine Corps’ espoused theory of
Mw closely aligns with Model II organizations that are more likely to engage in double-loop
learning, while the pre-1989 warfighting practice of attrition warfare is closely aligned with
Model I organizations that are more likely to engage in single-loop learning.
An organization with a Model I learning system and action strategies leading to singleloop learning consequences will have significant difficulty achieving the espoused theory of Mw.
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Table 2: Framework of Theory of Action and Warfighting Philosophies
Model I
Learning System
Governing
Variables

Avoid Risk (not lose or
lose face)
Emphasize rationality

Action
Strategies

Control environment,
centralized tasking
Low teamwork
Low risk

Attrition Warfare:
Theory-in-practice

Model II
Learning System

Maneuver Warfare:
Espoused Theory

Control, Efficiency,
Process, Hierarchy,
Internal focus on “my
lane”, Obedience to task

Free and informed
choice, Internal
commitment, Trust

Initiative, External focus
on the enemy, Fluidity,
Trust, Obedience to
intent

Internally task focused,
“go-and-do” orders and
procedures to minimize
risk, maximize effects

Sharing control,
Transparency,
Surfacing conflicting
views, Encouraging
public testing of
evaluations in design
and implementation
of action

Intent focused orders not
bound by tasks to
maximize flexibility

Process focused
planning and top-down
communication and
decision making to
achieve synchronization

Flexible inclusive
planning, decision
making, and
communications to
achieve intent
Must accept risk

Must eliminate risk

Consequences/
Relationship

Reduced production of
valid information

Relationships tend to be
more rigid and reflective
of hierarchy with dialog
and discussion about
“how”

Little public testing of
ideas

High premium on
obedience to orders

Defensive relationships
Low freedom of choice

Minimally defensive
relationships
High freedom of
choice

Relationships less rigid
and more introspective
with open dialog and
discussions about “why”
Relationship trust is built
on understanding.

Relationship trust is
based on obedience

Consequences/
Learning

Single-loop learning
Self-fulfilling

Learning is focused on
better implementing
procedures

Increased likelihood
of double-loop
learning.

Increased likelihood of
single-loop learning and
fixation on low-risk
internally focused tactics
and decisions

Learning is focused on
communication, trust,
and relationships
Increased likelihood of
double-loop learning to
innovate to solve
complex problems
Learns that Risk = Gain

Learns that Risk ≠ Gain

Consequence/
Self

Individuals seek to
minimize losing and
maximize winning

Individuals seek
assurance/security of
reputation through strict
application of processes
and procedures

Individuals are
minimally defensive
in protecting
reputation and will
seek understanding
of issues

Individuals are more
likely to seek and accept
personal risk of
reputation for
organizational goals
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Understanding what type of organizational learning system MCTOG mostly resembles
shed light on what has been, thus far, an unsuccessful struggle to implement its campaign plan.
The Model II organizational learning system is dependent upon a workplace culture that
encourages staff members at all levels of the organization to share ideas and insights. Perhaps
that is the nature of a workplace culture where the adoption of Mw and the MCTOG campaign
plan falls short (Eisenberg et al., 2018; Frost et al., 1985; Örtenblad, 2004; Whiteley et al., 2013).
Using ToA as the lens to view this problem would help explain whether the norms, assumptions,
governing variables, and actions strategies within MCTOG are indicative of a Model I or Model
II organization. It will also shed light on MCTOG’s difficulty to execute their campaign plan and
reinvigorate Mw.
The literature review was wide-ranging, with five separate steams considered, and did
provide a perspective from several angles to better illuminate the multi-faceted problem of
reinvigorating Mw. The literature review further helped to design the research method to best
answer the presented research question.
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III

RESEARCH METHOD

MCTOG is a complex and dynamic organization, and therefore choosing the appropriate
research method was paramount to an effective study. The research approach needed to be
pragmatic, flexible in nature, and capable of providing comprehensive in-depth understanding of
how things actually work in the real world. A case study method would ensure a tightly bounded
and engaged academic scholarship welcoming of diverse disciplines across all organizational
levels. Argyris and Schön’s (1974) recommended approach to ToA was one of joint inquiry,
meaning the researcher becomes a participant observer, and therefore the research encounter is
one of “engaged” scholarship (Mathiassen & Sandberg, 2013; Van de Ven, 2007). This research
seeks to co-produce knowledge and enhance learning effectiveness with practitioners,
specifically the Commanding Officer of MCTOG.
III.1

Selecting the Case Study Approach

A case study is a methodological approach that allows for in-depth, multi-faceted explorations of
complex phenomena in their natural settings. This study employed Argyris and Schön’s (Argyris
& Schön, 1974; O’Connor & Kotze, 2008; Salner, 1999) ToA to explore how and why an
organizational learning system impacted MCTOG’s ability to effectuate the strategic initiative to
reinvigorate Mw via the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028 (MCTOG, 2018b). To answer the
research question, I deployed a cross-sectional, single case study method for the following
reasons. First, this study was an empirical and exploratory effort to answer “how” and “why”
questions about a “contemporary, complex social phenomenon situated in real life” (Yin, 2009,
p. 13). Second, the study sought to provide an “analysis of a bounded phenomenon” (Merriam,
1998, p. xiii): the reinvigoration of Mw in MCTOG. Third, the six case study approaches to
gathering data, “analyzing documents, interviews, direct observations, participant observation
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and physical artifacts” (Yazan, 2015, p. 149; Yin, 2009) would provide a thorough understanding
of the problem allowing the research to be full of thick, rich descriptive data and provide internal
validity through triangulation among the individuals, the levels within the organization, and my
interpretation of the data (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009).
III.2

Building the MCTOG Theoretical Framework

As an interpretive single case study, I built the conceptual model as data was collected (Yin,
2009). The broad structural concept of the MCTOG theoretical framework (see Fig. 5) was
drawn from the work of Argyris and Schön (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996; Argyris, 2000;
Argyris, 2003). The key elements in the framework are espoused theory, theory-in-use,
assumptions, norms, governing variables, action strategies, and consequences for learning. In
keeping with Dubin’s (1969) theory-building approach, the specifics within the units of analysis
were based on my observations of the real world. The MCTOG theoretical framework was
inferred from the study’s secondary and primary data. The MCTOG Campaign Plan established
the organization’s espoused theory, the TECOM workshops, and the internal MCTOG staff
survey (MCTOG, 2019b; TECOM, 2016, 2018), which helped initially define the governing
variables as Marine Corps values, both bureaucratic and Mw. Action strategies and consequences
for learning were uncovered from the primary data created from the field work. For additional
investigation in the role of assumptions and norms in learning, I turned to the works of Edgar
Schein (1984). Schein’s (1984) approach was to dig deeper than the surface artifacts to uncover
the underlying assumptions and norms of the organization, “if we are to decipher a given
organization’s culture [assumptions norms] derived from a dynamic model of learning and
group dynamics, we must use a complex interview, observation and joint inquiry approach to
uncover the unconscious assumptions that are hypothesized to be the essence of the culture
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[norms]” (p. 14).
A single case study design analyzes an organizations’ practices by examining the actual
practices of the faculty and staff members who comprise the organization (Creswell & Poth,
2018; Yazan, 2015; Yin, 2009). For this study, MCTOG served as the single case, and the
organization’s faculty and staff members served as the multiple subunits at the individual, group,
and intergroup levels. As the engaged researcher, I wanted to understand each participating
faculty and staff member at each level of interaction: as individuals, as members of homogenous
groups (uniformed service members or government service employees), and as members of
intergroups (MCTOG Core Design Team), in order to better perceive the entire organization’s
learning system. This multi-level approach was intended to avoid an error inherent in single-case
study design addressed by Yin (2009)—simply put, ‘not seeing the forest for the trees.’ This
error occurs when researchers solely characterize the organization using individual-level data
and neglect to aggregate the data of the groups and intergroups to best explain the case of the
organization as a whole (Yin, 2009).
MCTOG and a ToA Theoretical Framework: Theories in use are complex. If all
behavior were to be accounted for, the complexity would be overwhelming (Argyris & Schön,
1974, p. 7). Using ToA as the primary theoretical framework serves to both model and simplify
the complexity of the MCTOG case study and capture data to indicate the impacts of the theoryin-use consequences on learning, relationships, and self and to influence either single-loop or
double-loop learning. The framework also helps diagram the interplay between governing
variables and the action strategies employed to hold one governing value within tolerance,
perhaps at the expense of other governing variables. This should give us insight into the
congruency or incongruency of the espoused theory and the theory-in-use.
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To better illustrate MCTOG’s use of espoused theory and theory-in-use, Fig. 5 presents
an adaptation of Argyris and Schön’s (1974) ToA that captures norms, assumptions, governing
variables, and action strategies inferred from primary and secondary data and in the context of
MCTOG’s campaign plan as the espoused value. While single-loop and double-loop learning do
not happen simultaneously, both are depicted in this framework for simplicity.
Figure 5: MCTOG ToA Theoretical Framework

Theory-in-Use
Governing Variables
Marine Corps
Hierarchical organization which rewards:
Conformity to norms of obedience, respect & rank
Adherence to values of Honor, Courage & Commitment
USMC history glorifying sacrifice and attrition
Task Focused: Physical Risk = Reward
Espoused Theory
Campaign Plan:
Aspirational document
intended to drive the
reinvigoration of Mw

Norms
&
Assumptions

Bureaucratic
Hierarchical authority that rewards:
Formal procedures and rules
Maintaining reputation
Technical competence = Promotion
Control Focused: Moral Risk ≠ Reward

Consequences To:
Action
Strategies

- Learning
- Relationships
- Self

Maneuver Warfare
Institutional culture that rewards:
Bias for action
Trust and initiative
Taking risk/boldness
Intent Focused: Moral Risk = Reward

Adapted from Argyris and Schön (1974, pg. 21)

Double Loop

OR

Single Loop

Governing Marine Corps Variable: The Marine Corps’ core values of “honor, courage,
commitment” and “every Marine a rifleman” (Holmes-Eber, 2014a; Krulak, 1984; MCA&F,
1960; Terriff, 2007b) are woven into the ethos of the Marine Corps from recruit training (boot
camp) and officer candidate school (OCS). Every Marine is thoroughly indoctrinated into a
hierarchical organization that values and rewards behavior that conforms to norms, is
instantaneously obedient, and respects rank. USMC values are captured in artifacts, such as
doctrinal publications, customs and traditions, and throughout the training and education
continuum. Ritualistic of rites of passage, such as the Crucible and The Basic School, reinforce
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the Corps’ values and anchor these desired behaviors in a Marine Corps history replete with acts
of valor, toughness, obedience, and glorifying sacrifice to accomplish a task (Holmes-Eber,
2014a; Krulak, 1984; MCA&F, 1960; Terriff, 2007b). To sum up this description as an
expression I inferred from the data: Task Focus + Obedience = Success + Promotion.
Governing Bureaucratic Variable: Values that reinforce hierarchical authority drive
task specialization that favor formal procedures, rules, and roles and are impersonal and designed
for optimal management and administration of an organization. Bureaucracies tend to reward
technocrats, those that are best positioned through specialization qualifications (special
certifications, program skills), and those that also have the political skills necessary to compete
for resources within the organization. To sum up this description in an expression I inferred from
the data: Technical Competence + Political Skill = Success + Promotion.
Governing Maneuver Warfare Variable: Values embedded into Marines’ training and
education continuum through doctrine and curricula create a culture that rewards an individual
for initiative; a bold bias for action built on trust, communication, decentralized execution, and
opportunity; and taking risks to achieve the desired intent. To sum up this description in an
expression I inferred from the data: Intent Focus + Initiative + Risk Taking = Success +
Promotion.
Internal Consistency: Governing variables have an acceptable range of behavior that
exists when there is no self-contradiction, referred to as internal consistency (Argyris & Schön,
1974). If in an action strategy calls for one or more of the governing variables to fall out of
tolerance, then there is internal inconsistency. For example, the governing variable maneuver
warfare, which promotes bias for action and initiative, may be in tension with the bureaucratic
governing variable that values and promotes process and procedure. If a theory-in-use employed
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by an actor can keep those two governing variables in tolerance, then there is internal
consistency. If one falls out of tolerance to accommodate the other, then there is internal
inconsistency (Argyris & Schön, 1974).
III.3

Organizing Data Collection
Understanding the Research Setting: The United States Marine Corps is an 187,000

strong, globally distributed organization. To focus this study, I narrowed the research setting to
the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG). MCTOG is a formal school within
the USMC training and education continuum providing advanced individual training to
designated operations and intelligence personnel within the Ground Combat Element (GCE) and
provide advanced collective training to operational units within the GCE. MCTOG is also the
GCE Center of Excellence (COE), with the responsibility of leading GCE doctrine development
and examining emerging concepts and technology to enhance GCE operational readiness
(MCTOG, 2018b). Focusing on the GCE is important because, while the entirety of the Marine
Corps, including aviation, logistics, and supporting establishment organizations, in principle
operates under the Mw doctrine, the execution of the Mw doctrine at a level approaching
espoused theory is most critical to the GCE that will actively seek close combat decisive
engagements with the enemy in the FOE.
Participant Screening: Participant screening focused on those personnel assigned as
faculty or staff at MCTOG and who had participated in the design, implementation, and delivery
of instruction or who were members of the Core Design Team (CDT) for implementing the
MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028. Eliminated from participation in this study were
government contractors who were not eligible due to the lengthy 4-5 months-long approval
process required by the Human Research Protection Program Office, which would delay the
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study beyond the period of time the CDT would be in session. This was not a detriment to the
study, as contractors by law cannot make decisions for the government (US military) and are
much more transient than GS or uniformed members. I specifically sought to recruit a holistic
representation of MCTOG personnel to include uniformed military and government service
employees. Of the uniformed military, I again sought a balanced representation between officers
and enlisted Marines, and a cross section of occupational specialties with operations,
intelligence, and aviation representation. Additionally, these participants had previously come to
MCTOG from either the supporting establishment or various elements of the operating forces,
thereby providing an indirect cross section of the Marine Corps. The participants were a mix
between the more senior members of MCTOG, considered prime movers, who held leadership
and decision-making roles and those with less time and influence at MCTOG but who filled
important roles in executing the MCTOG mission.
Participant Recruitment: I recruited a total of 14 volunteers for this study: 10
uniformed military members and four government service employees spread across faculty and
staff positions. Given the in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus group-guided discussions,
observation of the MCTOG working groups’ internal interactions, and interactions with the
commander, I assessed that this number of participants was adequate to produce rich, reliable
data for analysis. The uniformed military participants ranged in rank from E-7 Gunnery Sergeant
to O-5 Lieutenant Colonel, and the four government service employees ranged in grade from
GS-11 to GS-14. All participants were briefed on the purpose of the study and signed an
informed consent form acknowledging their volunteer status, their expectation of confidentiality,
and that there would be no compensation for participation. It is important to note that all
participants seemed eager to engage in this academic study, and all were very cooperative and
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generous with their time. Extraordinary care was taken during recruitment to avoid any
appearance of command influence. Additionally, to avoid any optics that may influence a
volunteer participant, I did not use my retired rank as a Marine colonel and ensured that all
recruitment materials, emails, and scripts identified me as Mr. McCoy, a doctoral student in
pursuit of my own academic objectives.
The uniformed military member population had been exposed to Mw doctrine during
compulsory entry- and career-level training and education and have presumably practiced Mw in
operational settings, including combat. A Marine from the faculty typically has 12–16 years of
service and is responsible for teaching tactics and operations in the context of Mw. Per the
MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028, each faculty and staff member had a role in co-developing
curricula to meet the rising conventional, unconventional, asymmetric, and hybrid threats of the
FOE and to effectuate the goals of MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028 and the MOC (MCTOG,
2018b; USMC, 2016b, 2016a).
The government service (GS) employees varied in years of GS experience, and all had
previous military experience. The GS participants held government service ratings ranging from
GS 11–14 and will be roughly equivalent to their military counterpart participants in terms of
rank. The GS population is responsible for co-developing curricula in support of Campaign Plan
2017–2027 to meet the rising conventional, unconventional, asymmetric, and hybrid threats of
the FOE and to effectuate the goals of MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–2028.
III.4

Collecting the Data

In studying espoused theory versus theory-in-use, it is critical to compare what a subject
professes in interviews with what behavior actually occurs at the individual, group, intergroup,
and organizational levels (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996). Primary data was collected
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during a four-week-long field work period via in-depth, semi-structured one-on-one interviews
with MCTOG faculty and staff participants. During these interviews, I was able to establish
espoused theories at the individual level. I followed up the individual interviews with three
separate homogenous focus group sessions to create the opportunity to observe any differences
and tensions between individual espoused theories from the one-on-one interviews and theoriesin-use that may emerge at the group level. Two focus groups consisted of uniformed military
only. Due to the number of participants in this group I broke this group into two sessions to
better accommodate participation with a smaller number of participants per session. The
participants for these two sessions self-organized by their schedule availability for one group of
six and one group of three. One uniformed participant was unavailable the group session due to a
scheduling conflict. The third focus group session consisted of GS employees only. Due to
scheduling availability, only three of the four GS participants were involved in the focus group
session.
The in-situ observation of the MCTOG CDT provided me an opportunity to observe
actual behavior (theories-in-use) for congruency with individual espoused theories at the
intergroup level as well as to observe the consequences of the various action strategies on
learning and relationships (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1991). Finally, observing in situ the
MCTOG CDT interacting with the MCTOG senior management for the final outbrief provided
the opportunity to observe all the above at the organizational level. Observing in situ interaction
at various levels provided a vantage point to identify elements of the theories-in-use and their
associated consequences for learning and the relationship to self and others to determine which
actions are and are not conducive to organizational learning at MCTOG.
Interviews and Focus Groups: The interviews and focus groups were semi-structured
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and discovery-oriented and employed interview and focus group protocols approved by the
separate institutional review boards for Georgia State University and Training and Education
Command (TECOM). Interview and focus group questions were aimed at establishing a baseline
of each participant’s understanding of Mw and the campaign plan and then discussing
organizational learning concepts as they applied to MCTOG executing the campaign plan. To
gather norms, assumptions and action strategies, how people communicate, and how conflict is
resolved, the interviews and focus groups were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim using
TEMI, an online transcription service with 90-95% accuracy. I then manually proofed each
transcript while listening to the audio to ensure the accuracy of the transcription. Following each
interview, I recorded my reflections in a contact summary report (Miles et al., 2014), added
explanations for acronyms, and noted shifts in the tone of voice and nonverbal communication.
The participants were asked a series of questions regarding their understanding of Mw in
practice and what the espoused theory should look like in action. I also plumbed the participants'
attitudes, assumptions, and perceived norms regarding working at MCTOG as it pertains to a
learning environment. During the interviews, I wanted to explore the role of culture regarding
governing values by asking questions that would illuminate Schein's (1984) levels of culture—
artifacts and creations, values, and basic assumptions—and how those might interact to impact
learning.
I followed up on the interviews and focus group sessions with in situ direct and
participant observations of MCTOG CDT sessions, interactions in a leadership offsite session,
and the final out briefing of the final town hall meeting where the commander announced the
results of the CDT. These observations provided an opportunity to compare what was espoused
in the interviews and focus group sessions with the observed behavior and action strategies put
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into play during interactions at the intergroup and organizational levels. Specifically, I sought to
observe how the participants responded to criticisms, differing views, perceived challenges, and
the participant networks that form positive or negative consequences for learning and
relationships.
Data collection occurred in three stages: establishing the espoused theory, data collection
from interviews and focus groups, and data collection from the CDT. Stage 1 consisted of two
steps and was intent on establishing espoused theory. Stage 1, Step 1 was the initial data
collection and analysis of secondary data from documents to establish the espoused theory at the
organizational level. Stage 1, Step 2 collected primary data from the interviews to establish the
espoused theory at the individual level. Stage 2 collected primary data at the homogenous group
level with the focus group sessions (all uniformed military or all GS). Stage 3 collected data
from direct and participant observations and was intended to collect data on intergroup and
organizational behaviors. Stage 3, Step 1 collected primary data via a participant observer of the
CDT, a MCTOG Leadership Offsite at the heterogeneous groups level. State 3, Step 2 collected
data via direct observation of organizational behavior. Each stage and step are detailed below.
Stage 1: Initial Data Collection and Analysis: The initial data collection and analysis
consisted of two steps: establishing the espoused theory and analyzing MCTOG written artifacts.
I collected and analyzed extant secondary data in the form of documents internal to MCTOG,
including organizational goal documents, curricula, guidance, organizational charts, working
group charters, and policy memoranda and artifacts. I also collected data external to MCTOG but
central to the study, such as Marine Corps documents on doctrine, directives concerning Mw,
and the TECOM workshops to reinvigorate Mw. Together, these documents, once analyzed,
served as important artifacts (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009) and provided an understanding of the
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espoused theory of the organization (Schein, 1984, 2017). I assessed the quality of the
documents and archival data according to four criteria: authenticity, credibility,
representativeness, and meaning (Merriam, 1998; Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2009). The documents
and artifacts helped triangulate the primary data collected from interviews, focus groups, and
direct observations and participant observations.
The interviews produced the bulk of the primary data to determine espoused values at the
individual level for this study. I conducted one-on-one, semi-structured interviews of 10
uniformed military personnel and four government service employees that amounted to 19 hours
and 29 minutes of digital audio recordings. The questions, per the interview protocol, were
intended to spark deep narratives from each participant that, when woven together, gave shape to
the experience composite at MCTOG and insight into the organizational learning system and
how that system impacted the campaign plan implementation (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978,
1996). The interview questions were open-ended and designed to uncover the unit of analysis
beyond individual norms, assumptions, and governing values. Semi-structured interviews gave
me the flexibility to redirect questions or probe into previously given answers. The interview
protocol was designed to establish validity (Yin, 2009) and is noted in Appendix A, and the
composite narrative is noted in Table 5.
Stage 2: Focus Groups Primary Data: The focus group sessions occurred with 12 of
the 14 participants and produced five hours of digital audio recordings. The sessions produced
the primary data used to determine the espoused values and action strategies at the group level
and detect any movement in individual espoused values in a group setting. This stage consisted
of establishing three focus groups, two consisting of uniformed military participants and the
other consisting of GS employee participants. Each focus group participated in a discussion I
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guided to determine how people interact within the MCTOG organization and how learning
takes place. The data collected here were analyzed to gain an understanding of both the espoused
values of each homogenous group (uniformed military members and GS employees) and to
observe and detect governing values and action strategies by individuals (Argyris & Schön,
1974, 1978, 1996). The focus group protocols for GS employees and uniformed military are
provided in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.
Stage 3: Participant Observation and Direct Observation: Myers (2009) made the
distinction between observation, “watching from the outside and taking no part in the activities,”
and participant observation, where the researcher not only observes but also interacts with the
participants in an effort to understand what is happing from the inside. “Participant observation
in-situ… where they are… will allow both intimate observation of parts of their behavior and
reporting it in ways useful to social science” (Myers, 2013, p. 137). Per the research protocol, I
did not use my rank of colonel; however, due to being known professionally by the participants
and my previous involvement in the 2018 leadership offsite, I assessed that any attempt I made at
being a pure observer in the background, taking no part in the activities of the working groups,
would present to the participants as inauthentic and would likely dampen discussions. The
approach of participant observer was more organic and allowed for deeper discussions and
connections (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002).
In addition to the individual interviews and focus group sessions, the time period for the
field work, running from May 20, 2019 to June 18, 2019, presented several opportunities to
conduct direct and participant observation at all levels: individual, group, intergroup, and
organization. Specifically, intergroup and organizational levels were observed during the Core
Design Team workshops, the Building Citizenship and Care Leadership Offsite (Part II), and the
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MCTOG Town Hall curriculum decision announcement.
Participant Observation: Core Design Team (CDT): Of the 14 total participants, eight
were members of the CDT and met for three to four hours a day on May 21, 22, 23, 30, and 31,
2019 (MCTOG, 2019a). I attended these sessions as a participant observer and recorded by field
note (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002) over 17 hours of interaction and discussion. The CDT met to
discuss the future of the curricula and pedagogy for the two main instructional courses offered by
MCTOG. The intended outcome of the CDT was to merge the separate curricula redesign efforts
from sub-working groups and a red team to create a continuous, integrated learning environment
through an intentional design process that will accelerate learning, enable the intellectual
advantage, and create the Learning and Maneuver Warfare Center for the GCE. Additionally, the
CDT sought to develop a master narrative intended to knit together the learning outcomes for the
various courses in the curricula (MCTOG, 2019a). These meetings involved roughly two dozen
members from across MCTOG (officer, enlisted, and GS) on a rotating basis, with every day
resulting in a different mix of attendees. This provided a venue for observing intergroup behavior
in discussing the campaign plan and curricula changes.
Participant Observation: Leadership Offsite: Of the 14 participants, six had attended
the December 2018 Campaign Plan Discussion Leadership Offsite, a two-and-a-half-day event
that took place at San Diego State University. While this event preceded this study, it was
discussed during the interviews and focus group sessions and provided keen insight into
individual and group approaches to executing, or rather not executing, the campaign plan. I
attended and presented at this conference as a member of MCTOG and had first-hand
observations from its conduct. The sequel to that event was the 2019 Building Citizenship and
Care Leadership Offsite (Part II). This event was observed as part of this study as well, and I
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took on the participant observer role once again. The attendance of the latter event involved
roughly 40 members of MCTOG, with 12 of the 14 participants of this study in attendance. This
event was held at the Community Center aboard Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms
California over the course of a single afternoon on June 10, 2019. While short in duration, this
venue provided valuable insight into group, sub-group, and organizational behavior in wideranging discussions covering curricula and the identity of MCTOG.
Direct Observation: Town Hall Decision Announcement: The town hall event took
place June 18, 2019, which was the final day of my field work period. This was an “all hands”
event requiring the attendance of all MCTOG personnel; therefore, all study participants
attended. The goal of the town hall meeting was for the Commanding Officer to announce the
curricula decisions from the CDT workshops. The town hall was held aboard the MCTOG
compound and lasted approximately 30 minutes, with a quick brief by the Commanding Officer
and a short question and answer period. This venue also provided insight into individual, group,
sub-group, and organizational behavior. I was strictly an observer for this event.
These three venues provided opportunities to observe how the mixed working groups
interact at the intergroup level (uniformed and GS) and at the individual level when briefing the
person with the most authority, namely the Commanding Officer of MCTOG.
Capturing the Nonverbal Communication: The participant observer approach was
useful in allowing me to examine nonverbal communication, especially if there was a
discrepancy between a verbal declaration accompanied by a nonverbal contradictory cue.
Nonverbal communication is typically sent with intent (consciously or unconsciously) and used
with regularity among members of a social community are generally interpreted as intentional
(Argyle, 1990; Mandal, 2014). During my prior military service, I was trained in Human
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Behavior Pattern Recognition and Analysis (HBPR&A). HBPR&A training provided
observational skills to sense, make sense of, and establish a baseline of behavior in operational
settings involving groups of people. The HBPR&A training enables one to detect behavioral
anomalies that fall above or below a baseline. This training was invaluable reading on the
nonverbal behavior of the organized working groups and briefings.
In HBPR&A, nonverbal communications are classified into six categories: proxemics, the
push or pull effect of one person on another person or group that signal affiliations or rivalries;
geographics, where people tend to anchor themselves in a social setting to establish security,
dominance, or affiliation; heuristics, a prototypical match used by a person as a shortcut in
assessing a situation, such as another’s viewpoint or position, which is a tell for displaying one’s
assumptions about the self and others; biometrics, which are tell-tale biological responses to
stress, anger, and anxiety that are impossible to mask, like the reddish skin tone from a histamine
flush; atmospherics, the environmental cues or feel of the room as being an enjoyable or
contested space; and kinesics, body language cues that betray underlying emotions and thoughts
regardless of verbal communication.
Utilizing participant observation, direct observation techniques (DeWalt & DeWalt,
2002), and HBPR&A training (Argyle, 1990; Mandal, 2014), I was able to observe and detect a
range of behaviors at the individual, group, intergroup, and organizational levels that provided
the opportunity to detect congruence or incongruence between the espoused theory and theoriesin-use and to observe the consequences to learning, relationship with self and others, and the
total sum impact on organizational performance.
III.5

Analyzing the Data and Addressing Bias

The qualitative data analysis approach will be the double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1993; Myers,
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2013). There are four reasons for this choice. First, the double hermeneutic enables a deep
understanding of people in organizational settings and provides an approach to human
understanding with a philosophical grounding for interpretivism (Myers, 2013). Second, in the
double hermeneutics approach, the researcher studies the organization from the inside and must
speak the language (Myers, 2000) and, in this case, understand the undercurrents of culture at the
macro (USMC) and micro (MCOTG) levels. Third, all qualitative research from an interpretive
perspective is subject to prejudiced opinion. In an attempt at full transparency, I acknowledge
that my nearly three decades as a US Marine and possessing deep familiarity with MCTOG as a
member of the organization and as a major contributor to the MCTOG Campaign Plan 2018–
2028 could introduce bias into my data interpretations. As Klein and Myer (1999) explained,
“hermeneutics recognizes that prejudice is the necessary starting point of our understanding”
(Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 76). “The critical task of hermeneutics then becomes one of
distinguishing between true prejudices, by which we understand, and false prejudices, by which
we misunderstand” (Gadamer & Linge, 1976, p. 124). From a hermeneutics perspective, my
previous experiences cannot be ignored and are best addressed with frank transparency. On the
one hand, I must acknowledge and account for a level of conscience and unconscienced bias. On
the other hand, my experience and exposure to the subject of Mw, the attempt to reinvigorate it,
and my affinity for and loyalty to the Marine Corps and MCTOG provided the impetus for this
study. With mitigating measures in place, my experience combined with academic rigor and
research skills will lend a valuable perspective in making sense of what happened during the
studied events and field work interviews. The fourth reason to employ hermeneutics is the
prominent role of culture within the Marine Corps (Brown, 2018; Holmes-Eber, 2014c; TECOM,
2016; Terriff, 2006c). At MCTOG, hermeneutic philosophy was useful in interpreting the
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cultural context to discover the meanings behind actions and dialogue (Frost et al., 1985) that
affect the MCTOG organizational learning system at the individual, group, intergroup, and
organizational levels.
Memos, Codes, and NVivo: Due to the large number of interviews and observations,
procedural and analytical memo keeping was used to inform the bottom up approach. Documents
and transcripts from secondary and primary data were uploaded into NVivo 12, a qualitative data
analysis software tool for organizing, categorizing, and coding data captured from artifacts,
interviews, focus group transcripts, and field notes (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). While this
software was very helpful for storing, sorting, coding, and developing themes, it was only a tool.
The interpretive approach to this qualitative study demanded manual analysis to sift through and
obtain the subtext nuances of pauses and inflections and emotional and kinesthetic emphasis
used to amplify speech during an observation encounter.
The data analysis was a continuous and cyclical process. As data were collected, a
preliminary analysis was conducted on the archival documents, transcribed digital audio
recorded interviews, and focus group discussions, as well as the field notes taken during direct
observation and participant observation of working groups at the offsite and town hall meetings
and briefings. This study was exploratory in nature, so I employed a bottom up data analysis and
allowed the concepts to emerge from a continued analysis of the data as it was collected and
analyzed for further coding of keywords and phrases. According to Miles and Huberman (2014),
“codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to descriptive or inferential information
compiled during a study” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 56). My approach to the first coding cycle was a
blend of conceptual coding to describe and summarize the data collected in terms of ToA (Miles
et al., 2014; Saldaña, 2013). I also employed thematic coding and identified the thematic
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contours of the qualitative data to capture the richness of MCTOG as a dynamic organization.
The first coding cycle produced 14 parent nodes and 74 child nodes. From the first coding cycle,
the story of the failed implementation of the campaign play began to take shape. The second
coding cycle was conceptional and focused on answering the research question and identifying
where MCTOG attempted to engage in Model II double-loop learning system behaviors and
Model I single-loop learning system behaviors and the impacts of those behaviors on the
implementation of the campaign plan.
After every contact with the participants, I prepared a contact summary report to capture
the atmospherics (tone, mood, nonverbal communication) from each contact and to refine future
follow-up questions in the interview and focus group protocols and to discover emergent themes.
III.6

Sharing the Research in Real Time

Congruent with engaged scholarship and the co-production of knowledge (Van de Ven, 2007), at
the conclusion of the data collection, I periodically conducted updates in the form of analytical
memos with the Commanding Officer of MCTOG, the most senior uniformed service member
who was not a participant in the study, but who collaborated with me to focus the study.
Additionally, I conducted a final debriefing with both the Commanding Officer and the top GS in
the organization, the Deputy of MCTOG, who was a participant in the study. The debriefing
covered all aspects of the study to include the case results and discussion items—particularly
those that bore implications for practice.
The debriefing was another element to check on observer bias, as it provided the
opportunity for questions from senior members of MCTOG and to challenge the case results,
conclusions, and recommendations. Questions asked during the debriefings were focused on
expanding understanding of the discoveries detailed in the results section of this study and
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discussing potential remedies. While there were no objections to the findings, there was a very
productive discussion on what to do with the findings. Additionally, having a senior
representative from both uniformed service members and GS members provided a valuable
opportunity to communicate the findings to those capable of making systemic changes to the
organization.
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IV

CASE RESULTS

The fieldwork for this study yielded a daunting amount of unstructured data harvested from 14
in-depth semi-structured interviews, three focus groups, and field notes created from 21 hours of
participant observations from group meetings and briefings. The method, combined with my
roles within the organization as an employee, retired Marine colonel, and as a researcher,
afforded a unique opportunity to study this organization as it implemented the campaign plan.
This approach gave me a multi-faceted vantage point from which to observe an organization
from both near and afar. From this vantage point and with tools and skills provided by academic
rigor, I was able to unearth and make sense of explanatory frames throughout this case; those
that would have eluded me in the past.
MCTOG was typically organized in a pyramidical hierarchy with lines of authority, roles,
and responsibilities cleanly depicted in a line and block hierarchical graphic (MCTOG, 2017).
MCTOG was well-led by experienced, intelligent, and earnest active-duty Marines and GS
employees. The Commanding Officer’s intent and guidance were clear and issued in writing and
verbally disseminated. The leadership created and maintained a positive command climate;
people wanted to be there (MCTOG, 2019b). MCTOG was primarily staffed by a roughly 150strong intelligent, dedicated, and experienced hybrid workforce consisting of both active military
and GS employees. The organization was not unwieldy, being neither large nor widely
distributed and inhabiting a compound of less than one acre. The usual suspects contributing to a
dysfunctional organization, including poor leadership and climate, improper organization, a
workforce that is not up to the task, or an unwieldy size or being too widely distributed, were all
absent. With so many positive aspects to the organization and so few of the negatives associated
with a dysfunctional organization, why did the campaign plan implementation and realization of
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the vision fail? Seeking to understand this phenomenon was the inspiration for this study.
The data unearthed five phenomena operating within MCTOG that provide an
explanatory framework (Figure 6) for answering the research question: “Why was it difficult for
the Marine Corps to implement the strategic initiative of Mw despite 30 years of training and
education efforts to do so?” The power of the explanatory frames is that they provide a structure
and lexicon to a set of unstructured, often hidden, and nameless dynamics at work within an
organization. This framework provides ‘name it to tame it’ mechanism necessary for managers
to make sense of a complex and dynamic situation. As a result, managers are more likely to
actualize their strategic pursuits.
Figure 6: The Five Explanatory Frames

Mw
Functional
Illiteracy
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Clan Control
to Maintain
Status Quo

Uncertainty
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Campaign
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Ignoring

The five explanatory frames are: 1) “Uncertainty in a hybrid organization.” 2) “Mw
functional illiteracy.” 3) “The campaign plan gets a damn good ignoring.” 4) “Lions living as
lambs.” 5) “Sub rosa clan control to maintain the status quo.”
These five explanatory frames describe and explain the complex and nuanced behavior of
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MCTOG’s members that ultimately placed the bureaucratic governing variable at odds, and
incompatible with the USMC and Mw governing variables. The behavior observed within the
bureaucratic variable was a form of careerism that ran afoul of the traditionally held Marine
Corps ethos of "honor, courage, and commitment” (Holmes-Eber, 2014b; Johnson, 2018).
Finally, the five explanatory frames revealed how a sub rosa clan operating within
MCTOG’s formal hierarchical structure to effectively countered MCTOG senior management’s
attempts to create a Model II, double-loop environment and implement a strategic initiative in
the form of the campaign plan (Chua et al., 2012; Ouchi, 1980). The result of this complex
interplay was that MCTOG’s attempted intervention to implement the campaign plan and
accomplish the mandate of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to reinvigorate Mw, ultimately
fell short of its goal.
The five explanatory frames presented in this chapter provide the warp and weft of a
storyline that examines one organization’s attempt to adopt a new espoused theory in the form of
the campaign plan. Running throughout this storyline is a fil de guidage rouge5, provided by the
salient elements of ToA, which are espoused theory, theory-in-use, Model I and Model II
organizational behaviors, governing variables, and single-loop and double-loop organizational
learning. Together, the explanatory framework set against the theoretical ToA framework serves
to answer the research question.
IV.1

Explanatory Frame 1: Uncertainty in a Hybrid Organization

MCTOG is a novel organization compared to most other Marine Corps organizations. As a
result, what seems familiar from the outside to incoming uniformed members results in a

5

A red guiding thread running through a story or body of work
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dislocation of expectations once they were inside the organization.
“Okay, this place is interesting. I’ve never been to a command that has the
dynamics of MCTOG. When I first got here, I thought it was the craziest
command I have ever been to.” (Faculty participant)
In 13 different interviews, participants referenced MCTOG’s unfamiliar hybrid
organization 53 times. In many ways, the novelty of MCTOG rendered previous assumptions
and norms held by the members from their previous experiences obsolete, requiring the
discovery of new assumptions and norms. The discovery process was idiosyncratic to each
member, as MCTOG lacked any form of socialization process to onboard new members and
explicitly established norms, values, and expectations. Without a formal onboarding process,
discovery took place on the job over the first year of their assignment and through interacting
with other members. The lack of formal socialization to aid new members in assimilating into the
unfamiliar structure created ambiguity in MCTOG’s purpose and created mixed messages and
silos of communication organized around those with the highest rank among middle
management.
“You have three lieutenant colonels and a vast preponderance of the leadership
who all have a different answer of what MCTOG [does], is indicative of the
problem.” (Faculty participant)
Explaining the atmospherics of what life at MCTOG was like for the participants
provides a contextual understanding of how the environment may have contributed to the other
explanatory frames discovered and that ultimately influenced organizational learning. There
were three main dynamics forming the atmosphere for life at MCTOG. First was the dynamics
created by a hybrid workforce of uniformed and GS employees. Second was the effect of many
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of the uniformed members at a crossroads in their personal and professional lives while trying to
establish a work–life balance. Third was the sense of uncertainty within the frenetic tempo at
MCTOG.
One of the factors making MCTOG a novel organization that seemed alien to the
uniformed members was how the structure and hierarchy at MCTOG differed from the operating
force in two important ways. First, MCTOG was staffed with a high concentration of senior
ranking uniformed members. Second, MCTOG had a significant presence of GS employees,
which most uniformed members had never worked closely with.
The high concentration of senior uniformed members was due to the relatively high rank
of the student population, which created a need for a faculty and staff that is atypically top-heavy
in grade compared to the structure of the operating forces that is familiar to most Marines.
MCTOG only had about 90 uniformed faculty and staff, yet the concentration of majors,
lieutenant colonels, and master sergeants assigned to MCTOG would be equivalent to a typical
Marine Corps organization five times that size. Such a concentration of seniority appeared to
blur what usually are very clear lines of hierarchical authority familiar to Marines.
“You have such a high number of ‘Alpha males,’ majors, lieutenant colonels, a
colonel, master guns, a ton of master sergeants, it’s very disjointed, everyone is
going in different directions, a thousand miles an hour, and it wasn’t cohesive.”
(Faculty participant)
The high concentration of seniority also added to a level of isolation or “siloing” between small
sections led by relatively senior Marines. The impact of this concentration on communications
across the command was referenced 40 times over 11 interviews.
“So, the three instructors I had…none of them ever talked. They kept to
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themselves, tried to do their own thing, and there was no crosstalk. No trying to
help each other out.” (Faculty participant)
Even in an organization as small and compact as MCTOG, the insulating effect of silos impacted
even the most basic of relationships, facial recognition.
“There's people that I know have worked for here for two years, I'm having a
conversation with them, and someone walks by, and I'm like, who is that? They
work here; they have a white badge. They have worked here at least six months
because the badge-maker has been broken for at least that long. But they've
[actually] worked here two years, and I've never seen that person. To me, that's a
problem at any organization, especially one this small.” (Faculty participant)
The other element of novelty about MCTOG was the presence of civilians in the
command, including the number two position in the organization. Again, to most Marines, this
was a completely different environment from the operating forces where civilians were not part
of the workforce. Even though all GS civilians had significant prior military experience, there
was a tension between the uniformed members and the GS employees. The GS employees
perceived a lack of respect for their experience prior to and within MCTOG, and the uniformed
perceived the GS employees to be entrenchment and resistant to change.
“Yep, so that bridge gets burned, and the lack of communication is sometimes
deliberate… There are some outstanding Americans here as GS that are
professional all the time… there others that should have been fired years ago that
are like a cancer holding this place back.” (Faculty participant)
GS employees tended to be in the organization much longer than uniformed members.
For example, two of the four GSs in this study had been at MCTOG for all 10 years of the
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organization’s existence. This longevity contrasted starkly with the uniformed members, whom
at most will spend three years, and often less, at MCTOG before heading to their next
assignment per normal Marine Corps personnel rotation policy. Often, the GS’s tended to feel
that the uniformed members did not appreciate their experience and that they were not listened to
when the organization engaged in problem solving.
"I've seen this problem three times now, and what you want to do just won’t
work.” (Staff participant)
Some participants voiced an undercurrent of resentment to the presence of civilians in a Marine
organization. One GS employee with 20 plus years of service as a Marine, including combat
tours, described his encounter with a senior enlisted Marine during his first week on the job at
MCTOG.
“I tried to have a conversation with a master sergeant, and we talked a little bit,
and after a couple of days, he was like, ‘why are you here? We don't need
civilians; we Marines can do our jobs’.” (Staff participant)
Conversely, some uniformed members saw the GS employees as entrenched and rigid.
“People are comfortable; there are staff [GS] that have been here for a lot of years that
have done things a certain way for a lot of years.” (Faculty participant)
One GS participant expressed knowledge about this perception as well.
“So, there is a perception, in my opinion, a false perception, you know some people
have been here so long they need to leave ‘cause [sic] they're stuck in their ways.”
(Staff participant)
The novelty of MCTOG as a hybrid, top-heavy organization in and of itself created an
atmosphere of uncertainty about where one fits in the organization and one’s value to the
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organization. Such uncertainty may sow the seeds fear and vulnerability, leading to a myriad of
defensive routines individuals will employ to reduce their exposure to embarrassment.
At the Crossroads of Life and Career: In addition to the uncertainty that accompanies
joining an unfamiliar and novel organization, many uniformed members found themselves
arriving at MCTOG with 10–12 years of service and at a crossroads in their careers. For the first
time in their careers, many contemplated the decision to either commit to getting to 20 years of
service to become retirement eligible or to simply resign and start another career in the private
sector. Adding to the context of life at MCTOG was a sense of tiredness among the uniformed
members. Many participants had arrived at MCTOG after being in the operating forces for
several years, where they had completed multiple overseas deployments. Typically, the
OPTEMPO in the operating forces is incredibly high and exhausting, and many of the instructors
hadn't taken leave6 for over two years before arriving at MCTOG and being expected to get up to
speed to instruct quickly.
“I mean we had a majority of guys [at MCTOG] with 60 plus days of leave on the
books that are coming off deployments… we had one guy last year, 90 some
days… and they go right into that [instructing]. So, I think that... some folks just
have different perspectives here, that kind of gets lost.” (Faculty participant)
When I asked a different participant about the impact of the operational tempo at MCTOG on the
faculty and staff the reply was as follows.
“They've gotten beaten down… some are just tired of being in this profession
[Marine Corps].” (Faculty participant)

6

An active duty, uniformed member of the military earns 30 days of ‘leave’ or paid time off annually.
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The other crossroads element encountered is that of finding a work–life balance.
“One of the problems I see [is] a lot of competing interests for the instructors,
whether it’s from trying to do their own service level [mandatory] professional
military education [to remain competitive for promotion], learn aspects at
MCTOG… you know the whole work, life, family balance.” (Faculty participant)
Many participants freshly out of the deploying operational forces are seeking to spend more time
with their families, which in their minds seemed to conflict with personally directed professional
development necessary to teach at MCTOG.
“The family/work balance is automatically, again, the first to suffer. But my wife
also understands that I’m coming home every night for the first time in a decade
that we’ve been together. So, she’s not terribly upset because I come home and we
eat dinner as a family and she gets the kids ready for bed and I go upstairs and I
got a stack of books on my desk I’m trying to read.” (Faculty participant)
Often times, instructors adopted a passive approach to MCTOG’s passive DIY self-directed
learning and focused instead on completing their tour and catching up on family time.
“Hey, am I really going to invest my nights and weekends reading these
publications when there is no real quality control mechanism? Or am I going to
make some decisions on, I'm going to work for 12 hours… to accomplish the
missions I've been given. But some nights and weekends I’m going to spend some
time with my friends and family because I haven’t seen them in a couple of years?"
(Faculty participant)
Uncertainty is a Given Certainty: As previously discussed, the lack of a formal
onboarding program at MCTOG that could communicate the organization's identity, norms, and
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values left new members to come to their own conclusions for each. Although questions
concerning uncertainty were not part of the interview protocol, a general feeling of uncertainty
due to a lack of direction within MCTOG appeared as a common theme throughout the study,
with 73 references over 13 interviews and in the two uniformed focus groups.
“There’s no clear sense of who we are as an organization. What the hell exactly is
it we’re doing… just this constant nebulous reactive world you live in, where
nobody really understands what the hell they’re doing or where they fit into it.”
Specifically, nine interviews produced 43 references pointing to a high OPTEMPO being
responsible for an atmosphere of uncertainty.
“But like [participant x] said, that's your primary job on Monday, and then you're
shifted to a different effort on Tuesday, and then you're doing something
completely different on Wednesday, so most of us go into pure survival mode.”
(Faculty participant)
Adding to the frustration of being “in survival mode” was also the perception that the
uncertainty and high OPTEMPO was self-generated within MCTOG.
“I think it is definitely self-inflicted… we do it to ourselves, intentionally and
unintentionally.” (Staff participant)
Finally, the lack of socialization through an onboarding process made for a very insular
or siloed organization where members of one department did not share information with
members of another department. Worse, even in a small compound with only 150 employees,
people didn’t know each other.
Good Things About MCTOG: For all the frustrations vented during the interviews, all
participants expressed positive sentiments about MCTOG and thought they brought value to the
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organization. They also expressed that MCTOG was positively assisting the operating forces.
“I would say 99.9% of the people say they liked being a part of MCTOG.
There’re some negative comments… but everybody believes that what they do
here not only makes a difference here at MCTOG but makes a difference across
the OPFOR [operating forces].” (Staff participant)
When asked to describe the impact of serving at MCTOG, one participant expressed a sense of
professional growth stemming from his duty as an instructor.
“Challenging, rewarding, frustrating… being in the classroom with the students,
challenging but very rewarding right? That’s how I’m being developed.” (Faculty
participant)
The established MCTOG norms and assumptions of uncertainty, exhaustion, high
operational tempo, and individuals facing personal and professional crossroads all combine to
provide a rich description of life at MCTOG and provide the atmospheric context to the
following four explanatory frames.
IV.2

Explanatory Frame 2: Mw and Functional Illiteracy

The original phenomenon that inspired this journey was the 37th CMC 's FRAGO-1/2016 call to
action to reinvigorate Mw. FMFM-1 Warfighting was published in 1989 by then CMC General
Al Gray and was vigorously implemented throughout the training and education continuum.
However, some 27 years later and after 15 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 37th
CMC’s FRAGO-1/2016 indicated dissatisfaction with the emphasis being placed on Mw and
sought an intervention to revive the cornerstone doctrine necessary for meeting the emerging
challenges of the 21st century. MCTOG was uniquely positioned to influence the reinvigoration
of Mw and saw the requirement for its own internal intervention necessary in the form of the
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campaign plan. But for MCTOG to reinvigorate Mw, its instructors must know the doctrine and
be able to teach it to the student population at the tacit level.
Teaching Mw at MCTOG was a Presumed Competency: The data show that among
the MCTOG faculty and staff, the knowledge and understanding of Mw and commitment to
teaching the Mw doctrine was an espoused theory only. To examine Mw as an espoused theory,
the interview protocol employed three questions intended to gauge a participant’s understanding
of Mw. For example, all participants were asked, “What is maneuver warfare and what does it
look like in practice?” The answers provided revealed the gap between each participant’s
espousal that they understand and practice Mw and their actual understanding and ability to
practice Mw, their theory-in-use. Additionally, during focus group discussions and during
participant observer sessions, I was able to assess the overall understanding of Mw as a doctrine
and philosophy from the answers given. While accounting for the fact that participants may be
caught off guard trying to articulate what may be fairly described as an abstract philosophy, and
might struggle a bit before getting around articulating the underlying principles and core
concepts, most never did get around to it. Nine of 14 participants gave rambling explanations of
Mw that seldom went beyond a few Mw buzzwords. For illustration, the Mw buzzwords are
bolded in the quotes below.
“All right, so, maneuver warfare, when I think of it, MCTOG is utilizing ideally
combined arms to generate some tempo or at least to have the desired effect on
your enemy. To make him bend to your will. That's – when I think of maneuver
warfare, that's what comes to mind for me.” (Faculty participant)
Often, participants struggled to distinguish Mw from attrition warfare.
“Um, first I’d say what maneuver warfare is to me, it would be, obviously, my
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definition per se is, is obviously do the most damage to the enemy with the least
amount of damage to yourself or your unit. When I say that to achieve, to achieve
which you know, your endstate.” (Faculty participant)
When pressed for more specific answers to define Mw, participants often conceded they could
not articulate Mw as a concept in action.
“I don’t know if we actually define maneuver warfare. It’s just one of those things
that we just say, oh yeah, maneuver warfare, EABO, MCO [tactical operating
concepts]. You know we just kind of throw it out there without really defining
what it means.” (Faculty participant)
One participant that had professed to be among the few career-long “maneuverists” struggled to
describe maneuver warfare.
“It’s one of those nebulous things where it’s – I don’t know, it's a mindset. So that
would, almost kind of be trying to define what a mindset looks like. And it's one of
those things where I know it when I see it, but I don't know if I can tell you in
practice what that actually is going to look like. Well, I don't.” (Staff participant)
Perhaps some of the difficulty in describing Mw lies in the deficit that exists among the
MCTOG faculty in the deliberate study and effort necessary to render a tacit understanding of a
concept into something more explicit for teaching students. This lack of study and understanding
presented itself in two ways during the interviews. First, when questioned, the instructors that
struggled with explaining Mw conceded they had not read the doctrine in a long while, some not
since entry-level training that had occurred over a decade ago.
“I've read it. It's been a while since I've read it, but I know it defines conflict. It
defines war, attrition, war of attrition, and maneuver warfare.” (Faculty
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participant)
In response to a follow-up to this question to another faculty member struggling to define Mw,
“When was the last time you read MCDP-1?” The reply was illuminating.
“Not [sic], I mean, not since TBS, at TBS7” (Faculty participant)
In the preface of the original Mw publication Warfighting FMFM-1 and in the updated
Mw publication Warfighting MCDP-1, the 29th CMC implored all Marines to “read and
reread” MCDP-1 Warfighting (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; USMC, 1989, 1997d) saying,
“This manual, Warfighting, describes a philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the
field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty” (USMC, 1989, p.1).
The lack of engagement by MCTOG faculty with the capstone doctrine of the Marine
Corps is evidence the 37th CMC was correct in his FRAGO-1 call to action to reinvigorate the
espoused theory of Mw. Furthermore, this is illustrative of the say-do-gap between the espoused
theory of the campaign plan and the theory in use by MCTOG instructors. The data from this
study shows that the 37th CMC call to action was well-founded, and the theory in use at MCTOG
fell well short of the 29th CMC call to “read and reread” the doctrine.
The second manner in which the lack of study and understanding of Mw presented was
how several participants confused the principles of Mw with elements of the Marine Corps
Planning Process (MCPP) and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). MCPP and IPB
are two highly structured and methodical planning and analysis processes closely aligned with
attrition warfare and the staple tools of staff planning for tactical operations. The following two
quotes from interviews with instructors speak to the emphasis placed on IPB and MCPP and how

7

TBS is the “The Basic School,” a compulsorily six-month entry-level school for all new Marine officers.
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they are conflated with Mw, in addition to the confusion between the IPB process and Mw
philosophy and doctrine8.
“Maneuver warfare practice I would say in today’s Corps is understanding the
battlefield, understanding your organization’s capabilities, and as important if
not more, is understanding the enemy in order to manipulate the terrain, whether
it, whatever domain it may be in.” (Faculty participant)
“So, maneuver warfare in my words, I guess, is the evaluation of an adversary,
understanding them as a system and then being able to creatively plan for and
adaptively apply our capabilities in order to unwind theirs to unhinge their
ability to actually fight on the battlefield.” (Faculty participant)
As a former tactics instructor, operations officer, and commander of an infantry battalion
for two combat tours in Iraq, I can attest that these statements are not fundamentally wrong.
Understanding the enemy is, of course, always a good thing, as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz
would agree (Charles & Tzu, 2012; Howard, 1998). However, the descriptions offered do reveal
a lack of understanding of the differences between Mw and the Marine Corps’ standard, linear
planning processes. Further evidence of conflating the planning processes with Mw doctrine was
the superficial sprinkling in of Mw terms such as “reconnaissance-pull” and “enemy
vulnerability” when trying to define Mw.
“I mean, for me, I'd say maneuver warfare is understanding your environment,
understanding the adversary. You know, I kind of see it as a recon pull thing. So
you use a little bit of understanding the enemy as a system and then going to see,

8

Bolded words are for effect and to identify Mw vernacular.
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you know, where the adversary is vulnerable. And then from there supporting
that, their vulnerability. It's not just straight-up attrition warfare to where you
just – I've got more tanks than you, and we just keep going.” (Faculty participant)
The above quotes are emblematic of the claim by some members of MCTOG that many
other members were simply “cocktail party dangerous” when it came to truly understanding and
teaching Mw. In a focus group of uniformed participants discussing the level of Mw proficiency
among instructors at MCTOG, they arrived at the following consensus summed up by one of the
participants:
“I think 40% of us understand and know how to apply maneuver warfare within
our MOS [military occupational specialty]. About 40% are just conversing in it,
and 20% are probably cocktail party dangerous.” (Faculty participant)
What is interesting about the consensus achieved in the focus group is that many of the
participants of this focus group themselves struggled to provide cogent answers on Mw during
their one-on-one interviews. Espousing their own knowledge of Mw and then pointing to others
as not knowing Mw is a classic defensive routine (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978, 1996). By
engaging in this defensive routine, the participants maintain governing values within tolerance
by avoiding the admission of their own lack of knowledge of Mw to preserve their self-image as
a professional knowledgeable in Mw. This defensive routine ensured the foundational flaw, that
the lack of sufficient understanding of the Mw capstone doctrine remained undiscussed within
MCTOG.
Discovering this general acknowledgment among the MCTOG staff and instructors that
there existed such a low level of knowledge regarding Mw was very surprising. While surprising,
what made this discovery very interesting was the organizational defensive routines and skilled
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unawareness necessary to prevent a significant defect in the organization from being surfaced
publicly—especially an organization with an experienced faculty and staff set out to reinvigorate
the Marine Corps' foundational doctrine. Taking the focus group's assessment and triangulating
with and from interviews, observations, and participant observations of the working group’s
discussions, a form of functional illiteracy in Mw among MCTOG instructors emerged. I’ve
extended the term functional illiteracy to frame the phenomenon of a large segment of MCTOG
faculty and staff possessing a low-level understanding of Mw as a hindrance to the MCTOG
mission. Just as inadequate reading and writing skills are a severe hindrance to an adult's
contribution and functioning in a community, so goes the ~60% of MCTOG instructors that are
unable to fluently articulate the basics of Mw to a level necessary to teach Mw and thereby
contribute the MCTOG mission. The United Nations Education Science and Culture
Organization (UNESCO) defines functional illiteracy as “a person is functionally illiterate who
cannot engage in all those activities in which literacy is required for the effective functioning of
his group and community” (UNESCO, 1978, p. 178). This definition fits the description
rendered by the focus group and the instructors who are not literate in Mw doctrine and,
therefore, cannot teach Mw and contribute to the group. Those deemed “D + or cocktail party
dangerous,” roughly 60% of the instructor cadre, ultimately cannot sufficiently contribute to
MCTOG’s effort to reinvigorate Mw.
Teaching Mw at MCTOG and Skilled Incompetence: The data revealed a low
understanding of Mw across the MCTOG faculty and staff, pointing to a hit or miss
understanding of Mw that was dependent on each individual’s self-study beyond TBS or other
entry-level exposure to Mw. While the MCTOG campaign plan also claimed to develop a
“world-class faculty” (MCTOG, 2017a, p. 5), the data revealed what on the surface appeared to
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be MCTOG's presumption of Mw competence with its instructors. After further analysis, Mw
functional illiteracy was more than a simple unexamined presumption: it was a functional
illiteracy that was both undiscussed and undiscussable in an open forum at MCTOG. As one
participant put it in a private interview:
“I would say we have to stop assuming that officers and SNCOs that get orders
here have the prerequisite knowledge or skills to be successful.” (Faculty
participant)
However, these sentiments were not voiced openly and addressed; instead, feelings were
suppressed, and the status quo, unequal understanding of Mw, and unfair workloads were
maintained. Maintaining the status quo meant MCTOG leaned heavily on those who arrived at
MCTOG with the requisite knowledge, skills, and experience to be successful as instructors and
carried the bulk of the instruction and workload. This core group of instructors self-identified as
the “fire brigade.” The fire brigade consisted of officers and enlisted members and had the
strongest grasp of Mw. The uneven distribution of work among instructors led to frustration and
resentment, exhaustion, and in some cases burn-out amongst members of the fire brigade.
“So, there are those who make that very mature, balanced decision [to do very
little]. And then there are others [the fire brigade] that are extremists who do the
twelve hours of work and then study at nights we do bottom-up like individual
professional development, and then all they get in return is even more work. And
then the twelve-hour day gets extended. Because they showed talent, they're going
to get worked. Because at the end of the day, the face that MCTOG puts out is
more important than what's going on under the hood.” (Faculty participant)
The reliance by MCTOG management on the fire brigade to deliver the bulk of quality
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instruction and maintain a high-quality MCTOG experience for the students created resentment
amongst the more capable fire brigade instructors for shouldering what they perceived to be an
unfair burden leading to burn out.
One instructor hinted at the old saw, “Never demonstrate a capability in the presence of a
need.”
“If you get singled out as being the expert, those in the middle and the
bureaucracy know what happens to the racehorse, they get ridden until they die.”
(Faculty participant)
One member of the fire brigade, when asked, “What do the non-fire brigade instructors do?”
replied:
“What is everybody doing? I really don't know; as a member of the fire brigade,
I'm constantly going from one thing to another. I know the perception here is that
the majority don't do a whole lot… [they] are very positive about working at
MCTOG, especially if the tax they pay is low and the core group [fire brigade] is
used and abused.” (Faculty participant)
Marines reporting to MCTOG for instructor duty were drawn from across the Marine
Corps operating forces and supporting establishments and represented several military
occupational skill designations. What became clear during the study was that individuals
possessed an uneven distribution of capabilities to instruct on operations, tactics, and Mw. The
checkerboard of talent arriving at MCTOG indicates that the issue of low Mw competency
observed at MCTOG possibly extends across the rest of the Marine Corps.
It was also clear that MCTOG did nothing to provide policies that benefitted everyone in
the form of instructor development. Instead, pressured by a high operation tempo, the minority of
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instructors that could instruct at a high level delivered the bulk of the instruction, and the rest
participated in the margins. The dynamic reminded me of the plight of Boxer, the workhorse in
George Orwell’s 1945 classic, Animal Farm. This classic tale exposes the all-too-common
inequalities in work environments through Boxers’ efforts working to exhaustion and lameness
on the farm while the other characters gladly let him do so, offering all assistance short of actual
help. Boxer’s reward for hard work was a trip to the glue factory.
While undiscussable in a public forum at MCTOG, the topic of insufficient or ineffective
instructor development was referenced 135 times in 12 of 14 interviews and in all three focus
groups. While there was instructor development available regarding the science of learning and
best practices for classroom instruction and leading discussion, it was episodic, not progressive,
and not mandatory. However, the MCTOG senior management assumed all instructors were
participating and were surprised when I informed them otherwise, as one instructor put it:
“So, initially, when it stood up last summer, we were all under the impression that
it was going to be a mandatory thing. The way that shook out was that if an
instructor didn't want to do it, they just didn't do it.” (Faculty participant)
Another instructor confirmed the optional nature of instructor development.
“Yeah, nothing, [official direction] if it’s mandatory, it’s on paper only, and I
haven’t seen a piece of paper that says it’s mandatory.” (Faculty participant)
Moreover, even if the extant instructor development program had been mandatory, it did
not address the low levels of Mw understanding amongst most of the instructors. One participant
said:
“We don't have any instructor development focused on the philosophy of
maneuver warfare at all… You know the analogy I've tried to use with people is, if
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I'm teaching math, you can make me the best teacher in the world as far as my
instructional technique. But if I don't know math, my students won't know math
when they leave.” (Faculty participant)
When it came to MCTOG instructors attaining a level of competency in Mw sufficient to
teach it, the bid for success relied on instructors being autodidacts, an aspiration that was not
uniform across the organization.
“We all talk about maneuver warfare a lot. I’m not sure that everybody here is
necessarily vested in developing an in-depth understanding of what that means to
us individually and as a service, That, I think, is where we’re lacking.” (Staff
participant)
Resistance to Instructor Development, I’m Not Smart and You Can’t Make Me:
One unstated reason instructor development remained unformalized by the command and
uncovered in the research was an unspoken resistance among the instructor cadre. This resistance
appeared in two main narratives: “I’m already an expert” and “We don’t have time.” These
narratives represent defensive routines aimed at preserving two elements of the bureaucratic
governing variables: protecting one's reputation as a competent and experienced professional and
protecting one’s personal time.
The “I’m already an expert” narrative can be related to the unusually high concentration
of senior Marines. Most of the senior enlisted Marines assigned to instructor duty had already
served one or more tours of duty as instructors and had achieved a rating of “Master Instructor.”
The following quote is from a senior instructor paraphrasing other senior instructors.
“And some [say] I’m already a master instructor, I don’t need to learn anything
else.” (Faculty participant)
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While this is true, master instructor certifications were focused on basic entry-level training for
the most junior Marines. The below quote is from an adult education subject matter expert on
staff at MCTOG.
“But look at the context in which they become master instructors, it was for
specific task-based training, do this, then this, then this, if this happens then do
this, the explicit piece, right?” (Staff participant)
And this quote from a long-time member of MCTOG and faculty observer:
"We have a very seasoned and senior staff, and having them go to something
called the new instructor course gives them an instant turn-off. I'm a Master
Sergeant, I am a LtCol, I am a Major… I don't need to be told or instructed how
to be an instructor.” (Faculty participant)
Basic entry-level training programs are focused on behavioral tasks and are at the explicit
end of the knowledge spectrum, focusing on declarative knowledge (what) and procedural
knowledge (how) (Gorman, 2002). Teaching at the explicit end of the spectrum is sufficient for
teaching the fundamentals and skills, IPB or MCPP. The explicit end of the spectrum was
typically delivered didactically and followed the formal instruction document titled the Master
Lesson File (MLF). The MLF is a very structured document that proscribes the elements for
instructing on a subject to include formal lecture, typically following a script with pre-approved
slides with no deviation from the instructor (MCTOG, 2018a). The MLF proscribed a didactic
pedagogical approach for teaching, which was very familiar and comfortable to the instructors.
By adhering to the MLF, there was little risk of an instructor ever being challenged or wrong;
therefore, they avoided embarrassment and risk to their reputation. By sprinkling in a few Mw
buzzwords, one could satisfy both Mw and bureaucratic governing variables and maintain the
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status quo of the theory in use. However, this pedagogical approach is insufficient for teaching
the art of Mw, tactics, and operations at the level of the campaign plan aspirations.
To reinvigorate Mw, the campaign plan envisioned a much more dynamic pedagogical
approach focused on the more tacit end of the knowledge spectrum. Teaching Mw would require
a departure from the familiar MLF didactic approach and would require a dynamic program of
instruction (POI) that focused on judgment (when) and wisdom (why) (Gorman, 2002). This
approach requires instructors to be fluent in Mw in order to facilitate discussion, discourse, and
engaging the students in free-play wargames where they challenge and may be challenged by the
students, and the instructor could be wrong. This was unsettling for much of the instructor cadre,
as it threatened the bureaucratic governing variable by exposing them to embarrassment and loss
of reputational status, and therefore upset the status quo of the Model I theory in use. This
sentiment of vulnerability to embarrassment and loss of reputation is captured in this quote by an
instructor:
“So [the student] is like this guy [MCTOG instructor] has done some things, been
some places, so he must be a true professional. Until you open your mouth and
you're wrong, and when you're wrong, you've lost that credibility.” (Faculty
participant)
The instructor cadre was not the only element within MCTOG to resist the aims of the
campaign plan and the effort to reinvigorate Mw. MCTOG management also exhibited a level of
avoidance when it came to mandating instructor development. A quote from a senior manager at
MCTOG underscores this reluctance.
“Nobody wants to own that program [instructor development] because they’re
going to have to teach their peers, and that's difficult. Showing them that they’re
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wrong isn't always easy or the nice thing to do, but we have to adopt that because
we're not going to get any better.” (Staff participant)
The sentiment in the above quote speaks to a Model I organization seeking to maintain the status
quo by not publicly surfacing defects, in this case, unprepared instructors. There was also what
may be described as cultural resistance to anything labeled mandatory that places the MCTOG
management in the position of making unpopular policy.
“I know you're well aware right, in the Marine Corps, as soon as you put the
word 'mandatory' in front of anything, it is automatically a turn-off for a lot of
people.” (Faculty participant)
IV.3

Explanatory Frame 3: The MCTOG Campaign Plan Gets a Damn Good Ignoring

The third explanatory frame is the ineffective implementation of the MCTOG campaign plan.
Despite MCTOG being in existence for 10 years, and the importance and complexity of its
mission as a schoolhouse and COE, it never had an overarching strategic vision to guide its
actions and activities and grow the scope of the organization. Consequently, resources and
priorities were approached in a very reactionary manner, as evidenced by MCTOG conducting
10 internal reorganizations in 10 years and never establishing a clear identity as a schoolhouse or
COE. Without a comprehensive long-range vision, MCTOG was reflexively responding to shortterm and divergent stakeholder demands from the supporting establishment and operating forces.
The combination of a robust task list from stakeholders, no clear identity as an organization and
lack of a long-range vision, all contributed to the chaotic atmosphere and sense of uncertainty
among the members. As an institution, MCTOG was underperforming in terms of its potential to
contribute to the overall combat readiness of the Marine Corps.
In June of 2017, MCTOG embarked on an effort to answer CMC’s FRAGO-1 call to
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action and establish its long-range goals as an institution. This effort was in the form of a
campaign plan outlining a 10-year (2017–2027) vision for the organization. Central to this vision
was to reinvigorate Mw through training and educating operations and intelligence officers and
senior enlisted Marines. MCTOG’s role as a schoolhouse afforded an ideal platform to influence
the key influencers across the GCE.
The Campaign Plan as a Strategic Initiative: The MCTOG 2018–2028 campaign plan
(MCTOG, 2018b) was an aspirational and strategic document designed to chart the
organization’s path for the future, establish priorities, and restore Mw to primacy as the doctrinal
underpinning all combat operations.
The MCTOG campaign plan was ‘strategic’ in four ways (Shivakumar, 2014). First, the
plan would provide a unifying vision for the training and education of key members of the
Marine Corps’ operating forces for the next decade (MCTOG, 2018b). Second, it aimed to
reinvigorate Mw, a priority for the CMC (USMC, 2016a). Third, such a change would
necessitate a large commitment of irretrievable resources, namely the time and effort to not only
redesign the existing curricula but to reimagine it in an entirely new approach to teaching.
Another significant commitment would be to formalize and resource a faculty development
program to develop the “world-class faculty” (MCTOG, 2018a, p. 5) necessary to deliver the
new curricula. Fourth, successful implementation of the MCTOG campaign plan was not a trivial
matter (Pinfield, 2006). The potentially dire battlefield consequences resulting from the Marine
Corps supporting establishment planning and equipping for war under the espoused theory of
Mw (USMC, 2016c) while the operating forces were actually holding to an attrition warfare
theory-in-practice presented a misalignment of preparation and execution. Such a misalignment
would be exposed on the battlefield against a capable enemy, likely resulting in mission failure
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and costing considerable blood and treasure.
In addition to the campaign plan being a strategic document, it served as an intervention
by MCTOG senior management to stimulate the adaptive change necessary for MCTOG to
address the chaotic and uncertain environment felt by its members and to gain relevance as an
institution. However, as an intervention, it also represented a new espoused theory for the
organization that would require members of MCTOG to change their approaches in instruction,
organizational structure, and responsibilities. The campaign plan, as a new espoused theory,
represented a threat to the status quo Model 1 theory-in-practice. This threat to the status quo
encountered numerous defensive routines at the individual and group levels, the most common of
which employed to maintain the status quo Model I theory in use were avoidance, inertia, and
indifference.
A primary defensive routine employed within MCTOG by the faculty and staff was a
conspicuous avoidance, inertia, and indifference to addressing the published campaign plan. The
campaign plan was published in January 2018 and went exactly nowhere for nearly a year. As
one of the major contributing authors to the campaign plan, I was invited to participate in an
MCTOG leadership offsite in December of 2018 to help provide a framework for its
implementation. In preparation for that offsite, the commander of MCTOG issued guidance for
the attendees, consisting of division heads, senior instructors, both officers and enlisted, and key
members of the staff, to read, reflect, and discuss the campaign plan implementation. I found
evidence of avoidance as many of the leadership team in attendance had not even read the
campaign plan, let alone internalized, analyzed, and discussed the implementation of it within
their sub-organizations. During the offsite, it was clear that elementary discovery learning was
going on with attendees engaging with the campaign plan, and each other, in a meaningful way
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for the first time in a year since it was published.
“When we finally looked at our campaign plan, and that was good exposure,
good discussion… frank discussion, about what it is what the purpose is.”
(Faculty participant)
Interestingly, the participants that complained of uncertainty and not knowing the
direction MCTOG was headed did not read the campaign plan. When challenged about their
disengagement, most cited being too busy and not having enough time. When I probed into the
‘not enough time’ avoidance defensive reasoning tactic, most all backed away from that excuse
as indefensible. An example of abandoning the ‘not enough time’ defensive routine follows.
“But so, let me rephrase that I believe we do have enough time, we got all the
time in the world. It's just that we use that as a crutch to prevent us from going
where we need to go. There is time; there is a ton of time.” (Faculty participant)
Other participants avoidance of defensive reasoning focused on the concern that they would
invest effort in an initiative that would end up changing anyway.
“I don't know. People not caring, probably, people not caring enough. They know
that stuff is going to change, so they're just oh yeah we got a campaign plan, Oh,
I'll just wait until it changes.” (Faculty participant)
This quote sums up the wait and see defensive reasoning to avoid the campaign plan.
“I honestly thought at the offsite that we’re going change it up a little bit. So, I
didn’t want to get too wrapped around it.” (Faculty participant)
One participant, an intelligent, very capable, and well thought of instructor and member
of the fire brigade, was at the end of his three-year tour at MCTOG and about to transfer to
another duty station within days. In a way, our interview served as a very candid exit survey of
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sorts. During the interview, we discussed his issues with, and opinions on, the campaign plan.
The following exchange revealed a sequence of layered defensive routines as the participant
employed one, and then abandoned it once challenged, quickly falling back on another before
abandoning it as well in an inwardly collapsing perimeter of defensive routines. When asked
about the campaign plan, the participant confirmed he had read it. When asked what it was
about, his defensive routine was one of indifference, stating the campaign plan was too vague to
be of much use.
“What’s the campaign plan about? That’s a good question… I read it about eight
months ago; I don’t feel the campaign plan gave enough granularity in the
functional or even detail realm.” (Faculty participant)
When pressed to give his opinion on some of the details the campaign plan lacked, he
admitted he yet had not read the campaign plan in detail. He then added that the campaign plan
had likely changed since it first came out, employing the “it’s going to change, so I won't engage”
avoidance defensive routine.
“I mean, I have a feeling it has been updated three or four times since I’ve had a
chance to see it.” (Faculty participant)
I informed the participant that the campaign plan had been neither updated nor modified since it
was published. Shifting in his seat, the participant then commented on senior management’s
attempt to ‘roll-out’ the campaign plan in January 2018 and intimated that the rollout of the
campaign plan was insufficient.
“We had a one-day PME [professional military education] in Classroom 1 on the
campaign plan… with the whole staff. Like, here's where we're going here's what
we're doing. I didn’t understand it then. Well, we didn’t spend the whole day.”
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(Faculty participant)
I then presented to the participant the fact the MCTOG Commanding Officer had issued a
directive for all personnel to read it and conduct a mission analysis within their sections and to
discuss and determine the details necessary for executing the campaign plan. The participant fell
back to the “we’re too busy” ‘inertia’ defensive routine. When asked what happened after the
rollout of the campaign plan, the participant responded with this avoidance/inertia defensive
routine.
“You know, at the instructor level, not a whole lot to be honest with you. People
got back to work in the trenches as far as what had to happen on a daily basis,
working with the students, there wasn’t a lot of energy from the organization
forced into the whole organization.” (Faculty participant)
I explained how the campaign plan was a 10-year vision that provided goals, reasoning
behind those goals, and lines of effort with waypoints to achieve those goals. The campaign plan
was never intended to be a detailed checklist, and the commander's instruction was for the staff
and instructors to engage with the campaign plan and bring the details to life. At this moment,
the participant revealed what seemed to be his truest objection to the campaign plan, which was
not having a say in drafting the campaign plan versus the campaign plan itself.
“I think some of this was unintentional, but part of it, you know, was intentional.
At least what I’ve seen in the past three years. Things are closely guarded, walled
off, then like a big unveiling, like, bam, here’s where we’re going. It’s like man,
where did this come from? Turns out, a small group of people decided that what
we’re going to do. Some of it’s good, yeah.” (Faculty participant)
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This final defensive routine, a feeling of indifference due to disenfranchisement, was
interesting and felt like something closer to the actual reason for resisting any action on the
campaign plan. What was more interesting is that the MCTOG senior management clearly gave
direction to middle management to solicit feedback from their sections and even required middle
management to provide that feedback to senior management. Despite these efforts from senior
management, middle management provided very little if any feedback. The participant above, as
a mid-grade instructor near the bottom of the hierarchy, had felt he was never given the
opportunity to contribute to the campaign plan’s development. While senior management gave
direction for vigorous discussion and feedback from across the command, that wasn’t translated
by the middle management to the instructor cadre. This point will resurface in the following two
explanatory frames concerning a tension between governing variables and clan activity.
IV.4

Explanatory Frame 4: Lions Living as Lambs

MCTOG is a relatively high performing organization that is well-led and populated by
intelligent, energetic individuals in and out of uniform. All but one of the participants had one or
more tours of combat, and as Marines, all would jump on a grenade if asked. Interestingly,
during the course of interviewing the participants, I frequently came upon the theme of fear.
“Fear” was the word the participants used in the context of the “fear of looking bad” and was
referenced 42 times in 12 interviews. In the interviews, I probed for but did not detect any fear at
all from the chain of command, taking punitive action, withholding support, or any other form of
coercive action. Digging deeper into the data, I was looking for the driving factors behind this
curious sense of fear in the organization. I found, embedded in the bureaucratic governing
variable (the drive to have a successful career and advance upwards through the bureaucracy),
typical defensive routine behaviors. Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978, 1996) define defensive
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routines as “maximize winning and minimize losing.” Defensive routines are used by individuals
to protect themselves and others from embarrassment and suppress defects or errors in the status
quo.
Reputation and Saving Face: The Marine Corps is small, and one’s reputation precedes
them like a shot from duty station to duty station for the length of their career and beyond. As
one participant stated:
“I can tell you from someone who's been here for four, five, six years, a person's
(reputation) can be misperceived, distorted, and then turned into the folklore of
how that person is or isn't. Without actually getting to know that person... The
perception is don’t go to him because you know, he’s whatever, angry, grumpy,
mad.” (Staff participant)
The above quote speaks to the social capital one’s reputation provides not just in terms of being
competent but in conforming to the norms of being a team player and not rocking the boat. It
also hints at the need to curate one’s reputation in a positive light. In addition to not protecting
one's reputation, staying in the middle ground of the system is important in the Marine Corps, as
“individuals that fail to conform to the norm, buck the system or challenge the system are likely
not to be promoted” (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p. 37).
“I don’t think they wake up, ‘like how am I going to hide and slide today?’ I think
its’s like learned behavior and the Marine Corps makes it well known that they
don’t like extremist on either end. So, it’s safe. That’s what the institution is
telling them.” (Faculty participant)
Maintaining one's reputation is, therefore, important, even existential for one's career,
seemingly more so in the senior ranks as the bureaucratic pyramid narrows and competition for
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promotion stiffens. Maintaining one’s professional reputation as a competent warfighter was
indispensable for promotion and thus closely guarded. One participant and member of the fire
brigade made this observation about curating one’s outward persona into order to conform to the
norm.
“That very conservative middle of the road, the way they wear their hair, the way
they dress, what they read, how they talk, it's the very conservative middle of the
bureaucratic road. And it's safe. If you take either of USMC or Mw variables to
the extreme, it is no longer safe for you even to question some of the bureaucratic
values or effectiveness of maintaining the status quo, especially in combat.”
(Faculty participant)
The active-duty Marines serving in middle management or as senior instructors had built
their reputations in the operating forces during combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Over 15 years of combat, the theater of operations had matured, become more static, and evolved
into very structured, rigid, procedure-oriented operations. A signature feature of the rigid
procedure-oriented characteristics of these deployments was the Battle Update Assessment
(BUA). With access to nearly limitless data and the bandwidth for transmitting terabits of
information, the BUA had evolved into a very stylized Kabuki theater with staff officers
displaying artful PowerPoint slides and spreadsheets crunching data from past encounters and
publishing future combat schedules. This phenomenon is aptly captured by Vietnam veteran and
former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Bing West. West spent many months on the front
lines in both Iraq and Afghanistan and became a keen observer of all levels of command in those
theaters. In his book The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, West
(2011) made this observation of the BUA:
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“Headquarters staffs convened daily for a Battlefield Update Assessment or BUA.
In operations centers across Afghanistan, rows upon rows of midlevel officers sat
in front of laptop computers looking, as though in a movie theater, at huge
screens that displayed colored maps and spreadsheets of data. The center screen
showed the gigantic image of the senior general chairing the meeting. He
presided like a deity, while one after another, junior officers walked to a
microphone to gravely report statistics on personnel, operations, logistics,
electric power, fuel, news, weather, and the latest engagements, from a few shots
fired in the north to a bomb explosion in the south. After each set of data was
displayed, the staff awaited the general's oracular pronouncement.” (p. 151)
The BUA practice described by West, and the behavior it created, represents the very
antithesis to Mw. Becoming very good at this mechanistic approach is what many of the
instructors at MCTOG had built their combat reputations on, and this carried over into their
approach to teaching their experiences and sticking to what they know—MCPP and IPB.
“Right, you will not be judged for your failure, because you used the prescribed
process. The problem with MCPP is it has become a high religion in the Marine
Corps… you run the process, and it poops out this two-inch thick order that I'm
going to execute step-by-step-by-step, and if it fails, oh, I used the right processes,
and we did everything by the book.” (Staff participant)
The planning processes and BUA techniques and procedures lent themselves to instruction at the
explicit end of the spectrum and therefore, within the comfort zone for many instructors. As
discussed earlier, with Mw as a presumed competency section, teaching Mw at the tacit level
was something uncomfortable, if not threatening, to many instructors.
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“What I've picked up on is people come in as unprepared [in instruct at the tacit
level], and they don't want to be identified as unprepared.” (Faculty participant)
The need to protect one's reputation, combined with combat experiences that were not
relevant to Mw and the direction MCTOG was headed with the campaign plan, created angst
among many of the instructor cadre who responded with defensive routines to suppress this
defect. These behaviors showed up throughout the data in various forms but were all connected
by fear of looking bad theme. Together, these behaviors formed an impressive panoply of
defensive routines conforming to Model I behaviors. The panoply of defensive routines consisted
of the following.
The first defensive routine to avoid embarrassment, individuals employed a “faking the
funk” routine to feign knowledge or competency in order to preserve their reputation. One
participant articulated the motivation behind “faking the funk” this way:
“And like, oh, you’ve been in 17 years and can’t explain it, [Mw] shame on you.”
(Faculty participant)
During a Core Design Team (CDT) session, the Deputy of MCTOG wrote on the
whiteboard a statement about creating battalion systems as a goal for curriculum development to
support the campaign plan. As a participant-observer, I did not understand what the Deputy
meant by this term but kept silent to observe the others. I noticed blank expressions. After
several more minutes of the Deputy talking and the working group being superficially engaged,
the Deputy began to move on to another topic, so I interrupted and asked what he meant by the
battalion system. This question was answered, and a meaningful discussion then took place to
define it further and the implications it held for the curriculum. In follow-up interviews, I asked a
participant who had been present in that session why nobody asked for clarification to the term
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and just passively sat there. His response clearly spoke to the “faking the funk” defensive
routine.
“I think that’s usually it [on why to fake the funk]. People are afraid that they’ll
look dumb in front of peers or subordinates or seniors.” (Faculty participant)
Illustrating that this observation was prevalent across MCTOG, another participant extended my
observation to include instructors and students in the classroom.
“If we had an audience of 10 or 20 people, everybody would just do this [nodding
head up and down]. They would nod their heads north and south and say 'we get
it'. But if that instructor or guest facilitator started to have a dialogue with the
group, they won't be able to have a conversation.” (Staff participant)
The second defensive routine data unearthed a defensive routine of “nay-saying” and
claiming “not enough of…” to deflect responsibility for acting or achieving results. This
defensive routine was a claim of a paucity of one resource or another to account for one's
inaction. This appeared in a few forms, such as not enough information, not enough time, not the
right people (students and instructors), not the right structure and finally, not enough institutional
buy-in. I likened the employment of the “not enough of…” routine to a tactical aircraft's
countermeasures of chaff and flares to decoy enemy-guided missiles away and protect the
aircraft. This defensive routine was referenced 76 times over 13 interviews. One staff member
commented on the weighting of the curricula to the explicit end as:
“I think from explicit learning [perspective], they're rock stars, ready to the next
level. But, then we have a bunch that is coming in, and I don't know, I could
probably make an argument that there is a failure of the system, as an
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organization writ large, the way we look at training and education is a little
warped.” (Staff participant)
MCTOG had never collected any data to gauge the level of knowledge for an incoming
student, so subjective assessments by the instructors were made that tended to reflect low
expectations for student preparedness. For example, the following was said from an instructor at
the end of a three-year tour.
“So, the assumption is that we have students starting at a certain level [gestures
one hand low], and we aspire to get them to this level [gestures the other hand
high]. At the instructor level our experience has been that students are actually
starting down here [gestures the low hand even lower] but we still aspire to get
them at least to there [gestures the top hand somewhere in the middle].” (Faculty
participant)
Another variation of low student preparedness as a reason for the curricula to remain at
the explicit level was a lack of student motivation.
“Our students that show up at MCTOG … and it’s like one-on-one, we have to go
back to the very basics of certain tactics and here's what MCPP stands for
[Marine Corps Planning Process], we spend so much time on that we don't get to
the deep levels. Another thing is people can’t fail [no academic attrition] when
they come through here.” (Faculty participant)
Another instructor and member of the fire brigade at the end of his three-year tour at
MCTOG saw the issue differently and made this observation regarding the claim of low student
preparedness as the justification for instruction remaining at the explicit end of the spectrum.
“There was a longstanding mentality here that because the students came in with
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a below-average understanding of [Mw] the [instructors] had to maintain explicit
knowledge to get them up to speed. I don't think that was actually true. Knowing a
lot of the students coming through here, I think it became a coping mechanism
[for the instructors] to maintain the status quo of what we did. Labeling the
students as not where they need to be so we can harp on the [explicit] brilliance
in the basics. “I think that reflected I'm only comfortable teaching the basics.
Therefore, I'm going to shape my environment to justify my staying basic,
explicit.” (Faculty participant)
In the cases where Mw instruction engaged the students more experientially with
Kriegsspiel (a student vs. student manual wargame), decision-forcing cases (DFC), and tactical
decision games (TDGs) and experientially taught Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum, student
engagement was remarkably different.
“It’s almost like they teach themselves. They don’t get a lot of time so they use
every single minute of it and they do their plan much better now, the students and
instructors both. It’s like 10 times better since I’ve been here.” (Faculty
participant)
The MCTOG middle management often claimed the reason for keeping the curriculum at the
explicit end was that the Marines assigned to MCTOG as instructors who were not capable of
teaching Mw at the tacit level.
“If we want a world-class organization, [referring to MCTOG campaign plan]
we need to do better as far as our vetting for who gets in here. It needs to be a
priority for higher [Marine Corps supporting establishment], that's the first step.
Due to the lack of [supporting establishment)] buy-in the recruiting, the [right]
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people coming in here.” (Faculty participant)
There is more than a thread of truth to the claim of not having a talented enough
instructor cadre. Some of those assigned to MCTOG for instructor duty had never performed as
an operations or intelligence officer of a unit in the operating forces, yet they were being asked to
train operations and intelligence officers from the operating forces. However, one key senior
middle manager with the position and authority to address instructor development was a
proponent of the “just stick to the basics” defensive routine and identified a lack of support from
the Marine Corps-supporting establishment for the shortage of capable instructors at MCTOG.
“Oh yeah, the right people, the first thing is we don’t have the right people
because we don’t have [supporting establishment] buy-in to this place, we don’t
have the right people. So, it makes your instructor development program even
more imperative because you don't recruit the right people to start with, with the
right qualities, background, and experience.” (Faculty participant)
When I followed up with a question on what he was doing about the imperative of instructor
development, he replied with the following:
“Due to the lack of [supporting establishment and operational force] buy-in,
people are coming in and right away, having to; they're teaching. There's no
depth to the current model; it’s not like you could have a dedicated instructor
development program; well, it would be second or third [priority] to their daily
duties.” (Faculty participant)
When I followed up again with the question if he himself was one of the right people, he replied:
“Um, yes, and no. Okay, Um, and why I say that, I say on a scale of 1-10, I'm a 6.
As a [states military occupational specialty], I know my [job]. Um, some of the
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things where I was deficient, which, [is] still not an excuse, because we don't
need, to focus on, you know regular infantry, it had been quite some time since
doing it in nature. So, I had to go back and think through the basics and through
my experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan at higher levels [of staff]. So yes, in that
respect, yes.” (Faculty participant)
A senior member of MCTOG management saw the resistance to developing the faculty to
teach Mw and operations at the tacit end of the spectrum as being less about institutional support
and more about avoiding the effort required to change the status quo.
“So, it’s a paradigm shift, but so what? You know where the pain come[s] from?
It’s a massive amount of work because quite frankly, if you go to this model
[teaching Mw at the tacit level as the campaign plan calls for], your one little
PowerPoint class that you just read slide for slide, isn’t going to cut it. That’s
where the hurt feelings [resistance] come from.” (Staff participant)
The data show there was a common acknowledgment that MCTOG needed to do more to
gain supporting establishment support to bring in instructors with the requisite backgrounds.
However, the action MCTOG could have done to address the issue of competency within their
span of control was conducting the instructor development necessary to deliver a curriculum to
teach Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum. Instead, the “not enough of…” defensive routines,
motivated by the desire to avoid embarrassment, prevent damage to one's reputation, and to
suppress conflict, ultimately reinforced a Model I learning system and retarded the Model II
learning system necessary for the implementation of the campaign plan.
IV.5

Explanatory Frame 5: Sub Rosa Clan Control to Maintain the Status Quo

During discussions, interviews, focus groups, and observation of working groups, the members
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of MCTOG occasionally referenced tribes, or being tribal. The reference to tribes was not
surprising. From my own experience, Marines considered themselves to be the strongest tribe
among the warring tribes of the Al Anbar Province in Iraq (West, 2008). Merging this tribal
reference observation with the previously addressed explanatory frames contributing to the failed
implementation of the campaign plan provided me another perspective on the case. From this
new tribal perspective, a fifth explanatory frame was revealed. Emerging from the data was the
existence of a sub rosa9 clan operating within the formal hierarchical organization. I researched
this further, looking at the works of Ouchi (1980), Kohli and Kettinger (2004), Chua et al.
(2012), and Eng et al. (2017). Ouchi and Price’s (1978) definition of a clan as a “culturally
homogenous group where members share common values, beliefs, and norms, and draws
informal control from peer monitoring and sanctions to promulgate shared values, beliefs and
norms” (p. 64) adequately described the dynamic I was observing at MCTOG. This definition
described the actions of an influential group of middle management and seasoned instructors at
MCTOG that resisted the campaign plan, instructor development, and teaching Mw at the tacit
level. In short, this clan acted against the MCTOG senior management’s directives in order to
maintain the status quo and used Model 1 behaviors to do so.
Informal Control Exerted by the Status Quo Clan: The above status quo clan (SQ
clan) employed different approaches to encourage the behavior to maintain the status quo. For
example, newer instructors not yet socialized to the clan’s norms or those capable of teaching
Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum (due to experience or self-education) were sanctioned by
being called out for going off script or cutting corners, not following the didactic master lesson

9

Sub rosa is a Latin phrase translated literally as “under the rose,” meaning, out of sight, in secrecy or private.
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file to the letter. An eyebrow-raising example of this was mentioned in three separate interviews.
One participant who witnessed this event first-hand described it this way:
“Like we had Master Sergeant X getting into with a Major Y outside of the
classroom about him [the major] not using the prescribed PowerPoint and 'doing
things his own way and cutting corners.' Well, he wasn't [cutting corners] he was
going above and beyond [teaching at the tacit end of the spectrum.]” (Faculty
participant)
The witness described the master sergeant’s likely motive.
“Yeah, he's one of the closed-minded. I mean, he's really not open to new things
because he knows what he knows. He knows the steps and sub-steps of everything,
[MCPP and IPB] and he sticks strictly to that. If they missed one thing, they fail.”
(Faculty participant)
This exchange is eyebrow-raising because the enlisted Marine was yelling at an officer, which
indicates the scope of the SQ clan's desire to maintain the status quo. The master sergeant in this
story was in his third year, and the major was in his first year of being an instructor at MCTOG.
This indicates that regardless of rank, the SQ clan was rooted to “time in MCTOG” and censored
the behavior of newcomers for upsetting the status quo.
“It got [sic] into a yelling match, and I was the one that stopped it. I said this had
gone far enough. You're not going to talk to a major like that; as a matter of fact,
he could charge you right now. ‘But, he's wrong.' [the master sergeant
responded]. I'm like no, what you think you know is wrong.” (Faculty participant)
Further indicative of the value the SQ clan placed on time in was relayed by an instructor at
MCTOG.
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“So, the culture right now is, and it's a lot of the old guard [on their third year at
MCTOG], is that you don't get a say unless you've been here for a year, and even
then, you get a minimal say. You're not really an instructor until you've been here
for two years, and then you're leaving again.” (Faculty participant)
One member of the fire brigade at the end of his tour described the SQ clan promulgating their
world view.
“These individuals want to maintain the status quo, the loudest voice with the
highest rank wins.” (Faculty participant)
Model I SQ clan control had impacts on learning within MCTOG for both faculty and
students. A key moment for learning occurs at the end of a tactical exercise or decision-making
problem when the after-action review (AAR) is conducted. By surfacing and openly discussing
mistakes, both the students and faculty learn from the exercise not only from their own mistakes
but also the mistakes of others. This process is only effective if people feel safe to raise mistakes
and discuss them. The following exchange from an interview with a highly competent and
earnest first-year faculty member showed more open AAR formats than what he encountered at
MCTOG. The participant relayed an incident from an AAR where a key debrief point concerning
the capability of a reconnaissance system was egregiously glossed over to the point that false
capabilities were being taught and negative learning occurring for both faculty and students.
Interviewer: “So when this incident was debriefed, why didn’t you stand up and say
anything?”
Faculty participant: “I think it would have been seen as rude.”
Interviewer: “Why would it have been rude? This is a learning institution.”
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Faculty participant: “It’s a learning institution, but this-it’s not how-it’s never happened
before… in a mass debrief like that.”
Interviewer: “So in a mass debrief, the norm is to just keep your peace?”
Faculty participant: “I would feel so yes… I think that debrief [critical feedback] happens
privately, but I've not seen that… I think it [a public correction] would have come off as
rude.”
Interviewer: “So calling that out would have produced some sort of conflict or tension,
and the norm is to suppress that?”
Faculty participant: “I think I would have been reprimanded by [omitted] had I done
that.”
When pressed further on why superficial debriefs occur across the faculty, the participant
replied:
“I think it's either not to ruffle feathers, or you know, they don't think they have
the political clout to do that [critical feedback], you know.” (Faculty participant)
When I raised the topic of superficial debriefs and discussing how touchy subjects are handled
with another instructor, he replied:
“They’re [touchy subjects] not [handled]. I think it’s a hierarchy thing…if there’s
any conflict they’ll disengage, and after that, talk behind each other’s back, to
prove they’re right I guess…you’ve just got to maintain the status quo.” (Faculty
participant)
The above exchange provides a sharp contrast to the example provided by Popper and Lipshitz
(1998) when discussing organizational learning that takes place within the Israeli Defense Force
Air Force, widely considered a world-class organization, during training and operational flight
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debriefings. The debriefings are described as “fiercely competitive… no stone is left unturned,
yet are open, cordial and democratic… and knowledge gained at one particular subunit are
shared throughout the air force” (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998, p. 168). In terms of organizational
learning, Popper and Lipshitz (1998) called debriefs that are open and honest “high quality
because they force participants to confront their errors” (p. 169). Conversely, the authors equated
“low quality debriefs as those that allow participants to go through the motions of learning”
(Popper & Lipshitz, 1998, p. 169). The authors attributed a thorough socialization, a form of clan
control, as the key enabler to high-quality debriefs where participants seek to surface and correct
defects in a Model II learning system. In the case of MCTOG, clan control reinforces a Model I
single-loop learning system where conflict is suppressed and therefore low quality debriefs are
conducted and the participants go through the motions of learning.
Another control tactic employed by the SQ clan was by virtue of their middle
management role. Their positioning within the formal hierarchy enabled a mediating of
communications between the MCTOG senior management and the rest of MCTOG. In mediating
the message, they would water down guidance and intent from MCTOG senior management.
Watering down was an action strategy motivated by trying to satisfy the bureaucratic variable,
preserving one's reputation, and getting promoted by maintaining the status quo. However, the
approaches used to satisfy the bureaucratic governing variable by maintaining the status quo ran
directly counter to the USMC’s and Mw’s governing variables.
Behavior Running Counter to USMC Governing Variables: The data revealed 41
references across 14 interviews where participants related to bureaucratic variables trumping
USMC values in order to enact SQ clan control. It is an axiom of Marine Corps leadership to
“issue every order as if it were your own, especially if it is a difficult or unpopular order.” This
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means taking ownership of a decision, even if you personally do not agree with it. An example of
watering down the commander's guidance in order to maintain the status quo was described
below.
“There’s a tendency around here that if they don’t like the decision, to not go out
there and own it. We will use the name of the decider, if you will, as the excuse,
and say the Deputy, or the Commander, or the OPSO said.” (Staff participant)
When asked why middle management leaders with 12–20 plus years of service would go against
USMC core values, he replied:
“I think it’s because they’re more concerned about being liked, I think it goes,
you know, they’re looking out for their own self, their own self-interest, how they
are seen.” (Faculty participant)
Behavior Running Counter to Mw Governing Variables: The data also revealed 84
references across all 14 interviews and all three focus groups instances where behaviors are
favoring the goals of bureaucratic governing variables over Mw governing variables. Mw is an
intent-based form of direction. The commander's intent is the vision for the outcome of an effort.
It provides the underpinning why for the organization and provides subordinates with ample
latitude in the ‘how’ of the desired outcome. The commander’s intent is threaded through every
element of the Marine Corps’ series of doctrinal publications. The Mw doctrine and the
commander’s intent is to be practiced in combat, training, or garrison and is expected to be
communicated two levels up and two levels down (USMC, 1997a, 1997d, 1997c, 2001).
“It’s interesting to watch it play out sometimes. I know that everybody in Trailer
1, [MCTOG senior management] when they pass guidance and intent and
taskings, they explain the ‘why’. Somewhere in the midlevel management, that
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gets lost and falls by the wayside.” (Faculty participant)
Typically, intent or guidance from Trailer 1 was either translated into a simplistic “go and do”
order (typically associated with attrition warfare) without context or was altogether ignored
through inertia or avoidance. In the quote below, avoidance was referred to as a “skewing” of
intent and “just follow orders” and then inappropriately contextualized as Mw, thus illustrating
an incomplete understanding the role of intent in Mw.
“Yep, it [intent] gets skewed. Just do it; follow orders. And that's ok sometimes,
right? From a maneuver warfare perspective, I want to understand why. So, if
your tactical task and mission don't work, I still know what I need to get done.”
(Staff participant)
Under Mw, doctrine intent is never “skewed.” Rather, it is the bedrock of the Marine
Corps’ warfighting philosophy. MCDP-1 Warfighting dedicates an entire chapter to the
commander's intent, as in this key passage: “Understanding the intent of our commanders [two
levels up] allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with the commander's desires” (USMC,
1997 p. 89).
The defensive routine employed by SQ clan members in justifying these actions was the
claim of uncertainty in mission or priority. The claim of uncertainty rang hollow, however. The
commander of MCTOG directed all hands, as individuals and as leaders of sub-groups within
MCTOG, to read, internalize, and discuss the campaign plan with their sub-groups. The data
shows in 31 references over 10 interviews and in all three focus groups that faculty and staff
admitted to having never made a serious effort to either understand the campaign plan or discuss
it internally.
The 8-Ball Chart, Misery Loves Company and a Cry for Help: Through all the
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explanatory frames discussed above, a pattern of well-worn defensive routines employed by
members of MCTOG was unearthed. Also examined was the tension between satisfying both the
USMC and Mw governing variables and the bureaucratic governing variable, with the latter
winning out over the two former governing variables. In other words, MCTOG members opted
to employ defensive routines in order to conform to norms, suppress conflict, and protect their
reputation, resulting in a form of careerism at the expense of USMC and Mw variables. If I had
explained this observation to the participants, I have no doubt they would have protested the
blasphemy of careerism being attributed to them. This makes sense, however, as individuals
simply do not accept responsibility for defensive routines (see Argyris & Schon, 1996).
One action strategy employed by the SQ clan to avoid facing the responsibility for
creating the conditions for careerism is following the first rule of misery, which is that misery
loves company. In this case, “company” was achieved through co-opting others into the SQ clan
using a graphic tool to help diffuse responsibility for personal actions to the faceless
“institution.” The graphic tool used was a PowerPoint slide titled “MCTOG Tour of Duty Phases
of Emotion,” most commonly referred to as the 8-Ball Chart.
The 8-Ball Chart (Figure 7) depicts the emotional progression of an MCTOG member
throughout their tour. This chart was sometimes tacked up in a cubical or in a desk drawer. All
participants were aware of it, though not all retained a copy of it. Many of the MCTOG senior
management saw the 8-Ball Chart as unprofessional and a form of insubordination. Such
unaccountable and victim-like behavior is not expected of Marines and GS civilians, especially
as senior as those at MCTOG. I must admit, when I first encountered this chart, I initially reacted
as a Marine colonel and shared the sentiments of the MCTOG senior management. I was able to
acknowledge this initial reaction and check my bias, though, by asking the question a researcher
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should ask, “What’s going on here?”
Figure 7: The 8-Ball Chart
UNCLASSIFIED

MCTOG Tour of Duty
“Phases of Emotion”
Mission Complete!
You successfully
made it through your
tour.

Checked-in.
Ready to work and
make a difference!
Ambitious

1
Relieved

Checking-out.
Tour is almost over.
Supportive of friends
remaining.

9

8

Continue to do job,
but interest is lost.

2

Time within
each stage
is dependent
upon previous
experiences
and career
goals.

Sympathetic

Receipt of Orders!
Renewed energy to
perform at high level
and finish strong.

Time required
to determine
your purpose.

Confused

Optimistic

3

Regression may occur
several times.
Ecstatic

Frustrated

7

4

Apathetic

Disgruntled

6

5

UNCLASSIFIED

Belief that YOU can
improve established
conditions.

After countless hours
of hard work, realize
it is impossible to
affect meaningful
changes.

End of tour is not in sight. You
become angry the institution
put you in this situation.

In the data and the literature, I found the answers to that question. The chart was used as a
tool to both diffuse personal responsibility for the defensive routines employed by the SQ clan,
(Argyris, 1996; Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1996b) and as a tool to co-opt others, typically those in
the first year of their tour, into the SQ clan by normalizing clan attitudes and expectations
(Ouchi, 1980; Ouchi & Price, 1978a) that ran counter to Marine Corps core values. One MCTOG
member recounted their introduction to the chart.
“I will share my experience with this chart [pointing to the 8-Ball Chart]. So, I
think I was here about maybe three months, and I went to go home. I won't say
who, there were a couple of people in the room. They pulled out this [8-Ball
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Chart] and said, you're right here [pointing to #4 frustrated]. I was at step four.
Yeah, I'm frustrated every day, but I don't stay frustrated. I didn't realize after
three months here, that was something people actually had on the desk or under a
calendar or pinned up and referred back to on occasion. That prevents us in some
aspects, not all, from projecting forwards.” (Staff participant)
The experience relayed above likely played out in one form or another for all members of
MCTOG. As mentioned earlier, MCTOG experienced a 40% or greater turn over in uniformed
personnel every year. Still, there was always a senior member with a connection to the past that
reinforced old norms, values, objectives, and defensive routines to maintain a Model I status quo
theory-in-use.
Again, checking my bias as a Marine colonel, I began to see the 8-Ball Chart less as an
act of insubordination and more of a cry for help. The 8-Ball Chart represented a reaction to the
uncertainty surrounding MCTOG as a hybrid organization and the threat of the campaign plan as
a new espoused theory that threatened the status quo. The SQ clan sought to use the 8-Ball Chart
to normalize their behavior and recruit others to diffuse the pain of the internal incompatibility of
their defensive routines that fell outside the Marine Corps values of honor, courage, and
commitment. The Chart was alternatively used to censure and recruit those trying to operate
outside the SQ clan’s values, beliefs, and norms. In this cry for help vein I found a rival to the
SQ clan – a very loosely formed clan among those that were later in their tours and who, while
frustrated, had not joined the SQ clan. This clan, which I’ll call the Mw clan, is composed of
those Marines who are well-versed in Mw and capable of teaching at the explicit or tacit levels
and still held on to an appropriate balance of the governing variables. The Mw clan was
generally junior to MCTOG middle management, who were often the SQ clan “elders.” While
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Mw clan members had resisted the informal control of the dominate SQ clan, they were still
under the hierarchical control of the more senior middle management (the highest rank with the
loudest voice in the room) of the SQ clan. This dynamic was captured in this quote from an Mw
clan member at the end of his three-year tour.
“So, it’s those that have a year or less under their belt, regardless of rank, are
really excited. They're really perceptive and they're really willing to bring up
observations that could potentially evolve the organization in the right direction.
What I've seen year after year, they kind of get beaten down either by exhaustion
or by the loudest voice in the room to where they rarely speak up again. They
rarely bring up insights anymore. I know [Trailer 1 senior management] doesn't
like this, but the MCTOG tour of duty phases of emotion [8-Ball Chart] are very
real here. And then once you get to a certain phase, you're just, I just want to
survive the rest of my tour, nothing's going to change.” (Faculty participant)
The impacts of the SQ clan Model I behavior and clan control can be traced through
every aspect of MCTOG and all five explanatory frames. With regards to learning at MCTOG,
the data revealed Model I behaviors produced negative consequences to learning with 121
references overall in 14 interviews and three focus group sessions. The Model I SQ clan control
also created consequences to behavior within MCTOG members, with 58 references over 12
interviews or focus groups, stifling communications and trust—the essential ingredients of
Model II behavior.
The next chapter answers the research question and makes the arguments for this study’s
contributions to the literature streams and contributions to practice.
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V

DISCUSSION

“There are two kinds of people when it comes to change. Those that don’t like it, and
those that really hate it.” -Anonymous
This study set out to answer the following research question: “Why is it difficult for the Marine
Corps to implement Mw despite 30 years of training and education efforts to do so?” To answer
that question, the study began by casting the net widely over the literature streams of
organizational learning, organizational culture, and learning in the military; Mw; and the Marine
Corps planning documents regarding the reinvigoration of Mw. A review of these literature
streams illuminated a general area of concern surrounding organizational learning as it
implements strategic change, as well as a specific problem area concerning the adoption of a
warfighting philosophy within a military organization. A final literature stream was included
after the field work was complete, when the data analysis revealed the presence of clan activity.
The review process also identified where contributions might be made by extending the
literature.
The qualitative case study and interpretive approach to answering this “why” question
concerning an emotional and existential topic created a tremendous amount of both structured
and unstructured data. Making sense of the unstructured data was the biggest, yet most rewarding
challenge of this study. Unstructured data is more elusive and requires time-intensive contextual
analysis to give it meaning. The data were organized into five explanatory frames: uncertainty
within MCTOG as a hybrid organization, functional illiteracy in Mw among the faculty, the
faculty and staff ignoring the campaign plan, lions living as lambs, and the phenomenon of an
informal clan operating sub rosa within the MCTOG hierarchy.
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Applying the academic rigor of ToA to these five explanatory frames provided a fil de
guidage rouge that lifted the discourse above the chatter—the noise of opinion and conjecture. It
allowed the unstructured data to be noticed and structured into meaning. The five explanatory
frames woven together with ToA answer the research question and produce contributions to both
literature and practice.
V.1

Answering the Research Question

The results of this study illustrate that the Marine Corps’ difficulty in implementing Mw is not
restricted to organizational structure or culture. Rather, the reinvigoration of Mw, embodied in
the strategic initiative of the MCTOG campaign plan, failed due to a persistent Model I singleloop organizational learning system. This system was made persistent by the actions of the SQ
clan operating in sub rosa fashion, which exerted informal clan control over many of the
members. The SQ clan Model I behaviors created a bête noires effect that subdued attempts by
MCTOG senior management to engage in Model II double-loop organizational learning. Table 3
and Table 4 identify the attempts made by MCTOG senior management to engage in Model II
double-loop learning and the ways in which the SQ clan countered those attempts with Model I
behaviors and the outcomes of those interactions. Table 5 synthesizes the attempted Model II
learning cycles and Model I counter-cycles, with the five explanatory frames, to fully illustrate
the impact of Model I clan behavior on the failed initiative to reinvigorate Mw.
Identified Attempted Model II Double-Loop Learning Cycles: The campaign plan
was an intervention by MCTOG senior leadership to move the organization towards a strategic
vision and initiate change that would require members of the organization to engage in doubleloop learning; to question assumptions, norms, and governing variables; and to take a risk to
move away from the familiar status quo. The campaign plan introduced a new espoused theory.
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To fully implement the campaign plan, MCTOG required Model II double-loop organizational
learning to take place in order to align the status quo with the new espoused theory. Argyris and
Schön (1996) offers four variables typically present within an organization for Model II doubleloop learning to occur, namely, “valid information, free and informed choice, internal
commitment to the goal, and constant monitoring” (p. 87). MCTOG senior leadership made
attempts to effectuate each of these four factors. Table 3 below identifies four attempts by
MCTOG senior management to engage in Model II double-loop learning, describes what
happened, and lists the impact on Model II double-loop learning.
Table 3: Identified Attempted Model II Double-loop Learning Cycles
Cycle

Description of Attempted Cycle

What Happened

Impact

1

Management attempted to
communicate valid information and
provide free and informed choice
through the opportunity to provide
feedback and contribute to
campaign plan implementation.

SQ Clan muted this opportunity
for all by defensive routines of
not communicating this
opportunity and gave passive,
false, or no feedback.

2

Management attempts to establish
instructor development program to
build world-class faculty.

No evidence of strong internal
commitment and monitoring
management to make it
mandatory.

3

Management held a Leadership
Offsite (Dec 18) to openly discuss
problems with implementing the
campaign plan.

Valid information was
exchanged with minimal
defensive routines present.

4

Management formed the core
design team to implement campaign
plan.

This was a cross-section of
faculty and staff; valid
information was not exchanged,
and high amounts of defensive
routines were present. Most had
not read the campaign plan and
passively participated.

Model II double-loop
learning not achieved.
Passive resistance to the
campaign plan characterized
by defensive routines of
avoidance, inertia, and
indifference.
Model II double-loop
learning not achieved. The
lack of demonstrated internal
commitment allowed the SQ
Clan to ignore the initiative as
optional.
Model II double-loop
learning is temporarily
achieved at the offsite.
However, once back at
MCTOG, SQ clan began
defensive routines thwarting
commitment to execution.
Model II double-loop
learning not achieved.
Management makes unilateral
decisions to press forward
with its implementation of the
campaign plan. SQ Clan
continues the defensive
routine of inertia.
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In successful Model II double-loop learning cycles, members will sense a decrease in
defensiveness in others and will reciprocate in turn, thereby, producing a reduction in the
overwhelming and stifling presence of “the fear of looking bad” and risking their reputation and
chances of promotion. In double-loop learning, the bureaucratic governing variable would have
been examined, and participants would have realized that the defensive routines employed to
maintain the status quo were not necessary to have a viable career, and therefore, altered the
bureaucratic governing variable to be more within tolerance of the remaining governing
variables. In other words, one can have a viable career while also upholding Marine Corps core
and Mw values.
Double-loop learning did not take place in cycle numbers 1, 2, and 4 because of the
action strategies employed by the SQ clan to keep the bureaucratic governing variable within
tolerance, resulting in an increasing level of incongruency with the Marine Corps’ core values
and Mw governing variables. In cycle number 3, MCTOG achieved a near miss as a temporary
environment of low defensiveness, and an exchange of valid information occurred. However, it
was short-term and ended once the actors returned to the physical MCTOG location. Without a
change to the bureaucratic governing variables and the Model I defensive routines, double-loop
learning could not occur.
Identified Model I Single-Loop Learning Counter-Cycles: Single-loop learning is
appropriate in many cases. The process of error detection and correction is completely
appropriate for incremental learning and maintaining a status quo. Single-loop learning also
maintains and does not question the governing variables. When the espoused theory of an
individual, group, or organization matches the theory-in-use, the governing variables are
compatible. However, when the espoused theory and the theory-in-use do not match, dilemmas
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develop between governing variables and behavior. Single-loop learning is then engaged to find
various ways to suppress conflict through action strategies and defensive routines to bring
governing variables back into tolerance without ever questioning the appropriateness of the
governing variable. In the case of MCTOG, the bureaucratic governing variables in a Model I
environment, the fear of looking bad and protecting one’s reputation, and by extension one’s
career, was out of tolerance with the other two.
For Model I single-loop learning to occur, four variables are typically in place: “define
goals and manage the environment to achieve them, maximize winning, minimize losing,
minimize expressing negative feelings, and be rational” (Argyris & Schön, 1974, pp. 68–69).
Table 4 below captures identified SQ clan Model I single-loop actions and activities which
severed as “counter-learning cycles” that retarded MCTOG’s senior management efforts to
engage in Model II double-loop learning cycles, and effectively, preserved the status quo.
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Table 4: Identified Model I Single-loop Counter Cycles
Cycle
1

Description of Model I
Counter Cycle
The SQ Clan countered
MCTOG management
Model II efforts by
redefining the goals of
MCTOG management by
teaching the MCPP, IPB
basics and remaining at the
explicit end of the
knowledge spectrum.

What Happened

Impact

The SQ Clan engaged in defensive
routines of avoidance, inertia, and
indifference to the campaign plan and
blaming low student and instructor
quality as the reason for remaining at the
explicit end of the teaching spectrum for
maintaining the status quo.

Status quo maintained.
Campaign plan was not
effectively implemented
for more than 18 months.

2

The SQ clan countered
MCTOG management
Model II efforts with
Model I to maximize
winning and minimize
losing by falsely taking
responsibility for making
change.

The SQ Clan publicly agreed with
MCTOG management but in private
complained of lack of clarity, direction,
and resources. SQ clan enacted clan
control over other MCTOG instructors to
maintain the status quo by keeping
instruction of classes explicit.

Status quo maintained.
Campaign plan was not
effectively implemented
for more than 18 months.

3

SQ clan countered
MCTOG management
Model II efforts by
minimizing the expression
of negative feelings to
protect self and others.

When publicly asked about the campaign
plan by Management, the SQ Clan
nodded “north and south” in agreement to
avoid conflict with management and
preserve one’s reputation and therefore
get promoted. Holiday leave pointed to
for “loss of momentum” on campaign
plan changes.

Status quo maintained.
Other than the “near miss”
at the Dec 18 leadership
offsite, issues with the
campaign plan never
publicly surfaced. Instead,
new defensive routines
were engaged.

4

SQ clan countered
MCTOG management
Model II efforts with the
“be rational to protect
others” approach by
withholding or distorting
communication from
MCTOG management to
faculty and staff and by
censoring behavior.

This was a classic SQ clan activity. The
clan censored information by not
conveying intent and guidance from the
commander. It also sanctioned behavior
through the 8-Ball Chart and keeping
people in line by teaching only at the
explicit level. Rational defensive routines
included blaming a lack of resources
(time, talent, guidance) as the reason to
maintain the status quo.

Status quo maintained.
Very low internal
commitment to the
campaign plan and overall
success of MCTOG as an
organization.

The Impact of a Model I Single-Loop Learning System: The data showed that the
impact of a Model I single-loop system at MCTOG countered and retarded any efforts by the
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MCTOG senior management to implement the campaign plan. The middle management and
senior instructors of MCTOG that generally comprised most of the SQ clan became quite adept
at employing defensive routines. In fact, in my interviews, I observed a reflexive use of these
routines, and if I challenged one, then another was instantly deployed. How this well-used
panoply of defensive routines ran across each Model II learning attempt made by MCTOG senior
management, along with each of the explanatory frames, is captured in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Explanatory Frames by Model II Learning Cycles & Model I Counter-Cycles
Cycles and Counter-Cycles
1

2

3

4

MCTOG
Management
Model II
Attempt

Opportunity to shape
the campaign plan
(Free and Informed
Choice)

Establish Instructor
Development Program
(Internal Commitment)

Leadership Offsite I
December 18, 2018
(Valid information)

Establish Core Design
Team to Implement
Campaign Plan (Valid
information)

SQ Clan
Model I
Reinforcement
and Counter
Cycle

SQ Clan Attempt to
Re-define MCTOG
Goals

SQ Clan Attempt to
Maximize Winning and
Minimize Losing

SQ Clan Minimizes the
Expression of Negative
Feelings to Protect Self

SQ Clan Attempt to
Appear Rational While
Controlling
Communication from
MCTOG Senior
Management to Faculty
and Staff and by
Censoring Behavior.

“These individuals
want to maintain the
status quo, the loudest
voice with the highest
rank.”
“Some people, you’ll
see them get shut
down in discussion,
someone will ask a
probing question and
won’t continue.” #07

“So, there are
individuals on the staff
doing everything they
can…in an underhanded
way, return us to the
explicit state at
MCTOG.” #04

“So, the culture right
now is, and it’s a lot of
the old guard, is that you
don’t get a say unless
you’ve been here for a
year. You’re not really
an instructor until
you’ve been here for
two years.” #14

“I think they’d rather
just shut up and color,
go with the flow, don’t
cause a ripple, ask a
question. They’re not
being told to shut up and
color…what they want
to do doesn’t fit with
MCTOG’s adult
learning approach.” #03

Explanatory
Frames
Uncertainty in a
Hybrid
Organization

117
Cycles and Counter-Cycles
1

2

3

4

MCTOG
Management
Model II
Attempt

Opportunity to shape
the campaign plan
(Free and Informed
Choice)

Establish Instructor
Development Program
(Internal Commitment)

Leadership Offsite I
December 18, 2018
(Valid information)

Establish Core Design
Team to Implement
Campaign Plan (Valid
information)

SQ Clan
Model I
Reinforcement
and Counter
Cycle

SQ Clan Attempt to
Re-define MCTOG
Goals

SQ Clan Attempt to
Maximize Winning and
Minimize Losing

SQ Clan Minimizes the
Expression of Negative
Feelings to Protect Self

SQ Clan Attempt to
Appear Rational While
Controlling
Communication from
MCTOG Senior
Management to Faculty
and Staff and by
Censoring Behavior.

"Labeling the students
as not where they
need to be so we can
harp on the [explicit]
‘brilliance in the
basics.’ I think that
reflected “I'm only
comfortable teaching
the basics; therefore,
I'm going to shape my
environment to justify
staying explicit.” #04

"If we had 10 or 20
people, everybody
would just nod their
heads north and south
and say 'we get it'. But
they won't be able to
have a conversation [on
Mw]. What I've picked
up on is people come in
as unprepared, and they
don't want to be
identified as
unprepared.” #01

"Yep, It, [commander's
intent] gets skewed. Just
do it; follow orders. And
that's ok sometimes,
right? From a maneuver
warfare perspective."
#03

“So initially we did [the
campaign plan] working
groups, then the [CDT]
stood up. It became the
Deputy's working group;
he has a vision; this was
propaganda to sell us his
vision. My personal
opinion, I'd like to hear
more commander's
guidance.” #08

Lions Living as
Lambs

Oh yeah, the right
people, the first thing
is we don’t have the
right people because
we don’t have
[HQMC] buy-in to
this place, we don’t
have the right people.
#08

"There's a reluctance to
put themselves in a
vulnerable
position…exposing
yourself to judgment, we
talk about [MCTOG] as
graduate level, it's not,
most of what we do here
is entry-level." #13

“I honestly thought at
the offsite that we’re
going change it up a
little bit. So, I didn’t
want to get too wrapped
around it.” #05

"We don't want to have
uncomfortable
discussions; it's
undiscussable. But you
know, we'll focus on
discussions about how
we're going to support
ITX [exercise] all day
long. #02

Sub Rosa Clan
Control to
Maintain Status
Quo

"You know, at the
instructor level, not a
whole lot to be honest
with you. People got
back to work; there
wasn't a lot of energy
from the
organization." #12

“Like we had Master
Sergeant X getting into
with a Major Y outside
of the classroom about
him [the major] not
using the prescribed
PowerPoint and ‘doing
things his own way and
cutting corners.’” #05

“It’s interesting to
watch. I know
(management) passes
guidance and intent,
they explain the ‘why.’
Somewhere in the
midlevel management
that gets lost and falls by
the wayside.” #09

"The CO was frustrated;
he was like 'What is
going on? Why isn't the
information getting
down to the lowest
echelon, you all come
here and make notes, it
is going in one ear and
out the other, and you're
not giving it to your
Marines.'" #11

Explanatory
Frames
Maneuver
Warfare
Functional
Illiteracy

Note: # = participant
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In effect, the SQ clan Model I behavior and their negative socialization influences
employed to exert informal control over other members to MCTOG effectively neutralized the
Model II learning attempts and preserved the status quo. With the SQ clan active and operating
in sub rosa fashion, the MCTOG campaign plan and the reinvigoration of Mw within MCTOG
were destined for stagnation. The data showed that a congruence of goals between the SQ clan
and senior management at MCTOG did occur, but only episodically and only under duress. One
instance of episodic congruence occurred when MCTOG was required to lend critical support to
an external and highly visible requirement from its higher headquarters. The requirement
impacted the daily tasks and priorities of MCTOGs’ members eliciting the defensive routines of
nay-saying, inertia, and resource blaming to avoid the task. In the eleventh hour, with a deadline
looming and failure approaching, the groups came together and “pulled it off,” a feat recounted
by one participant with some pride. The driving factor for congruence was that the bureaucratic
governing variables, specifically personal reputations, was held in extremis, as failure would
have splashed on the reputations of the SQ clan and senior management alike. Even then, change
was spasmodic and in the form of short-term cooperation lasting only until the crisis passed.
Additional evidence of this short-term convergence occurred after my onsite fieldwork
concerning the campaign plan. In this instance, the Commanding Officer dropped his attempts to
gain buy-in to a change in the curriculum to teach Mw at the tacit level and directed via
executive fiat a significant change to the core academic course. The new course featured a heavy
focus on teaching Mw at the tacit level, and MCTOG would execute the first course in three
months. The name of the new course, interestingly enough, was the Advanced Maneuver
Warfare Course (AMWC). The faculty and staff, regardless of clan and previous views, were
goaded by necessity and fear of failure to pull together, develop the curriculum, and initiate an
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internal instructor development course to prepare instructors to deliver the curriculum. Three
months after the field work was complete, the inaugural AMWC course was successfully
executed; however, it remains to be seen how long the cooperation and instructor development
will last.
The remainder of this chapter will highlight the study’s contribution to the literature and
to the related field of practice. It will also provide an overview of each explanatory frame and
detail its impact on organizational learning and offer potential corrective interventions. The
results expose the many nuances of the interplay between organizational learning and clan
control and provide a wealth of insight for managers and leaders alike who are contemplating, or
have undertaken, organizational change.
V.2

Contributions to Literature

The findings in this study contribute to the literature on organizational learning, specifically
ToA, and to the literature on Mw. Additionally, and unexpectedly, this study also examined the
interconnectedness between organizational learning theory and control theory. The role of clans
operating within hierarchical organizational structures are every present, and managers and
leaders must learn how to identify and manage them (Ouchi, 1980; Ouchi & Price, 1978a).
V.2.1 Organizational Learning
This study extends the extant literature on organizational learning by situating the study within a
large military organization attempting to reinvigorate a warfighting philosophy through
implementing a strategic initiative. What is unique to this study is that the strategic initiative of
the MCTOG campaign plan essentially imposed a new espoused theory on the organization.
Ironically, this new espoused theory in and of itself upset and threatened the status quo theory-inuse by requiring faculty to teach Mw at the tacit end of the knowledge spectrum, a most-lacked
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capability that put reputations at risk.
The risk to reputation placed the governing variables of Marine Corps core values and
Mw core values in conflict with the bureaucratic governing variable of preserving one’s
reputation and being promoted. This conflict, in turn, created a state of incongruency among the
governing variables that required many members to use action strategies to maintain the
bureaucratic variable within tolerance and sustain the status quo.
The organizational learning literature was further extended by examining how
organizations can look to organizational learning systems to address the challenges of difficult
organizational change that accompany strategic initiatives. Frequently, when organizations
attempt to adapt to new and emerging realities in their environments, the methods of adaptation
often focus on deficiencies in structure and culture (Bate et al., 2000; Holmes-Eber, 2014b;
Matzenbacher, 2018; Schein, 2017; Terriff, 2007a). The Marine Corps’ “Reinvigorate Mw”
workshops hosted by TECOM also produced recommendations focused on changing both
structure and culture (TECOM, 2016, 2017, 2018). As seen in this study, members at MCTOG
readily claimed deficiencies in resources, “not the right people,” and deficiencies in institutional
support from external organizations lack of buy-in (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) as reasons to not
implement the campaign plan or teach Mw at the tacit level. Given the deeply embedded nature
of military organizational culture (Hawkins, 2015; Piscitelli, 2017), there is a great, if not
overwhelming, difficulty in changing it (Kelly, 2008; Schein, 2017). This study illustrated how
an organizational learning system, not structure or culture, was the principal issue opposing
change. Contrary to the TECOM workshop claims of culture as the culprit, the Marine Corps
culture is one of adaptation and innovation (Augier & Barrett, 2019; Davidson, 2010; Krulak,
1984; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a) and is as well-suited as any military culture to employ Mw.
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In a contemporary and parallel case, the United States Army's attempt to effectuate and
reinvigorate their version of Mw, Mission Command, has focused largely on the need for a
cultural shift for an organization of over 2 million active and reserve soldiers (Matzenbacher,
2018; Townsend et al., 2019a, 2019b). This study could further inform and reshape the United
States Army’s approach to include a review of extant organizational learning systems as a pivot
to reinvigorate Mission Command.
This study also confirmed that Model I single-loop learning systems are extremely
effective at maintaining the status quo. Despite documented attempts by MCTOG senior
management to engage in double-loop learning cycles, Model I single-loop learning system
behaviors were successful in blunting those initiatives. The study also corroborated Argyris and
Schön’s (1996b) claim that Model II double-loop organizational learning systems are rare. The
Model I inhibiting behaviors detailed in the explanatory frames created a level of skilled
incompetence within the faculty and staff and was sustained by the senior management’s skilled
unawareness (Argyris & Schön, 1996b, p. 217). Even though the MCTOG senior management
genuinely attempted double-loop learning, the study documented an unconscious level of skilled
unawareness surrounding the explanatory frames, with a self-defeating effect.
V.2.2 Maneuver Warfare
This study appears to be the first empirical examination of why the Marine Corps’ recent efforts
to reinvigorate Mw have failed within the training and education continuum. To this point, the
literature on Mw has primarily centered on three main themes: (1) the inception and initial
adoption of Mw; (2) the implementation of Mw in practice; and (3) the discussions surrounding
the need for the reinvigoration of Mw. This study adds the latest chapter to the story arc of the
Mw literature stream that begins with the strategic Cold War threat that provided the impetuous
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behind the Marine Corps’ movement to Mw (Brown, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017; Terriff, 2006a). The
literature continues with a backwards look at the inception of Mw as a warfighting philosophy
and details the Marine Corps' initial efforts 31 years ago to adopt Mw as the Marine Corps’
fundamental warfighting philosophy (Brown, 2018; Damian, 2001). The story arc then focused
on explicating Mw as a doctrine with in-depth explanations of Mw theory (Osinga, 2007),
operational examples of the implementation of Mw (Piscitelli, 2017) and how-to manuals (Lind,
1985a), and examples of the transferability of Mw philosophy to civilian companies (Clemons &
Santamaria, 2002). The Mw literature stream includes discourse concerning the utility of Mw
(Robeson, 1989; Tucker, 1996) and dissatisfaction with the Marine Corps’ commitment to Mw
(Anonymous, 2011). The story arc culminates with the Marine Corps' strategic initiative to
reinvigorate Mw through the 37th CMC's strategic initiatives and TECOM workshops that
advocated for structure and culture remedies to reinvigorate Mw. This study continues the story
arc of Mw literature with an empirical account of MCTOGs’ efforts to reinvigorate Mw by
implementing a campaign plan and leveraging its unique position as a schoolhouse and COE
(MCTOG, 2018b; Nicastro, 2017, 2018).
This contribution to literature turns the focus of the remedy from structure and culture to
a discussion surrounding how to reinvigorate Mw to include organizational learning systems for
serious consideration. This research also exposed the essential role clans played in determining
the outcome of the reinvigoration of Mw effort within the TECOM training and education
continuum.
V.2.3 Control Theory
Ouchi and Price (1978), Jaeger (1983), and Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) all thoroughly investigated
the impact of informal clan control within organizations. Kohli and Kettinger (2001), Chua et al.
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(2012), and Myers (2013) investigated the role of social capital in clans and how management
may engage to influence clans with social control and negotiated order to achieve congruence
between the clan and the organization’s goals. Their research was limited to clans operating
explicitly within an organization. This study extends the literature in two important ways. First,
this study identified a previously undetected clan operating in sub rosa fashion and counter to the
organization’s goals. Second, this study further explored and documented the impact of how sub
rosa informal clan control, striving to maintain the status quo, effectively resisted MCTOG
senior management’s attempts to engage in the Model II double-loop organizational learning
necessary to implement the campaign plan.
Ouchi (1980) attributed organizational control to three factors: markets, bureaucracies,
and clans. Ouchi and Price (1978a) provided a widely accepted definition of a clan as being a
group “culturally homogenous with common values, beliefs, and norms and draws informal
control from peer monitoring” (p. 64). In his writings, Ouchi (1980) described clans as operating
explicitly to reinforce the organization's goals by employing “social mechanisms [to] reduce
differences between individual and organizational goals” (Ouchi, 1980, p. 136). Wilkins and
Ouchi (1983), in their research, described the adaptive nature of clans and how members use the
clan structure to deal with considerable change within an organization, so long as there is
congruence between the clan and the organization’s goals (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 479).
Kohli and Kettinger (2004) examined how clan goals and organizational goals may be brought
into congruence, even in cases when the organization's management does not possess the power
to impose conformity. In these cases, congruence was achieved when management created a
common cause with key clan members through transparency of information (Kohli & Kettinger,
2004). However, for congruency to occur, the existence of a clan and its goals must be explicit.
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Chua et al. (2012) discussed ways in which existing clans may be deliberately leveraged
or “enacted” through clan empowerment and claimed that “clan control is often essential for
complex multi-stakeholder project success” (p. 577). Their literature thoroughly discusses the
positives and negatives of clan control when operating explicitly and the steps to bring
congruency to clan and organizational goals. Where this study extends the literature is in
addressing the impact of a clan whose goals have fallen out of congruence with the organization
and which then proceeds to operate in a sub rosa fashion within the formal hierarchy. While
clans are remarkably adaptive (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983), the impact of the campaign plan as a
strategic initiative to reinvigorate Mw by teaching at the tacit level threatened the status quo and
its clan members’ professional reputations. At this point, the clan and the organization
experienced divergent and incongruent goals and began to operate sub rosa. The result was an
organization that appeared mired in a status quo that was insufficient for the mission to
reinvigorate Mw.
V.3

Contributions to Practice

This study focused on describing and explaining MCTOG’s attempt and failure to sufficiently
implement a strategic initiative to achieve a desired outcome. Regardless of business or conflict
domains, the findings in this study are transferable to any military or non-military organization
(Augier et al., 2014; Tinoco & Arnaud, 2013). This study may benefit and inform managers and
leaders who face the need to implement a strategic initiative to adapt to a dynamic and contested
environment in two ways. The first potential benefit is taking a deliberate approach to
understanding one’s organizational learning system and recognizing it as a competitive
advantage (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; March, 1991a; Teece et al., 1997). The second potential benefit
is understanding that strategic initiatives that upset the status quo may foment sub rosa clan
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activity incongruent with organizational goals. These clan activities will hamper the strategic
change initiative from within, create turmoil, and result in the loss of time and committed
resources.
Focusing for a moment on specific contributions to practice in a military organization, let
us consider the strategic initiative in question, the MCTOG 2017-2027 Campaign Plan. This
document articulated a 10-year vision that would alter how the organization would conduct
business internally, its role in the larger community of interest, and its relationships with external
stakeholders. It held the potential to create significant and positive gains for the institution it
served. Understanding and explaining why a “say-do-gap” existed between the espoused theory
and theory-in-use is not a trivial matter—in fact, it is imperative to the change process, as blood
and treasure are at stake in the event of war (Davidson, 2010; Kelly, 2008; Shultz, 2012). To
open the aperture of this study, let us consider the contributions to practice in a non-military
organization. Whether a commercial enterprise, public service, or non-profit, any organization
attempting to adapt to a dynamic or contested environment can benefit from this research. Often,
when significant adaptation to a dynamic environment is required, it involves strategic changes
to how the organization does business, its relationships, and its commitment of resources to a
particular goal (Shivakumar, 2014). The prudent manager and leader should understand how an
extant organizational learning system may influence their strategic initiatives and dynamics
within their organization.
The data coding process revealed five phenomena operating within MCTOG that, when
viewed through the theoretical lens of ToA (Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1978, 1996), produced a
framework of five explanatory frames. Each explanatory frame carried with it consequences to
organizational learning as detailed in the previous chapter. Additional insight for each
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explanatory frame is noted below, along with recommended corrective interventions that
managers and leaders may wish to consider.
V.3.1 Explanatory Frame 1: Uncertainty in a Hybrid Organization
MCTOG’s personnel composition created a dynamic of external pressures influencing internal
priorities that resulted in members feeling pulled in many directions. MCTOG was also
unusually top-heavy in rank due to the mid-grade ranks of the students and the presence of GS
civilian co-workers, an absolute novelty for many Marines. Such a high density of senior
Marines and the presence of GS civilians, often in senior- or middle-management positions,
disrupted the normal pecking order to which military members are accustomed. What became
apparent in the study was that MCTOG members had not been formally informed or socialized
to the new reality of their role in MCTOG. Socialization instead transpired informally and took
on as many forms as there were members.
In many cases, the vacuum of socialization to MCTOG was filled by the SQ clan. The
data revealed a common theme of not knowing the corporate identity of MCTOG. The campaign
plan addressed MCTOG’s mission as a schoolhouse and COE and the dynamic space it occupied
astride institutional tension. However, the lack of engagement with the campaign plan and the
negative socialization exhibited by the SQ clan sustained and perpetuated the uncertainty
surrounding MCTOG’s identity.
Potential Corrective Interventions: The uncertainty induced by a lack of formal
socialization to this hybrid organization produced a dislocation of expectation for members,
which induced an ill-defined sense of purpose across the organization and resulted in defensive
routines to protect reputations. Members' defensive routines were intended to reduce the
potential for conflict and embarrassment and to “just survive this tour.” The defensive routines
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also restricted communications into silos with little cross-talk, underwhelming after-action
reviews, and the avoidance of critical conversations, resulting in superficial learning (Popper &
Lipshitz, 1998). The weight of uncertainty alone created by the absence of a formal socialization
process reinforced the elements of a Model I learning organization system.
A formal socialization process for all incoming members that leverages the formal
authority of MCTOG senior management will reduce uncertainty and provide legitimacy to a
new expectation and set norms and assumptions with a level of intentionality. While formal
socialization alone will not turn a Model I single-loop organizational learning system into a
Model II organizational learning system, it will reduce uncertainty by assuring members of their
role within the organization and the goals of the organization. Additionally, a clan operating
explicitly, and with goals generally congruent with the organization, can be a powerful ally to
management. These clans, when enabled by resources and the legitimate authority of the senior
management, can establish positive behaviors favorable to the organizations’ strategic initiative.
V.3.2 Explanatory Frame 2: Mw and Functional Illiteracy
The data show that among the MCTOG faculty and staff, the knowledge and understanding of
Mw and commitment to teaching Mw doctrine was an espoused theory only. The combination of
a significant level of Mw functional illiteracy, combined with a campaign plan that emphasized
teaching Mw at the tacit end of the spectrum, presented a threat to faculty. Faculty seeking to
preserve their professional reputations created an array of defensive reasoning for not teaching
Mw at the tacit level. Over time, the defensive reasoning produced a condition of “skilled
incompetence” among instructors.
The “skilled incompetence” displayed by faculty was enabled by a condition of “skilled
unawareness” displayed by senior management to avoid the difficult work and take the apparent
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but unpopular remedy of a mandatory, formal, and progressive instructor development plan. The
default action instead relied on the autodidact faculty members to perform the bulk of tacit-level
instruction. Lacking sufficient knowledge and competency in Mw among the faculty was
certainly a hindrance to reinvigorating Mw. Moreover, the combination of skilled incompetence
of middle management and skilled unawareness of senior management ensured a Model I singleloop organizational learning system would persist despite the Model II aspirations noted in the
campaign plan.
Potential Corrective Interventions: It is axiomatic that a formal instructor development
program in Mw would be a significant remedy to the issue experienced at MCTOG. The large
issue is, for managers at any organization, to not presume the competence of its members in core
functions. To do so is an act of omission that hinders organizational learning by placing members
in the position of suppressing defects in their preparedness with Model I behaviors. If members
are presumed competent and are asked to perform a task that exceeds their abilities, there are
very good reasons members will develop an array of defensive routines to camouflage their
shortcomings to avoid embarrassment and damage to their reputation. Managers initiating a
strategic initiative should consider conducting an intervention that sets a non-threatening
expectation of transparent competency and provides a path to achieve said competency. Doing so
will likely reduce the reliance on defensive routines to hide a deficiency in skill and set the
conditions for a Model II learning system.
V.3.3 Explanatory Frame 3: The Campaign Plan Gets a Damn Good Ignoring
The MCTOG campaign plan was a strategic document meant to serve as an intervention to
stimulate the adaptive change necessary to realize its role and reinvigorate Mw. However, it also
represented a new espoused theory for the organization impacting approaches in instruction,
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organizational structure, and responsibilities. The new espoused theory was injected into the
MCTOG dynamics and represented a direct threat to the status quo, a Model I theory in practice.
Combined with the uncertainty extending from a lack of intentional socialization and an
insufficient capacity to teach Mw, the campaign plan encountered multiple Model I behavior
defensive routines—namely avoidance, inertia, and indifference—at the individual and group
levels, which ensured the campaign plan went exactly nowhere.
Potential Corrective Interventions: Managers attempting to implement a strategic
initiative should consider the impact on the current status quo theory-in-use. Even if a strategic
initiative is specifically intended to disrupt the status quo, one should understand a sub rosa
clan’s potential consequences to organizational learning and incidental development.
V.3.4 Explanatory Frame 4: Lions Living as Lambs
MCTOG is a well-led organization with active senior management, and the workforce is
comprised of intelligent, competent Marines and GS employees, most of whom had served as
active duty Marines. Nearly all participants had served operationally overseas and had been in
harm's way for one or several combat tours. Given this picture of MCTOG and its members, it
was surprising to me that the data revealed fear, specifically “fear of looking bad,” as one of the
most dominant themes. The socialization of Marines upon entry into the service is intense and
comprehensive. Marines are indelibly stamped with the Marine Corps core values of “honor,
courage, commitment” and the Marine Corps ethos of martial prowess, tenacity, “can-do”
obedience, and subordinating oneself to the good of the unit and mission. A Marine’s personal
reputation is built upon those core values and ethos. The Marine Corps is also the smallest of the
services, and one's reputation is not only lasting, but it precedes them a shot to their next duty
station. Protecting reputation is important.
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The campaign plan required teaching Mw at the tacit level and required a level of Mw
competency that most of the faculty did not possess. The prospect of trying to teach Mw at the
tacit level with insufficient literacy in Mw posed a direct threat to those instructors’ reputations
for martial prowess. In their study, Staw et al. (1981) examined how, in the presence of threat
and fear, individuals, groups, and organizations will respond with rigidity. Threat and fear
produce"…a reliance on a tried and true mode of operating. As a result, threat is often more
associated with inertia, protection of the status quo, and sometimes inaction – the deer in the
headlights syndrome" (Ancona, 2009, p. 12). Threat and fear induced by the campaign plan
manifested within MCTOG as defensive routines that locked in a Model I single-loop learning
system. The prospect of executing the campaign plan and teaching Mw at the tacit level
threatened the professional reputation and, therefore, the careers of the majority of the faculty.
The fear of looking bad induced Model I behaviors at the individual and group levels to maintain
the status quo and effectively counter senior managements’ attempts to engage in Model II
double-loop organizational learning.
Potential Corrective Interventions: Managers seeking to install a strategic initiative
should carefully consider how the initiative will impact the members of the organization.
Understanding what elements of a strategic initiative may be perceived as a threat and what
elements may create uncertainty among the workforce is the first step. Proactively, preemptively,
and explicitly addressing threat perceptions and uncertainty through clarity, consistency, and
connection in their communications will help managers achieve the organization’s goals. Clarity
of communication requires a dialogue that ensures the message and expectations are not
ambiguous or vague and that understanding is positively confirmed. Consistency of management
actions and behaviors refers to the golden rule that actions speak louder than words. Managers
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and leaders must ensure there is not a “say-do-gap” between their words and deeds. Finally,
managers and leaders must work to establish a connection between the organizations’ goals and
the goals of its members to allow a congruency among them to develop. This requires a great
deal of effort. Clarity of expectations and providing a pathway to achieve the skills to function
within a new system will reduce the fear of looking bad across an organization. Managers and
leaders need to see that clarity, consistency, and connection requires the necessary spadework to
engage in Model II double-loop organizational learning.
V.3.5 Explanatory Frame 5: Sub Rosa Clan and Control to Maintain Status Quo
The literature concerning clan behavior within organizations mainly portrays clans as operating
explicitly and in some form of congruence with the organization it is in. The findings of this
study demonstrate the opposite. The data revealed the surprising existence of a sub rosa SQ clan
operating within the hierarchical structure and counter to the organizations’ goals of
implementing the campaign plan. The actions of the SQ clan contributed to the ineffective
implementation of the plan and, ultimately, the efforts to reinvigorate Mw.
It is not the intent of this study to paint the SQ clan as the villain of the story. The SQ
clan did exert informal control in the form of Model I behaviors to counter senior managements’
attempts to implement the plan. However, in many ways, the SQ clan was responding to the
uncertainty and fear induced by the insufficiently communicated campaign plan and was
protecting its members from looking bad. The SQ clan reacted to the organization's failure to
provide clarity, consistency, and connection of purpose and provide a path to goal congruence
between the SQ clan and the organization. The impact of informal SQ clan control resulted in not
only the failed implementation of the campaign plan, but it also ensured through censure of its
members, that learning would remain superficial and rooted in rote memorization of the
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processes and procedures.
The attempt to install a new espoused theory (Mw/campaign plan) was senior
management's bid for Model II double-loop organizational learning. The unintended outcome
was that the new espoused theory created ambiguity, uncertainty, and fear and threatened the
status quo. The response was the rise of the SQ clan—those who maintained the status quo
through Model I behaviors and informal clan control. These conditions resulted in an
undiscussable détente between the skilled incompetence of the SQ clan and the skilled
unawareness of the senior management, ultimately preserving a Model I single-loop learning
system and the status quo.
Potential Corrective Interventions: Informal clan control and formal hierarchal control
need not operate exclusively, as clans and organizational hierarchies inside of MCTOG can work
through common cause to achieve goal congruence. Hierarchical organizations typically possess
significant influence, authority, and resources that may be applied to influence clans and shape
congruency between clan and organizational goals. Managers and leaders can proactively and
preemptively shape clan behaviors through the “clarity, consistency, and connection” spadework
addressed previously. However, before a common cause may be achieved, managers must first
be aware of the clan’s presence, whether explicit or sub rosa, and they must be aware of the
clan's goals. Once managers have diagramed the internal clan structure, they may thoughtfully
employ their legitimate control, influence, and resources to enable informal clan control that is a
common cause with the organization.
When management lacks the legitimacy to impose control, the common cause may be
achieved by empowering the clan to legitimize the message. What was discovered in the case of
MCTOG was the need to ‘flip’ a sub rosa clan to achieve congruency between clan and
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organizational goals. Flipping a clan that harbors goals incongruent with the organizations’ goals
requires a Damascene conversion of the existing clan leader. Such a leader, whom already
possesses sufficient social capital to be influential within the organization, may potentially be
‘flipped’ through thoughtful, empathetic, and transparent dialogue with senior management.
Such an engagement can bring clan and organizational goals into congruence. Once congruence
is achieved the clan leader may operate explicitly and as a sort of Apostle Paul, who then carries
the message of the new espoused theory to the clan. Alternatively, the organization may enable
an outsider with sufficient social capital to make the clans’ activities explicit and work to gain
congruency of goals. With congruency of goals, the reasons for sub rosa activity are known in
advance and uncertainty and fear are neutralized. The spadework for a Model II organizational
learning system may now begin.
V.4

Limitations

The Marine Corps is a 185,000-person strong, globally distributed organization. This study is
limited to one organization within that structure, and admittedly a small one. This fact is
mitigated by selecting an organization that is situated at the nexus of the major elements inside of
the Marine Corps. The Fleet Marine Force and the supporting establishments each have a stake
in the MCTOG mission. Additionally, MCTOG was one of the few organizations to aggressively
pursue the call to reinvigorate Mw and was uniquely situated as a schoolhouse and COE to effect
that change. Members of MCTOG are drawn from both major elements and include officers and
enlisted Marines who possess backgrounds in ground combat, combat support, combat service
support, as well as aviation. This diversity of rank and occupational specialties, while not fully
complete, provides a cross-sectional representation of the Marine Corps. The transferability of
this study to the rest of the Marine Corps is not universal, however. Operational units and
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functional areas of the supporting establishment will not find as much utility as will
organizations within the TECOM training and education continuum. That said, any organization
seeking to effect change through a strategic initiative or struggling in the midst of one could use
the explanatory framework findings of this study to examine their organizational learning
system.
This study was a cross-sectional case study conducted in situ and therefore captures a
snapshot in time of a very dynamic organization. If this study were conducted again today, many
of the findings would be different. Some of the differences would likely be a result of this study's
engaged scholarship approach. I partnered closely with the Commanding Officer of MCTOG in
the co-production of knowledge by sharing analytical memos and the interim case summary. In
some instances, the Commanding Officer acted on the real-time disclosure of the research
findings. Specifically, the power in naming a hidden and complex dynamic appropriately and
effectively prompted the formalized and mandated instructor development program, with the
Commanding Officer giving full-throttle support.
One challenge of case studies is to recruit participants with enough diversity to ensure a
complete view from several aspects within the Marine Corps. This challenge was mitigated by
recruiting participants who were at the beginning, middle, and end of their tours. Additionally,
there was a proportional representation among uniformed military, both officer and enlisted, and
GS employees with representation among senior management, middle management, and the
instructor cadre. All participants were generous with their time. They were open, honest, and
eager to participate.
Self-reported data from interviews and focus groups may threaten the data validity, and
participant observation is subject to researcher bias (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). These issues
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were mitigated through triangularization of interviews, focus groups, participant/observer
activity in workshops and meetings, and direct observations. These methods allowed me to check
participants’ self-reported data against actual behavior and other participants’ comments. Having
the time to thoroughly absorb the data provided insight into participant agendas, attempts at
deception, and to check statements against facts and secondary evidence.
V.5

Future Research

The data show where Model II double-loop learning was attempted at MCTOG, but failed to take
root, due to an overwhelming presence of inhibiting Model I behaviors in the organization.
MCTOG’s senior management exhibited several attempts of Model II double-loop learning by
soliciting input on the campaign plan from its members and its attempts to engage at two
leadership offsite events. Many participants received these Model II overtures enthusiastically,
yet they were suppressed by SQ clan informal control, suggesting that an organizational learning
system may not be monolithic when an organization possesses one particular learning system at
the exclusion of the other. Future research could investigate the presence of both Model I and
Model II organizational learning systems and the relational dynamics that enable one over the
other. As the presence of a sub rosa clan operating within the hierarchal structure and at a
counter-purpose with senior management was as a surprise, future research could be conducted
to help managers and leaders diagnose clan presence and diagram the boundaries of informal
clan control, allowing organizational influencers to conduct more precise and mindful
interventions in enabling positive clan attributes and inhibiting negative clan attributes.
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VI

CONCLUSION

Organizations invest billions and risk their very existence in attempts to implement change
through strategic initiatives. Managers who understand their organizational learning systems and
how those systems and people will respond to changes in the status quo will make better
informed decisions regarding implementation. This study captures the story of one organization's
attempt and failure to sufficiently implement a strategic initiative. This story may be broadly
fitted to any organization seeking the adaptive change necessary to succeed in the dynamic and
contested environments of business or conflict. The strategic initiative, in the form of a campaign
plan, was a 10-year vision that would alter how the organization would conduct business
internally, its role in the larger community of interest, and its relationships with external
stakeholders and held the potential to create significant and positive gains for the institution it
served. The dynamics of an SQ clan operating sub rosa within the hierarchical structure of
MCTOG exerted informal clan control that countered senior management implementation
efforts. The SQ clan consisted of middle management and those with greater time in the
organization and was primarily concerned with maintaining the status quo and their individual
reputations. The SQ clan unconsciously acted with fear-inspired defensive routines establishing
and sustaining a Model I organizational learning environment that muted the more junior and
less tenured members through censure and, in effect, blunted the MCTOG senior management’s
efforts at change. The result was the campaign plan going absolutely nowhere.
This study was an engaged scholarship effort and offered a penetrating look into the
subtle, yet impactful interplay between organizational learning and control theory. The interplay
between these two social phenomena ultimately muted the organization’s effort to implement a
strategic initiative. The explanatory framework provided a structure and lexicon to a set of
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unstructured, often hidden, and nameless dynamics at work within an organization. Also
revealed was how the SQ clan, while acting without nefarious intent, responded to organizational
uncertainty and employed its collective social capital in the form of middle management
positions, seniority and an array of Model I defensive routines to enforce status quo norms.
Ultimately, the actions of the SQ served as the bêtes noires to senior management attempts to
engage the in the Model II organizational learning activities necessary to implement the strategic
initiative and reinvigorate Mw.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Interview Protocol
Dissertation Research
BP McCoy
Georgia State University
______________________________________________________________________________
______
Participant # ______
Interviewer Name: BP McCoy
Date of Interview:
Time Interview Started:
Time Interview Concluded:
Location of Interview:
Length of Service:
Length of Time at MCTOG:
Rank/Rate:
Assigned Working Group:

______________________________________________________________________________
Instructions: The interviewer will ask the numbered interview questions. At their discretion, the
interviewer will use the lettered questions as probes to elicit data-rich, narrative responses. As a
semi-structured interview, the interviewer should ask additional follow-up questions beyond this
protocol in order to clarify the participant’s response or probe further into the qualitative data
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provided in the open-ended responses.
Note that special instructions are in italics and should not be read aloud. The interviews are
audio-recorded, in order for the interviewer to later analyze the verbatim interview responses.
Throughout the course of the interview, the interviewer should record, in writing, nonverbal
communication as it is observed or immediately following the interview.
______________________________________________________________________________

Thank you for meeting with me today and participating in this research study. My research
involves organizational, philosophies, how people interact within organizations, and how
organizations learn. I will ask you broad questions about what it’s like to work here in order to
get a sense of the organization’s norms, commonly held assumptions, and the ways people
interact. Also, thank you for signing the informed consent. Do you have any questions about it or
the study in general before we get started?
I appreciate the time you’ve agreed to commit, so I’ll set a timer to ensure we do not exceed the
agreed-upon 90 minutes. As mentioned in the informed consent, I will be recording this
interview so that I may have a verbatim transcript and capture everything accurately. Is this still
ok with you?
The interviewer should ensure the participant gives a clear response.
As detailed in the informed consent form, the transcript will not contain any information that
could identify you, and your comments will be assigned a randomly generated code, such as
“Participant #XX.”
I am the lone investigator on this study project and commit to preserving confidentiality for you
and all other participants. In the interest of confidentiality for you and all those involved and not
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involved in this study, I must remind you to not use the names, initials, rank, or other identifying
information of other people in the course of our interview. Do you have any questions?
______________________________________________________________________________
_
This is a semi-structured interview, there are no right or wrong answers, so please answer frankly.
Questions Regarding Maneuver Warfare and Learning:
1. How would you describe Maneuver Warfare in practice? What does it look like?
a. What does it look like operationally?
b. What does it look like in garrison or in the schoolhouse?
c. How are the tenants of Maneuver Warfare applied at MCTOG?
d. What is the role of risk in Maneuver Warfare?
e. Is risk rewarded? Under what circumstances?
2. Given MCTOG’s mission as both a schoolhouse and a center of excellence and the
aspirations of the campaign plan, in which areas does the organization need to excel?
a. In other words, given MCTOG’s mission and goals, what do you need to be really
good at to succeed, and what does the organization need to learn in order to
succeed?
3. In terms of learning, what new insights and behaviors are required at the individual level
in this command to achieve the goals of the campaign plan?
4. In terms of learning, what new insights and behaviors are required and the group or
community level to achieve the campaign plan?
5. Given the required insights and behaviors identified for the individual, groups, and
organizational levels, how can MCTOG facilitate that learning?
a. Is the knowledge MCTOG is seeking to develop more explicit or tacit in nature?
b. How does that type of explicit knowledge development shape your learning
approach?
c. How does that type of tacit knowledge development shape your learning
approach?
d. How does learning happen now?
e. How do you go about your job as it applies to facilitating learning?
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6. What are your underlying assumptions about the complexity and adaptability of the
environment here at MCTOG?
a. Internal complexity and adaptability?
b. External complexity and adaptability?
7. What mental models or framework do you use to guide your decisions?
8. How do these assumptions influence our learning styles?
9. How do we test the viability of our assumptions and approaches?
10. Given MCTOGs agenda, what’s the required speed, depth, and breadth of the learning
required to achieve the goals of the campaign plan?
a. How can MCTOG support the transfer of learning throughout the organization?
Questions Regarding Organizational Norms, Culture, and Learning:
11. What is it like to work here?
a. How does everyone get along here?
b. What is the interaction like?
c. What are the unwritten rules here about how things get done around here?
d. How well do people work as a team?
e. At MCTOG, how does the faculty learn?
f. At MCTOG how does the staff learn?
12. What happens when there is disagreement?
a. How do members communicate during disagreement?
b. When there is disagreement, what is the atmosphere like?
c. Are there subjects that are touchy or to be avoided?
d. When members disagree, how is your work affected?
13. In what ways is the following statement accurate or inaccurate? “At MCTOG, my talents
and thinking is valued.”
a. What does “my talents and thinking are valued” look like?
b. Do you agree or disagree with this statement? “When members at MCTOG have a
difference of opinion there is frank and professional discussion about it.”
c. What does the idea of an “frank and professional discussion” look like for you?
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14. When conflicts occur at MCTOG, how is that conflict resolved?
a. What does the idea of “resolving conflict” look like for you?
15. In what ways is the following statement accurate or inaccurate? “When people disagree at
MCTOG, it is resolved and the organization learns and makes improvements.”
a. What does the concept of “organizational learning” look like for you at MCTOG?
16. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? “I trust those I work with here
at MCTOG.”
a. What does the concept of “trust” look like for you here at MCTOG?
17. Do you have anything else to share with me about the MCTOG culture or the way things
get done or how members conduct themselves?
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Appendix B: Government Service Employee Focus Group Protocol
______________________________________________________________________________
Participant Codes:

Interviewer Name:

Date of Focus Group:

Time Focus Group Started:

Time Focus Group Concluded:

Location of Focus Group Discussion:

______________________________________________________________________________
Instructions: Gather a group of government service employee staff -members to form a focus
group. Ask the questions to the group.
Note that special instructions are noted in italics and should not be read aloud. The focus group
will not be audio-recorded. The interviewer should record, in writing, both verbal and nonverbal communication as it is observed during the focus group.
______________________________________________________________________________
Introduction: Thank you for meeting with me today and participating in this focus group. My
research involves how people interact within organizations and how organizations learn. During
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this focus group, I will ask you questions as a group about the learning environment.

Focus Group Questions

Interviewer Observations on Qualitative Responses
from Participants

1. How do people learn on the job at
MCTOG?
2. In what ways does MCTOG provide
(or fail to provide) a supportive learning
environment?
3. In what ways does the leadership at
MCTOG promote (or fail to promote)
learning by welcoming input and
listening?
4. In what ways does MCTOG provide
(or fail to provide) the opportunity to
learn as you work by experimenting and
sharing ideas with each other?
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Appendix C: Uniformed Military Focus Group Protocol
Participant Name:

Interviewer Name:

Date of Focus Group:

Time Focus Group Started:

Time Focus Group Concluded:
______________________________________________________________________________
Instructions: Gather a group of uniformed faculty members to form a focus group. Ask the
questions to the group.
Note that special instructions are noted in italics and should not be read aloud. The focus group
will not be audio-recorded. The interviewer should record, in writing, both verbal and nonverbal communication as it is observed during the focus group.
______________________________________________________________________________
Introduction: Thank you for meeting with me today and participating in this focus group. My
research involves how people interact within organizations and how organizations learn. During
this focus group, I will ask you questions as a group about the learning environment.

Focus Group Questions

Interviewer Observations on Qualitative Responses from
Participants
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1. How do people learn on the
job at MCTOG?
2. In what ways does MCTOG
provide (or fail to provide) a
supportive learning
environment?
3. In what ways does the
leadership at MCTOG promote
(or fail to promote) learning by
welcoming input and listening?
4. In what ways does MCTOG
provide (or fail to provide) the
opportunity to learn as you work
by experimenting and sharing
ideas with others?
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